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Abstract
There is a considerable amount of heterogeneity in the individual success of workers on the 
labour market. This justifies the existence of social insurance and of redistribution programs. 
However, when investigating these policies, it is essential to take into account the search and 
informational frictions that characterize the labour market.
The different chapters of this thesis all rely on dynamic macroeconomic representation of the 
economy in order to address labour market issues from either a positive or a normative 
perspective. The first chapter characterizes the optimal design of labour market institutions in 
a dynamic search model of the labour market. Particular attention is paid to the interaction 
between the different policy instruments due to the search-induced general equilibrium 
effects. The following chapter investigates, from a positive perspective, the impact of growth 
by creative destruction on the rate of unemployment when on-the-job search is allowed. 
Chapter 3 solves for the optimal provision of disability insurance in a dynamic context with 
imperfectly observable health. Chapter 4 characterizes the optimal redistributive policy with 
an endogenous decision to retire. Finally, the last chapter investigates, theoretically and 
empirically, the long-run interactions between the provision of unemployment insurance and 
the cultural transmission of work ethic.
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Introduction
Most workers only have one job. Labour market outcomes are therefore extremely important 
for the welfare of individuals. To a great extent this justifies the existence of social insurance 
and of redistribution programs. The effectiveness of these policies is heavily influenced by the 
functioning of the labour market. Hence, when analysing these policies, it is crucial to rely on 
realistic representations of the search and informational frictions that characterize the labour 
market.
The different chapters of this thesis all rely on dynamic macroeconomic 
representations of the economy in order to better understand the functioning of the labour 
market and of the corresponding policies. Three chapters address these issues from a 
normative perspective. They are concerned with the optimal design of labour market 
institutions, the optimal provision of disability insurance and the optimal redistributive policy 
with an endogenous decision to retire. Two other chapters adopt a positive perspective. One 
investigates the effect of growth by creative destruction on the rate of unemployment when 
on-the-job search is allowed, while the other investigates how cultural transmission and the 
provision of unemployment insurance are intertwined.
The first chapter, “Optimal Labor Market Policy with Search Frictions and Risk- 
Averse Workers”, focuses specifically on the consequences of search frictions for the 
optimal design of labour market institutions. I jointly derive the optimal level of 
unemployment benefits, employment protection, hiring subsidies and income taxes within a 
Mortensen-Pissarides framework which induces a trade-off between insurance and 
production. My main finding is that, in that context, firing taxes should typically exceed 
hiring subsidies and the difference between the two is sufficiently large to finance a large 
share of the unemployment benefits. Also, while firing taxes are justified to induce employers 
to internalize the social cost of job destruction, they should not be too high as, otherwise, they 
would prevent a desirable reallocation of workers from low to high productivity jobs.
In the context of growth by creative destruction, the reallocation of workers from low 
to high productivity jobs is essential for the economy to take advantage of technological 
progress. A common result in the literature is that growth by creative destruction increases the 
equilibrium rate of unemployment. The second chapter, “Creative Destruction with On-the- 
Job Search”, revisits this conclusion by arguing that creative destruction naturally induces 
workers to engage into on-the-job search. Moreover, with on-the-job search, growth generates 
a direct reallocation of workers from low to high productivity jobs without intervening
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unemployment. As a result, it is shown in a calibrated example that the flow of obsolete jobs 
practically disappears and that the impact of growth on unemployment becomes close to zero.
While a considerable literature has investigated the optimal provision of 
unemployment insurance, there has been relatively little work on the closely related, and 
practically even more important, problem of the optimal provision of disability insurance. 
Hence, in the third chapter, “Optimal Social Security with Imperfect Tagging”, co­
authored with Oliver Denk, we characterize the optimal provision of insurance against the risk 
of permanent disability in a dynamic setup where health is imperfectly observable by the 
government. We therefore allow for a more realistic informational friction where the 
government has some information on the health status of individuals but nevertheless makes 
errors, i.e. awards disability status to some able workers (type II error) and rejects some truly 
disabled individuals (type I error).
The macro-labour literature has recently provided new insights about the dynamic 
nature of workers’ labour supply problem with a participation margin (see, e.g., Mulligan 
2001, Ljungqvist Sargent 2006, Prescott Rogerson Wallenius 2009). Thus, in the presence of 
a fixed cost of working, workers can convexify their labour supply problem by alternating 
spells of employment and leisure, while smoothing their consumption over time with a risk­
free asset. Thus, in the fourth chapter, “Dynamic Optimal Redistributive Taxation with 
Endogenous Retirement”, I characterize the optimal redistributive policy in a dynamic setup 
where a fixed cost of working induces agents to make a retirement decision. I show that 
redistribution should be done within a Social Security system which induces higher 
productivity workers to retire later than others. This contrasts with the corresponding static 
analysis with a participation margin where the optimal policy is to implement a tax credit, 
such as the EITC in the US (cf. Saez 2002).
The nature of optimal policies differs across countries due to different preferences. For 
instance, it is commonly argued that the magnitude of the moral hazard problem induced by 
unemployment insurance is larger in Mediterranean countries than in Scandinavia. However, 
conversely, in the very long run preferences could also be affected by policies. To capture this 
idea, the key insight, initially emphasized by Bisin and Verdier (2001), is that, rather than 
being something spontaneous, the transmission of preferences from one generation to the next 
results from an optimizing behaviour of parents who weigh the benefits and costs of 
transmitting desirable values to their children. In the final chapter, “Unemployment 
Insurance and Cultural Transmission: Theory & Application to European 
Unemployment”, I rely on a Bisin Verdier framework and argue that the provision of social 
insurance could be detrimental to the work ethic of a population. Supportive evidence is 
provided in the European context.
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productive. Hence, a typical concern is that government interventions aimed at improv­
ing insurance, such as the provision of unemployment benefits or employment protection, 
might also have adverse consequences for aggregate production.
Search frictions are a major source of the trade-off between insurance and production1 
since they generate some unemployment and they prevent an immediate reallocation of 
workers from low to high productivity jobs. A macroeconomic framework is required to 
analyze this trade-off as search frictions induce non-trivia! general equilibrium effects on 
job creation and job destruction which axe key to the reallocation process of workers. 
Furthermore, wages could be affected by macroeconomic variables such as the expected 
length of an unemployment spell. These genera! equilibrium effects imply that different 
labor market policy instruments do interact among each other. They therefore jointly 
influence the provision of insurance and the efficiency of production.
A search model a, la Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) with risk-averse workers captures all 
the above features and allows for a joint analysis of the different policy instruments. In 
this chapter, I therefore rely on such a framework to determine the main characteristics 
of an optimal labor market policy. Employment protection takes the form of layoff taxes. 
The government can also give hiring subsidies to encourage job creation. The generosity 
of unemployment insurance is determined by the level of unemployment benefits. Payroll 
taxes could be used to raise revenue. If they happen to take negative values, payroll taxes 
could also be seen as employment subsidies. Importantly, it is assumed throughout, 
as in most of the literature on the topic, that the government is the sole provider of 
unemployment insurance.2
1 begin by deriving the optima! allocation of resources chosen by a planner who wants 
to maximize the welfare of workers subject to matching frictions and to a resource con­
straint. In this idea! setup, full insurance is provided and aggregate output, net of recruit­
ment costs, is maximized. It turns out that this first-best allocation could be implemented 
in a decentralized economy when workers are wage takers. To obtain an efficient rate of 
job destruction, layoff taxes should induce firms to internalize the social costs and benefits 
of dismissing a worker. The costs consist of the unemployment benefits that will need to 
be paid and of the forgone payroll taxes; while the benefit corresponds to the value of a 
desirable reallocation of the worker from a low to a high productivity job. Hiring subsidies 
are needed to partially offset the negative impact of layoff taxes on job creation. Finally,
^ h e  other major source of the trade-off is moral hazard which will be allowed towards the end of 
this chapter.
2 The implicit contract literature has argued that risk-neutral firms should be expected to provide 
unemployment benefits to risk-averse workers; see, for instance, Baily (1974a) or Azariadis (1975). How­
ever, in reality, such contracts remain the exception rather than the rule. Thus, although somewhat 
ad-hoc, the assumption that the private market does not provide insurance seems reasonable and has the 
merit of making the analysis transparent. This assumption has nevertheless been relaxed in the optimal 
policy analyses of Fella (2007) and Chetty Saez (2008).
13
and perhaps surprisingly, payroll taxes should optimally be approximately equal to zero. 
Thus, both unemployment benefits and hiring subsidies are almost entirely financed from 
layoff taxes.
I then consider a number of deviations from this first-best benchmark. First, I show 
that additional government expenditures, to provide public goods for instance, should be 
exclusively financed through higher payroll taxes and lower unemployment benefits, even 
if this induces a downward distortion to the participation decision of workers. Layoff taxes 
should therefore be seen as a Pigouvian instrument which corrects for inefficiencies in the 
rate of job destruction, not as a source of revenue to the government. I then turn to the 
possibility of a non-insurable utility cost of unemployment. In this context, it is optimal to 
reduce the rate of unemployment, which acts as a substitute to the provision of insurance 
through unemployment benefits. However, the lower rate of unemployment slows down 
the reallocation of workers and therefore fails to maximize output. This illustrates the 
conceptual distinction between the welfare maximizing optimal rate of unemployment3 
derived in this chapter and the output maximizing rate of unemployment which is central 
to the search-matching literature.
I then rely on numerical simulations to explore the optimal policy when workers have 
some bargaining power. As the provision of insurance tends to be insufficient, the plan­
ner wants to reduce market tightness in order to decrease wages which, by relaxing the 
resource constraint, allows an increase in the level of unemployment benefits. This is 
achieved by setting layoff taxes higher than hiring subsidies in order to discourage the 
entry of firms with a vacant position. I then allow for moral hazard which generates the 
opposite possibility that insurance may be too high, in which case the planner wants to 
increase market tightness. However, the simulations reveal that under-insurance remains 
the main concern whenever workers have substantial bargaining power. Thus, moral 
hazard does not seem to be the most important feature of the fundamental trade-off 
between the provision of insurance and the level of aggregate production. General equi­
librium effects on wages and on job creation and job destruction seem to be at least as 
important.
This chapter is related to the extensive economic literature on optimal labor market 
institutions. The main strand of this literature is on optimal unemployment insurance. In 
their seminal work, Shavell and Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) focused 
on a single unemployment spell and derived the optimal time profile of unemployment 
benefits when moral hazard introduces a trade-off between the provision of insurance 
and incentives to search. By contrast, Baily (1974b) and Chetty (2006) focused on 
the level of benefits, rather than their time profile, in a framework which allows for
3 To the best of my knowledge, there is no other paper which derives such an optimal rate of unem­
ployment properly microfounded in terms of the individual risk-averse preferences of workers.
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multiple spells. Importantly, these contributions assume that unemployment benefits are 
exclusively financed from payroll taxes and abstract from general equilibrium effects.
The literature on employment protection is mostly positive, rather than normative. 
The crux of the academic debate is about the impact of layoff taxes on the level of em­
ployment; with the underlying presumption that layoff taxes are desirable if they decrease 
the number of jobless. Bentolila and Bertola (1990) showed, in a partial equilibrium con­
text, that firing costs have a larger impact on job destruction than on job creation and 
should therefore be beneficial for employment. This conclusion was challenged by the gen­
eral equilibrium analysis with employment lotteries of Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). 
Ljungqvist (2002) showed that, in search models a la Mortensen-Pissarides, layoff costs 
increase employment if initial wages are negotiated before a match is formed, while the 
opposite is true if bargaining only occurs after the match is formed. Importantly, these 
contributions either assume that workers are risk-neutral or that financial markets axe 
complete. Hence, they do not generate any trade-off between insurance and production 
efficiency and cannot give sensible measures of the welfare implications of layoff taxes. 
These analyses are therefore hardly informative about the optimal level of employment 
protection.
While most papers ignore the interaction between different policy instruments, there 
are two important exceptions which are closely related to this work. First, Mortensen 
and Pissarides (2003)4 analyze labor market policies in a dynamic search model with risk- 
neutral workers. Since there is no motive for insurance, the best that the government 
can do is to maximize output net of recruitment costs. If the Hosios (1990) condition 
holds, i.e. the bargaining power of workers is equal to the elasticity of the matching 
function, then it is optimal for the government not to intervene. While, if it does not hold, 
policy parameters should only be used to correct for the resulting search externalities. 
An important insight is that the introduction of unemployment benefits has a positive 
impact on wages and, therefore, increases job destruction. This should be offset by higher 
layoff taxes. Hiring subsidies should also be increased such as to leave the rate of job 
creation unchanged. However, with risk-neutral workers, there is no trade-off between 
insurance and production.
The second closely related paper is Blanchard Tirole (2008) which proposes a joint 
derivation of optimal unemployment insurance and employment protection in a static 
context with risk-averse workers. They show in a benchmark model, which is the static 
counterpart to the first-best policy derived in this chapter, that unemployment benefits 
should be entirely financed from layoff taxes, rather than payroll taxes, in order to induce 
firms to internalize the cost of unemployment.5 However, their static framework ignores
4See also Mortensen Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides (2000, chapter 9).
5This policy, often referred to as "experience rating", was originally proposed by Feldstein (1976).
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the adverse effect of layoff taxes on job creation. In fact, as I shall show, in a dynamic 
context the share of unemployment benefits financed from payroll taxes is determined by 
the job creation side of the economy, which is absent from their framework. Also, and 
more fundamentally, a static approach entails an entirely negative view of unemployment; 
whereas in a dynamic setting an unemployed worker is a useful input in the matching 
process. In fact, to maximize output in an economy without governmental intervention, 
the Hosios condition actually maximizes the rate of job destruction!
Finally, this chapter is also related to a small literature on policy analyses within 
dynamic search models of the labor market with risk-averse workers. Cahuc Lehmann 
(2000), Fredriksson Holmlund (2001) and Lehmann van der Linden (2007) focus on the 
optimal provision of unemployment insurance under moral hazard. All three contributions 
pay particular attention to the general equilibrium effects of unemployment insurance and 
to their consequences for the overall provision of insurance. Interactions with layoff taxes 
are nevertheless ignored.
Acemoglu Shimer (1999, 2000) showed, in the context of directed search with risk- 
averse workers, that higher unemployment benefits could improve the quality, and pro­
ductivity, of job-worker matches. By contrast, in this chapter, match quality is unrelated 
to the length of unemployment. Alavarez Veracierto (2000, 2001) rely on calibrated search 
models with risk-averse workers to investigate the effects of different labor market poli­
cies. However, their approach is entirely positive and does not attempt to characterize 
optimal policies.6
In a closely related chapter, Coles and Masters (2006) show that there is some comple­
mentarity between the provision of unemployment insurance and that of hiring subsidies. 
The idea is that, by boosting the job creation rate, subsidies exert a downward pressure 
on unemployment and, hence, on the cost of providing unemployment insurance. How­
ever, their model does not have an endogenous job destruction margin and, therefore, 
cannot be used to determine the optimal level of employment protection.
This chapter begins, in section two, with a brief reminder of the key features of 
the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) framework, on which all subsequent work relies. In the 
following section, I derive the first-best policy, which then serves as a benchmark. Section 
four investigates how government expenditures should be financed when payroll taxes and 
layoff taxes are both potential sources of revenue. I then turn to the consequences of a 
non-insurable utility cost of unemployment. Section six relies on numerical simulations to 
investigate optimal policies when workers have some bargaining power. Finally, the last
Other related contributions on the topic, and mostly in favor of such policy, include Topel Welch (1980), 
Topel (1983), Wang Williamson (2002), Cahuc Malherbet (2004), Mongrain Roberts (2005), Cahuc 
Zylberberg (2008) and L’Haridon Malherbet (2009).
6Ljungqvist Sargent (2008) also investigate the interactions between unemployment insurance and 
employment protection in a positive analysis of the labor market, but with risk-neutral workers.
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section deals with the consequences of moral hazard. This chapter ends with a conclusion.
2 Search Model
Before solving for optimal policies, it is necessary to describe the main characteristics 
of the dynamic search model on which all subsequent work relies. The structure of the 
economy corresponds to the standard Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) framework. Produc­
tion requires that vacant jobs and unemployed workers get matched, which occur at rate:
m — m(u, u), (1)
where u stands for the number of unemployed and v for that of vacancies. For simplicity, 
each firm can employ, at most, one worker and the mass of workers is normalized to 
one, so that u also stands for the rate of unemployment. The matching function m  is 
increasing in both arguments, exhibits decreasing marginal product to each input and 
satisfies constant returns to scale. It follows from this last assumption that the key 
parameter of interest, which summarizes labor market conditions, is market tightness 
defined as the ratio of vacancies to unemployment, 6 = v/u. The rate at which vacant 
jobs meet unemployed workers is given by:
m (u ,v )  r  t l  i - n i _  „,flN ,2s= m Q , l )  = " » ( ! ,  l )  =q{9),
where q is a decreasing function of 0. Similarly the rate at which unemployed workers 
find jobs is:
-  =  m( 1,0) = 0q(0). (3)u
The elasticity of the matching function, to which I will subsequently refer, is defined as:7
The other main feature of the Mortensen-Pissarides model is that the productivity of 
a match is subject to idiosyncratic shocks. Production starts at maximal productivity, 
normalized to 1. The idea is that recruiting firms are prosperous and initially provide 
their employees with the best available technology.8 At Poisson rate A, the match is 
hit and a new productivity x G [V>, 1] is randomly drawn from c.d.f. G{x). The match
7Note that rj is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to the number of unemployed, i.e. 
^ =  mlJu' anc* 1 ~  ^ the elasticity with respect to the number of vacancies, i.e. 1 — rj =
8This assumption, which is standard in the search-matching literature, is also made for convenience 
and its importance should not be overstated. Indeed, firms base their recruiting decisions on the expected 
net present value of a new match rather than on its initial productivity.
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dissolves if the new productivity is below a threshold R, to be determined. Additional 
details will be given as the optimal policy is being derived.
3 First-Best Policy
The optimal policy is derived in two steps. First, I characterize the optimal allocation of 
resources chosen by a benevolent social planner. Then, I turn to its implementation in a 
decentralized economy with free entry of risk-neutral firms.
3.1 O ptim al A llocation
The optimal allocation maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function subject to a resource 
constraint and to the search frictions that characterize the labor market. It is therefore 
the solution to the following problem:
poo
max /  e~pt [(1 — u)v(w) +  uv(z +  &)] dt (5)
subject to u = XG(R)(1 — u) — 0q(6)u (6a)
y = 6q{6)u +  A(1 — u) f  sdG(s) — Xy (6b)
Jr
(1 — u)w -bub = y — cOu (6c)
where p stands for the planner’s (or workers’) discount rate, w for the net wage that 
an employee receives, 2  for the value of leisure, b for unemployment benefits, y for the 
aggregate output of the economy and c for the flow cost of posting a vacancy. The in­
stantaneous utility function of risk-averse workers is denoted by9 v(.), which is increasing 
and concave.
The planner’s objective is to maximize intertemporal social welfare, which, follow­
ing a utilitarian criteria, is composed, at each instant, of the instantaneous utility of u 
unemployed and 1 — u employed workers10. The first constraint depicts the dynamics 
of unemployment, driven by the difference between the job destruction flow and the job 
creation flow. A match dissolves when it is hit by an idiosyncratic shock that generates 
a new productivity below the threshold R , which occurs at rate \G (R). This rate of job
9 In the previous section v  denoted the number of vacancies. However, this variable will not appear in 
the rest of the text (except when I define the matching function under moral hazard in the last section 
of the chapter). I focus instead on 6 and u and, where needed, v  is just replaced by 6u.
10 An alternative would be to maximize the weighted average between the expected utility of an em­
ployed and of an unemployed worker. Such objective function would be more appropriate for political 
economy work focusing on the conflict between insiders and outsiders. However, without time discount­
ing, this would be identical to the planner’s objective retained in this chapter.
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destruction applies to the mass 1 — u of existing matches. Job creation is simply equal to 
the rate at which unemployed workers find jobs, 0q(0), multiplied by the mass u of job 
seekers. It should be emphasized that this first constraint captures the fact that even the 
social planner is subject to matching frictions. The second constraint gives the dynamics 
of aggregate output, y. At each instant, 0q{0)u new matches are formed and each of 
these has a productivity of 1. The 1 — u existing jobs are hit at rate A by idiosyncratic 
shocks which destroy their current productivity and replaces it, in case of survival, by 
a randomly drawn number greater or equal to the threshold R. Finally, any feasible 
allocation must satisfy the economy’s resource constraint. The expenses, composed of 
the wages paid to the employed and the benefits paid to the unemployed, cannot exceed 
total output net of the resources allocated to recruitment, which amount to a flow cost c 
paid for each of the 0u vacancies. The planner’s control variables are market tightness 0,
threshold productivity R, net wage w and unemployment benefits b. The state variables
are unemployment u and aggregate output y.
The planner’s problem is straightforward to solve using standard optimal control 
techniques. The first characteristic of the optimal allocation is perfect insurance for 
workers:
w = z + b, (7)
which follows directly from risk aversion, i.e. from the concavity of v(.). This could be 
combined with the resource constraint, (6c), to give the optimal value of w and b:
w = y — c0u +  zu, (8)
b = y — c0u — z(l — u). (9)
Note that perfect insurance necessitates a replacement ratio smaller than one whenever 
the value of leisure, z, is strictly positive. The optimal value of 0 and R  is implicitly 
determined by the following two first-order conditions:
(10>
R=*+T^)*~irrxfca- R>dGM' (11)
where rj(0) denotes the elasticity of the matching function, cf. equation (4). These two 
optimality conditions are exactly identical to the one derived in Pissarides (2000, chapter 
8) for net11 output maximization. This is not surprising as, when nothing prevents the 
provision of full insurance, the best that the planner can do is to maximize output.
11 Under risk neutrality, the optimal policy is to maximize the net present value of the flow of net 
output, where this flow is given by y  — cOu +  uz.
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The first equation, (10), corresponds to optimal job creation. The cost of job creation 
consists of the flow cost of having a vacancy, c, multiplied by the expected time that 
has to be spent before a worker could be found, l/q(Q). The value of a newly created 
match is equal to (1 — R)/{p  +  A). However, optimally, recruitment costs should only 
absorb a fraction 1 — rj(0) of this value, otherwise there is too much job creation and an 
excessive amount of resources is allocated to recruitment. Equation (11) gives optimal 
job destruction. In the static context of Blanchard Tirole (2008), the optimal threshold is 
just equal to the value of leisure, i.e. R = z. Making the model dynamic yields two extra 
terms. First, when a low productivity job is destroyed, the corresponding worker returns 
to unemployment with the hope of finding a new job with productivity 1. To make this 
explicit, the corresponding term of equation (11) could be rewritten, using (10), as:
^  c6 = 05(0)r/(0)1 R
1 -  1/(0) p +  A
=  6 q ( e ) n ~ R_p + A q(8)_ (12)
This says that, once a job is destroyed, an unemployed worker gets matched at rate 6q{6) 
which generates a social value of (1 — R)/{p + A) net of the expected recruitment cost 
c/q(6). In other words, the threshold R  has to be sufficiently high to induce an efficient 
reallocation of workers from low to high productivity jobs. The second additional term 
to the expression for the optimal threshold R  corresponds to the option value of a match. 
Even if current productivity is very low, keeping the match alive preserves the option of 
being hit by an idiosyncratic shock that restores a profitable level of productivity. The 
option value decreases the optimal threshold R.
The optimal allocation of resources chosen, in steady state, by a benevolent social 
planner is characterized by the first-order conditions (7), (10) and (11) together with the 
constraints (6a), (6b) and (6c) with u = y = 0.
3.2 Im plem entation
Having characterized the optimal allocation, I now turn to its implementation in a de­
centralized economy. Four stages of interest could be distinguished.
• Stage 1: The government chooses the level of unemployment benefits b, payroll 
taxes t ,  layoff taxes F  and hiring subsidies H.
• Stage 2: Entrepreneurs decide whether or not to create a firm with a vacant position.
• Stage 3: Once a match occurs, the employer and employee agree on a wage rate.
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• Stage 4: Firms choose a threshold productivity R  below which a match hit by an 
idiosyncratic shock dissolves.
I now proceed by backward induction and start by determining the threshold R  chosen 
by a risk-neutral employer. The asset value of a producing firm with productivity x , J(x), 
solves the following Bellman equation:
rJ{x) = x - ( w  + t)  + A [  J(s)dG(s) -  A G{R)F -  A J{x), (13)
J r .
where r  denotes the interest rate, w the net wage that the worker receives and w +  r  the 
gross wage paid by the employer. Note that, in this framework, the planner’s discount rate 
p does not have to coincide with the economy’s interest rate r. This Bellman equation 
states that, for a firm, the flow return from having a filled job with productivity x is 
equal to the instantaneous surplus it generates to which the possibility of a change in 
productivity should be added. An idiosyncratic shock destroys the value of the firm 
at the current productivity and replaces it by either a corresponding expression, if the 
new productivity is above the threshold, or by the cost of layoff12, if the match is to be 
destroyed. As J(x) is strictly increasing in x, employers’ chosen threshold R  is determined 
by:
J(R)  =  - F .  (14)
This says that, at the threshold, employers are indifferent between closing down and
continuing the relationship. Simple algebra13 on (13) and (14) gives the expression for
the value of R  chosen by firms:
A f 1
R = w + r  — r F    /  (s -  R)dG(s). (15)
r  +  A Jr
The threshold productivity is smaller than the cost of labor because of the firing tax 
and of the option value of continuing the match. Note that, for this to be possible, 
firms must be able to borrow and lend from perfect financial markets, an assumption 
that is maintained throughout this chapter. Equation (15) is our first implementability 
constraint.
Let us now turn to the determination of the wage rate that occurs at Stage 3. The 
formation of a match generates a surplus that needs to be shared between the two parties.
12Throughout this chapter, it is assumed that firms are able to pay the layoff tax. Blanchard and 
Tirole (2008) investigate the consequences of having employers constrained by shallow pockets. See also 
Tirole (2009) for a deeper analysis on the topic which allows for extended liability to third parties.
13An analytic expression for the function J(.) could be obtained by taking the difference between 
equation (13) evaluated at x  and the same equation evaluated at R. This expression for J(.) could then 
be substituted into (13) evaluated at R. Finally, (15) is obtained by plugging (14) in.
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But, from equation (7), optimality requires that the net wage paid to a worker, w, is equal 
to the wage equivalent of being unemployed, z + b. This leads to following lemma:
Lem m a 1 A necessary condition to implement the first-best allocation is that workers 
are wage takers and that all the surplus from matches is captured by firms. This ensures 
that, as desired:
w = z-\-b. (16)
The intuition for this result is straightforward. If workers have some bargaining power, 
they will obtain a mark-up over and above their outside option which is the income 
they get while unemployed. But this prevents the provision of full insurance which is 
a characteristic of a first-best allocation.14 Clearly, with a binding resource constraint 
(6c) and perfect insurance, the optimal values of w and b are still given by (8) and (9), 
respectively.
In the context of this chapter, the requirement that workers have no bargaining power 
could also be seen as part of the optimal policy to be implemented15. For example, 
the labor market could be organized in such a way that firms and workers first meet 
without exchanging any information on the wage rate. Then, firms make a take-it-or- 
leave-it offer to workers. Note that, here, a minimum wage would be detrimental to 
insurance. Excessive monopsony power of firms should rather be dealt with traditional 
policy instruments such as payroll and layoff taxes, hiring subsidies and unemployment 
benefits.16
Finally, the following corollary is an immediate consequence of the above lemma:
Corollary 1 The first-best allocation cannot be implemented when the Hosios condition 
holds, i.e. when the bargaining power of workers is equal the elasticity of the matching 
function r)(0).
The Hosios condition balances search externalities on both sides of the market such that, 
without government intervention, output is maximized. It is, however, inconsistent with 
the provision of perfect insurance. Since the optimal allocation of resources is character­
ized by output maximization, cf. (10) and (11), and workers have zero bargaining power, 
the optimal policy will correct the rates of job creation and job destruction for the failure 
of the Hosios condition to hold.
14It should be noted that, in their benchmark case, Blanchard and Tirole (2008) also assume that the 
bargaining power of workers is nil. Thus, the first-best benchmark derived in this section is a dynamic 
counterpart to theirs.
15 In an environment with Nash bargaining, one solution proposed by Lehmann and van der Linden 
(2007) consists in setting a marginal rate of income taxation equal to 100%.
16See Cahuc Laroque (2009) for a similar argument in a redistributive context.
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Stage 2 is solved by assuming free entry. Vacancies keep being created by entrepre­
neurs until the returns from doing so reduce to zero. More formally, the value of a vacant 
position, V, solves:
rV  = - c  +  q(9) [J{ 1) + H - V ) .  (17)
This states that the return from a vacancy consists of the flow cost of recruitment, c, and 
of the possibility of filling the position at rate q{6) which yields the value of an active 
firm with productivity 1. The employer also qualifies for a hiring subsidy, 77, when he 
hires a worker. Free entry implies:
V = 0. (18)
The amount of job creation could then be determined by plugging (18) into (17) and by 
using the value of J( l )  deduced from (13) and (14). This gives:
— r  = (19)r  +  A q(8)
The left hand side is the value of a new match to a firm, J(l);  while the right hand 
side corresponds to the expected cost of recruiting a worker. Equation (19) is our second 
implementability condition.
At Stage 1, the government needs to choose the optimal policy. The corresponding 
implementability condition is the usual government budget constraint:
(1 -  u ) t  + (1 -  u)\G (R )F  = ub + u0q(9)H. (20)
Revenues consist of payroll taxes paid by employed workers and of layoff taxes applied to 
the job destruction flow; while the expenses are the payment of benefits to the unemployed 
and of hiring subsidies to the flow of newly created jobs.
It is now straightforward to find the optimal policy by matching the implementability 
conditions to the equations that characterize the first-best allocation. More specifically, 
(19) should be combined with (10) and (15) with (11). This gives:
f  — h  =  ■n(e)^ — ^  +  p ~ r 1 ~  R , (21)
'  >  +  A r  +  Ap +  A v '
r F  -  ‘ -  r = & “* R m ‘ ) ' (22)
where 0 and R  are jointly determined by (10) and (11). These are key equations char­
acterizing the optimal policy in the benchmark model. They ensure that the rate of job 
creation and job destruction prevailing in the decentralized economy coincide with the 
planner’s optimum.
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These conditions have a potentially insightful interpretation. Let us start with the 
implementation of the optimal level of job creation, (21). Under free entry, firms should 
only capture a fraction 1 — r](0) of the surplus from a match; otherwise, entry is too high 
and too many resources are allocated to recruitment. However, employers have all the 
bargaining power and this must be offset by setting a firing tax that exceeds the hiring 
subsidy in order to reduce job creation to an efficient level. The second term is just a 
correction in case the planner’s discount rate p differs from the market interest rate r. 
If the planner is more patient than market participants, p < r, then the social value 
of a new match exceeds the private value perceived by entrepreneurs. This problem is 
addressed by raising the hiring subsidy for a given firing tax. Condition, (21), could also 
be seen as a correction for the failure of the Hosios condition to hold. If it did hold, then 
output maximization would only require F = H.
Let us now turn to the interpretation of the equation implementing the optimal level 
of job destruction, (22). As can be seen from (15), a layoff tax only affects the threshold 
R  if firms discount the future, r  > 0. Indeed, any match will eventually be destroyed 
and, hence, by not laying off its worker now, the firm is only postponing the payment of 
the tax. Thus the relevant cost imposed by the layoff tax is rF, rather than just F.
A firm that dismisses its worker imposes a double externality on the financing of 
unemployment insurance. First, the worker will qualify for benefits and, second, he 
will no longer contribute to its funding by paying payroll taxes. The layoff tax should 
therefore be sufficiently high to ensure that employers internalize these effects. This is 
the main message of Blanchard Tirole (2008)17. The additional insight that is obtained 
by extending the analysis to a dynamic context is that there is also a social benefit from 
laying off a worker: it allows a desirable reallocation of this worker from a low to a high 
productivity job. This is captured by the third term of equation (22) which was given 
an intuitive interpretation when the optimal allocation was derived, cf. equation (12). 
This effect reduces the net social cost of dismissal and, hence, the level of the optimal 
layoff tax. Again, from an output maximization perspective, the condition for optimal 
job destruction implicitly corrects for the failure of the Hosios condition to hold. If it did 
hold, then wages would be sufficiently high for this third term to drop out of the equation. 
Finally, if p = r, then the option value of keeping the match alive is properly taken into 
account by firms and therefore does not affect the size of the optimal layoff tax. However, 
a correction is needed if the planner’s discount factor differs from the interest rate. For 
example, if the planner is more patient than entrepreneurs, p < r, then the option value 
is larger for the social planner than for firms and, hence, the layoff tax needs to be raised.
17In fact, in Blanchard Tirole (2008) payroll taxes do not appear as they should optimally be set 
equal to zero. However, Cahuc and Zylberberg (2008), who propose a generalization to the case where 
the government needs to raise taxes on income in order to redistribute wealth across heterogeneous 
individuals, did explicitly have them affecting the level of layoff taxes.
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The level of payroll taxes is simply pinned down by the remaining implementability 
constraint, i.e. by the government budget constraint, (20). Using the fact that, in steady 
state, the job creation flow is equal to the job destruction flow, (1 — u)XG(R) = u9q(9), 
we obtain:
T =  -H— \ b - e q { e ) { F - H ) \ .  (23)1 — U
An important insight from this analysis is that the job destruction side of the economy 
determines the level of layoff taxes, F\ while the job creation side determines the difference 
between layoff taxes and hiring subsidies, F  — H.  Note that this result is fundamentally 
due to the implementability conditions, (15) and (19), and will therefore remain true in 
all extensions of the benchmark model. An important implication, which follows from 
(23), is that the share of unemployment benefits financed from payroll taxes is essentially 
determined from the job creation side of the economy, a margin that is absent from 
Blanchard Tirole (2008).
Further insights on the optimal level of payroll taxes could be gained by replacing 
F  — H  in (23) by its value from (21), which, after some straightforward rearrangement 
using (10), yields:
ur  = 1 — u
b -  6q(0) 1 — R_p + X q{9)_ r +  A p +  A
(24)
The flow of unemployment benefits, 6, constitutes the social cost of having an unemployed 
worker. The second term represents the corresponding social benefit. Indeed, at rate 
6q(9), an unemployed finds a job which generates a social value equal to the expected 
profits from production net of the recruitment costs. If r > p, the value of a match to an 
entrepreneur is smaller than its social value. This should be offset by having sufficiently 
large hiring subsidies. But this is costly to the government and, hence, payroll taxes need 
to be raised accordingly.
Since the optimal rate of unemployment should ensure that the social benefits from 
joblessness is not too distant from its social cost, we expect the first two terms in (24) 
to be close to each other. In fact, with time discounting, we expect the first term to be 
slightly larger than the second one since the benefit will only be realized in the future. 
This intuition is formally confirmed by rewriting the expression for the payroll tax, (24), 
as:
yr  =  -u
p +  A
t — o 1 — R  - R  + - ? - X G(i ?)±— (25) 1 - u  r+ A  v J p + X
This expression is derived in Appendix A. Hence, without time discounting, i.e. p = r = 0, 
payroll taxes are not part of the first-best policy. In this case, both unemployment 
insurance and hiring subsidies should be financed, exclusively, from layoff taxes.
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The intuition is that the optimal rate of unemployment is such that the social cost is 
equal to the social benefit of having an unemployed worker. The key element is that, with 
free entry and zero bargaining power to workers, the social benefit is entirely captured 
by the government as fiscal revenue. Similarly, the social cost, i.e. the unemployment 
benefits, is a government expense. Hence, the two cancel out of the budget constraint 
and payroll taxes could be set equal to zero.
The optimal policy could now be fully characterized.
P roposition  1 When workers are wage takers, the first-best allocation could be imple­
mented by choosing the policy instruments b, H, F  and r  that satisfy equations (9), (21), 
(22) and (25).
Knowing that the first-best allocation is implementable, we could derive the equilibrium 
rate of unemployment by setting u = 0 in the equation determining the dynamics of 
unemployment, (6a). This yields the well known expression:
_  XG(R)
x G { R ) + 6 q { e y  *■ ^
This equation nevertheless has an interesting new interpretation in this framework. Whereas, 
for optimal values of 9 and R, this is the output maximizing rate of unemployment18 with 
risk-neutral workers; here, given the microfoundations laid in terms of risk-averse work­
ers, this is the optimal rate of unemployment. Not only could unemployment be too low 
from an output maximization perspective, it could also be too low from a welfare point 
of view, which is conceptually very different.
4 Financing of Public Expenditures
A characteristic of employment protection in the proposed framework is that it generates 
some revenue to the government. Thus, a natural question to ask is whether layoff taxes 
should be higher when governmental expenditures are higher. This question is particu­
larly interesting in a second-best environment where the financing of public expenditures 
distorts the labor supply decision of workers. I therefore add a participation margin to 
the previous model.
People who choose to remain out of the labor force enjoy a dollar value of leisure 
equal to I. The distribution of I across agents in the economy is given by the c.d.f. K(l). 
Thus, there exists a threshold I such that agents choose to work if and only if their value
18This is often referred to as the "efficient rate of unemployment" in the search-matching literature 
with risk-neutral workers.
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of leisure I is smaller or equal to I. In a decentralized economy, the value of the threshold 
I is privately chosen by workers.
4.1 O ptim al A llocation
As in the previous section, I begin by determining the optimal allocation of resources. 
The population is normalized to 1. Let I  denote the number of people out of the labor 
force, A the number of employed workers and U that of unemployed. We clearly have 
1 = I  + N  + U and I  = 1 — K(l). Thus, A + U — K(I). The optimal allocation is the 
solution to:
poo r poo
max _ /  e~pt Nv(w) +  fK(l) -  A1 v(z +  b) +  /  v(l)dK(l) 
{0,R,b,w,l} Jo I Jl
dt (27)
subject to N  =  0q(0) [K(l) -  N] -  AG(R)N  (28a)
Y  = 0q{0) [K{1) - N ] + \ N  f  sdG(s) -  AY  (28b)
Jr
Nw  +  [K{J) — N]b = Y  — c$ [K(I) -  N] -  E  (28c)
where Y  stands for aggregate production and E  for the resources allocated to the public 
expenditures. It is assumed that non-participating workers are not eligible for unem­
ployment benefits.19 Note that the dynamic evolution of employment N  is used as a 
constraint, (28a), instead of that of unemployment U. In fact, here, the number of un­
employed, U — K(I) — N, is not a state variable as non-working agents who decide to 
enter the labor force have to transit through unemployment. Conversely, with less than 
full insurance, marginal workers who decide to leave the labor force must be unemployed. 
The above formulation implicitly assumes that this is still the case with perfect insurance. 
In other words, U is not a state variable as it jumps when the control variable I jumps.
The optimality conditions are identical to those of the previous section. Perfect in­
surance is still desirable, which combined with the resource constraint (28c), gives:
K(J)w = Y - c 6  [K(l) -  A] + [K(l) - N ] z - E , (29)
K{l)b = Y - c Q  [K(I) — A] — N z — E. (30)
The optimal values of 6 and R  are still determined by equations (10) and (11). The only 
novelty is the condition for the optimal participation threshold I, which in steady state,
19This assumption, which is standard in the search-matching literature with endogenous participation 
and unemployment compensation (see, for instance, Sattinger 1995 and Garibaldi Wasmer 2005), is 
consistent with job search being observable and the associated absence of moral hazard.
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is:
v(w) — v(l)
N E (31)K(j) K( jy(1 -R )G (R )  + [  (s — R)dG(s)Jr.
Without public expenditures, E  = 0, and with perfect insurance, we would expect to 
obtain I =  w = z +  b. But, as can be seen from the first term on the RHS of (31), such 
is not the case when the planner discounts the future, i.e. when p > 0. The intuition 
for w = z +  b > I is that, initially, when a person enters the labor force, he becomes 
unemployed and qualifies for unemployment benefits, which is costly to the government, 
while he will only become productive in a more distant future. Conversely, if we had 
assumed that the transition was directly from outside the labor force to employment, 
without intervening unemployment, we would have obtained w — z + b < I since, in this 
case, the marginal worker is producing and therefore relaxes the resource constraint, (28c). 
Anyway, the first term of the RHS of (31) is not very interesting for our purpose and would 
vanish by assuming either p = 0 or that workers enter the labor force with a probability 
u of being unemployed and 1 — u of being employed, where u = (K(I) — N ) / K(I) denotes 
the rate of unemployment.
When E > 0, the interesting term in (31) is the last one. When some public expendi­
tures need to be financed, it is desirable to have a larger share of the population working, 
I > w = z + b. This increases the number of households who contribute to the financing 
of the government expenditures. In other words, the social value of participation, Z, is 
larger than the private value that a worker derives, w = z + b. The failure of workers to 
internalize the entire social value of their participation decision explains why, as we shall 
see, it is not possible to implement a first-best allocation of resources in a decentralized 
economy.
4.2 O ptim al P olicy
I now turn to the determination of the optimal policy in an economy where workers 
have no bargaining power, i.e. where w = z +  b. The implementability constraints for 
job destruction and job creation are the same as before, i.e. (15) and (19), respectively. 
Public expenditures, E, should be added to the government budget constraint which then 
becomes:
N r  +  NXG(R)F = [K(l) -  N] b +  [K(l) -  N] 0q(0)H +  E. (32)
The novelty is that workers privately choose whether to participate or not and the govern­
ment cannot influence this decision by taxing the leisure of non-participating individuals. 
Thus, workers will only participate if their value of leisure, Z, is lower than the income 
they get while participating. This yields a new implementability constraint for I which,
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under perfect insurance, is20:
T = z  + b. (33)
But, this cannot be reconciled with the first-best choice of I given by equation (31). 
Hence, the first-best allocation is not implementable here.
The optimal policy is instead derived by adding the implementability constraints to 
the planner’s problem. Now, (27) should be maximized under the previous constraints 
(28a), (28b), (28c), the equilibrium wage when workers have no bargaining power, i.e. 
w = z +  5, and the binding implementability constraint (33). This yields the optimal 
second-best policy. Strictly speaking, the other implementability constraints, (15), (19) 
and (32), should also be included. However, they can be safely omitted as they form a 
system of three equations in three unknowns, r , F  and H, which do not appear elsewhere 
in the problem.
I have just described how the optimal policy should be derived when workers have no 
bargaining power. But note that, in a second-best environment, it is not clear that perfect 
insurance is still desirable. Hence, the corresponding policy might not be second-best 
but third-best.21 To check this, the above problem should be solved without imposing
any restriction on the net wage w , which could then be treated as a control variable.
Importantly, the implementability constraint for I  needs to be changed; (33) should now 
be replaced by:
„ . n \  (P +  A G (/2 ))  v ( z  + b) +  0q(0)v(w) , OA^
V{1) =  P + XG(R) +  eq{e) ’ (34)
which says that the marginal worker’s utility from not participating must be equal to 
the expected utility from unemployment. It turns out that, with no discounting, p — 
0, perfect insurance is still desirable. With discounting, p > 0, insurance should be 
less than perfect in order to deter the entry of new workers who would initially all be 
unemployed and would all qualify for unemployment benefits. This is related to the first 
term on the RHS of equation (31), which, as previously argued, is not really interesting. 
What is important is that, as far as the government expenditures E  are concerned, the 
impossibility of implementing the first-best level of participation does not justify any 
departure from perfect insurance. This is intuitive since the suboptimally low level of 
participation is due to the existence of a wedge between the social and the private return 
from work which can only be worsen by under-providing insurance to workers.
Let us now turn to the characteristics of the optimal policy when workers are wage 
takers. Under perfect insurance, the level of benefits b is still given by equation (30)
20It is implicitly assumed that the leisure value of unemployment, z,  is sufficiently low so that the 
solution to the problem is well-behaved and non-trivial.
21 This assumes that the government can increase the bargaining power of workers if it is optimal to 
do so.
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which in steady state, N  = Y  =  0, simplifies to:
b = y -  c9u -  (1 -  u)z -  -^=~, (35)
where u denotes the rate of unemployment and y the level of output per participant, i.e. 
Y/K(J). It turns out that the optimal value of the threshold R  and market tightness 
9 are still determined by the first-best conditions (10) and (11). The implementability 
constraints for job creation and job destruction being the same as before, i.e. (15) and
(19), the optimal level of hiring subsidies H  and layoff taxes F  are still given by (21) 
and (22). Finally, the level of payroll taxes is determined by (32) which, in steady state, 
could be written as:
r  =  - ± - [ b - $ q ( 0 )  ( F - H ) }  + ^1 — u iv
=  \y ~ c6u u)z ~  e^ 6) (F  _  (36)
where the second line was derived by substituting expression (35) for the optimal level of 
unemployment benefits.
Clearly, from (35) and (36), b +  r  is unaffected by the level of public expenditures. 
Hence, from (22), layoff taxes remain unchanged; furthermore, from (21), hiring subsidies 
also remain unchanged. This leads to the following proposition:
P roposition  2 The amount of public expenditures, E, has no effect on the optimal level 
of layoff taxes and hiring subsidies.
The public expenditures are entirely financed through higher payroll taxes and lower un­
employment benefits. This result might seem surprising as, in a second-best environment, 
intuition suggests that two small distortions are preferable to a single large one. This 
should have led us to expect that the public expenditures should be partly financed from 
layoff taxes. Such is not the case. In fact, this is a consequence of the Diamond-Mirrlees 
(1971) production efficiency result according to which optimal taxes never lead to any de­
viation from production efficiency as this would add some distortions without correcting 
the existing ones. This result applies since the rate of job creation and job destruction 
could be seen as being part of the aggregate production function of the economy. Hence, 
layoff taxes and hiring subsidies should be viewed as Pigouvian instruments used to cor­
rect for externalities induced by the decisions of entrepreneurs, not as a general source of 
revenue for the government.22
22 The proposition might seem to contradict the findings of Cahuc and Jolivet (2003) who show that 
public expenditures increase the optimal size of layoff taxes. However, their model does not allow for 
government-provided unemployment insurance and the increase in layoff taxes is fully compensated by an 
increase in hiring subsidies. Hence, the public expenditures are entirely financed from taxes on income.
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5 Limits to Insurance
It has so far been assumed that workers could be perfectly insured against the risk of 
becoming unemployed. Following Blanchard Tirole (2008), I now consider the possibility 
that there is a non-insurable utility cost B  > 0 of unemployment. This specification 
is consistent with findings from the happiness literature which has provided extensive 
evidence that unemployment has a long-lasting negative effect on life satisfaction; see, 
for example, Clark Diener Georgellis Lucas (2008). The social planner’s problem now 
becomes:
the optimal allocation. Importantly, it remains desirable to equalize the marginal utility 
of consumption across different states and, hence, to have w = z +  b. Thus, B  is said
Now that workers cannot be perfectly insured against unemployment, it is desirable to 
decrease the threshold productivity below which a job is destroyed.
Implementing the optimal wage is not as straightforward as before. Indeed, if workers 
have zero bargaining power, their wage rate is determined by v(w) — v(z + b) — B, 
which is not desirable as the marginal utility of consumption would then be higher when 
employed than when unemployed. The optimal policy could nevertheless be implemented 
when workers have sufficiently low bargaining power by setting a binding minimum wage 
equal to z + 6 .23 Or, alternatively, if the wage rate is exogenously fixed such as to satisfy 
the resource constraint (38c), by enforcing the optimal level of unemployment benefits 
given by (9).
Since the implementability constraints for job destruction (15), job creation (19) and
23Hungerbuhler and Lehmann (2009) argue, in a redistributive context, that the minimum wage could 
be a useful policy instrument when workers have insufficient bargaining power.
max /
{0,R,b,w} J o
(37)
subject to u = XG(R)(1 — u) — 6q{6)u
Jr
(1  — u)w +  ub — y — cQu
(38a)
(38b)
(38c)
where the constraints remain unchanged. Equations (8 ), (9) and (10) still characterize
to be non-insurable as it does not affect marginal utilities and should therefore not be 
compensated by higher consumption during unemployment. The only difference to the 
optimal allocation is that the condition for optimal job destruction, (1 1 ), is replaced by:
(39)
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the government budget constraint (2 0 ) axe not affected by the utility cost of being unem­
ployed, it is straightforward to derive the optimal policy. F  — H  remains given by (21) 
and r  by (23). The only modification is that F  now solves:
tF  = 6 +  r  -  - +  r  ~  P. A . f \ s -  R)dG(s). (40) 
1 - 77(0 ) v'(w) r + \ p  + \ J R
Layoff taxes need to be raised24 in order to implement the new optimal threshold which 
is lower than before. Although a similar result has already been derived by Blanchard 
and Tirole (2008), the interpretation is slightly richer in a dynamic context. The opti­
mal policy implements a lower productivity threshold R  and, hence25, a higher market 
tightness 0. This induces a decline in the rate of job destruction, AG(R), and a rise in 
the rate of job creation, 0 g(0 ), which unambiguously leads to a lower equilibrium rate of 
unemployment. It is interesting to note that the optimal job creation condition (10) is 
only indirectly affected, through R, by the non-insurable utility cost of being unemployed 
B. This suggests that the planner primarily tries to reduce job destruction while leaving 
job creation unchanged. This is implemented by an increase in layoff taxes together with 
a corresponding adjustment in hiring subsidies such as to restore an optimal rate of job 
creation.
The key new feature of the optimal policy is summarized in the following proposition.
P roposition  3 A higher non-insurable utility cost of being unemployed, B, is associated 
with a lower optimal rate of unemployment.
When insurance cannot be perfect, reducing the number of jobless is a substitute to 
the provision of unemployment benefits.26 This policy nevertheless comes at a cost as 
the lower threshold R  hinders the reallocation of workers from low to high productivity 
jobs and, hence, net output is no longer maximized. It follows that purchasing power 
is now lower for both the employed and the unemployed. This case clearly highlights 
the conceptual distinction between the output maximizing rate of unemployment and the 
welfare maximizing optimal rate of unemployment
Finally, it is possible to compute the optimal level of payroll taxes by replacing b and 
F — H  by their optimal values in the steady state government budget constraint, (23).
24It could be shown that, under the optimal policy, F  =  [^1 — R]G(R) +  /^ (s  — -R)dG(s)j. Hence,
strictly speaking, F  is decreasing in R  if and only if g(R)  [1 — R] <  1. For example, this condition is 
always satisfied for a uniform distribution of idiosyncratic shocks.
25If the elasticity of the matching function is not constant, a sufficient condition for 9 to be increasing 
in B  is dr}(9)/dd > —rj(0) [1 — 77(0)] /6.  This could be seen by totally differentiating the optimal job 
creation condition (10) with respect to B  and by using the fact that dR /d B  <  0.
26 This is reminiscent of the over-employment result of the implicit contract literature; see Baily (1974a) 
and Azariadis (1975).
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This yields:
B
T  =  —U +v'{w) p + Au 1 — u - R r  +  A p +  A
(41)
With no discounting, i.e. p =  r = 0, payroll taxes are negative. The intuition is 
that the social cost of unemployment now exceeds the corresponding budgetary cost to 
the government as, without perfect insurance, the social cost of having an unemployed 
worker is larger than the level of benefits to which he qualifies. However, the social 
planner still equates the social cost to the social benefit of unemployment and, hence, 
the budgetary benefit, 0q(O)(F — H), now exceeds the budgetary cost, b. This generates 
a surplus that allows the implementation of negative payroll taxes or, equivalently, of 
positive employment subsidies.
6 Workers with Bargaining Power
Under risk aversion, it is desirable to suppress any fluctuations in income between em­
ployment and unemployment. Thus, the implementation of a first-best allocation requires 
workers to have zero bargaining power, as stated in Lemma 1. However, it could be ob­
jected that workers fundamentally do have some bargaining power and that this cannot be 
influenced by the planner. Thus, when solving for the optimal policy, the expression for 
the wage rate resulting from the bargaining process should be added to the implementabil­
ity constraints. The resulting planner’s problem yields first-order conditions which are 
hardly interpretable. Hence, I perform a reasonable calibration of the model and report 
numerical evaluations of the optimal policy for different values of the bargaining power 
of workers.
An obvious limitation of the analysis of this section is that it does not allow for private 
savings. When workers have some bargaining power, their income fluctuates over time 
which should induce them to borrow and save through a risk-free asset in order to smooth 
their consumption over time. It should nevertheless be acknowledged that, in practice, 
workers are often liquidity constrained, as shown by Card Chetty Weber (2007) and 
Chetty (2008), and that assuming unrestricted risk-free borrowing and lending might 
be even more remote from reality than assuming that workers have to consume their 
cash-on-hand at each instant.
6.1 N o C om m itm ent: Surplus Splitting
With bargaining, wages typically depend on worker’s outside opportunities which are 
affected by a number of endogenous parameters. In order to address these effects, I first
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propose to implement the optimal policy in a decentralized economy where wages are 
determined by surplus splitting as in Mortensen-Pissarides (1994, 2003). Thus, workers 
get a proportion ft of the dollar amount of the surplus from the match. It could, fairly, be 
objected that worker’s risk aversion should be explicitly taken into account in the wage 
bargaining process. However, in the absence of commitment, the resulting bargaining 
problem would be intractable. Thus, surplus splitting could seen as a proxy for the out­
come of the wage bargaining process without commitment. Also, splitting the surplus in 
fixed proportions does not seem completely implausible27 and has the important advan­
tage of yielding closed form solutions for the wage rates. This transparently shows how 
wages are affected by the endogenous variables of the model.
Wages axe bargained over each time a productivity shock occurs. The initial net wage, 
denoted Wo(l)> is different from others since, in case no agreement is reached, the firm 
does not receive the hiring subsidy but does not have to pay the firing tax28. By contrast, 
subsequent bargaining is not affected by the subsidy, which is sunk, but does respond to 
the cost of laying off a worker. The resulting net wage is denoted by w(x) for a match of 
productivity x. The corresponding expressions are:
tuo(l) =  (3 [1 cO — t — XF +  (r +  A)iif] -1- (1 — (3) [z 6], (42)
w{x) =  P [x +  c9 — r  +  rF] +  (1 — p)  [z +  b], (43)
where it is assumed that workers and firm both discount future income at rate r.  Details 
on the surplus splitting rules and on the value functions of workers and firms used to derive 
these expressions are given in Appendix B .29 An attractive feature of these wage rates 
is that they capture the fact that, initially, the hiring subsidy increases the bargaining 
power of workers while the firing tax decreases it; while, subsequently, the hiring subsidy 
is sunk and the firing tax put workers in a stronger position. Also, importantly, a higher 
market tightness reduces the length of unemployment which improves the outside option 
of workers and, hence, their wages.
Proceeding as in the first section, it is easy to show that the job destruction condition,
determined by J(R) = —F, is now given by:
R  = z + b + T + - ^ c e - r F - - ^ ~  f \ s  -  R)dG(s); (44)
1 — p  r  +  A J R
27This is indeed the form of wage bargaining that was considered by Blanchard and Tirole (2008) in 
an extension to their benchmark model.
28 The layoff tax nevertheless enters the expression for the initial wage rate as it affects the firm’s 
expected profits from a newly created match.
29 Also, note that similar expressions are carefully derived in Mortensen Pissarides (2003) and in Pis- 
sarides (2000, chapter 9).
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while the job creation condition, resulting from free entry V  — 0, is:
a - / ? )
1 - R
r + X + H - F (45)
Note that these two expressions generalize the previous implementability conditions. In­
deed, for ft = 0, (44) and (45) reduce to (15) and (19), respectively.
With fluctuating wages, it is clearly impossible to implement the first-best alloca­
tion. The optimal policy should therefore be solved directly under the implementability 
constraints, i.e. under the decentralized job destruction, (44), and job creation, (45), 
conditions and under the government budget constraint, (20). The corresponding opti­
mization problem is:
max
{0,R,b,T,F,H}
[  e pt nv(w0(l)) +  (1  -  u -  n) [  7 ^ 7 ^ -dG(x)+uv(z+ b)
JO L J R  1 — G \ R )
dt (46)
subject to u = XG(R)(1 — u) — 9q{9)u (47a)
fi = 9q(9)u — X n (47b)
y = 9q(9)u +  A( 1  — u ) f  sdG(s) — Xy (47c)
J r
nwo(l) + (1 — u — n) [  . dG(x) + ub = y -  c9u (47d)
J r  1 — G { K )
_ (d XR = z + b + r  +  ---- -c9 — rF  —
( l - « 1 - r + h - f
[  (s -  R)dG(s) (47e) 
Jr
r  +  A m
(47f)
(1  -  u ) t  + (1 -  u)\G (R)F  = ub + u0q(9)H (47g)
where n denotes the number of matches which have not been hit by an idiosyncratic shock 
yet and with prevailing wage Wo(l)* The second constraint, (47b), depicts the dynamics 
of n. Clearly, the expressions for the wage rate, (42) and (43), should be substituted 
into the maximization problem where needed. As the resulting first-order conditions are 
extremely heavy and hardly interpretable, I now rely on a numerical calibration of the 
model.
I use the same functional forms and parameter values as in Mortensen Pissarides 
(2003), except for risk aversion which does not appear in their model. Thus, I take a 
Cobb-Douglas matching function, which reduces to:
q{0) = qoS-". (48)
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It clearly implies that the matching function has a constant elasticity, 77. The distribution 
of idiosyncratic shocks is assumed to be uniform on [if;, 1]; hence its c.d.f. is:
<„>
Finally, I use a standard constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) instantaneous utility 
function with CRRA coefficient </>:
r i-<f>
«(*) =  (50)
The chosen exogenous parameter values are displayed in Table 1, where the unit of time 
is a quarter.30
Table 1: Exogenous parameter values
r p V c z A tf; Qo 0
0 .0 2  0 .0 2 0.5 0.3 0.35 0.1 0.65 1 3
The calibration results are reported for four different values of the bargaining power 
of workers, f3. The initial case, ft = 0, corresponds to the first-best benchmark. The
30When {3 =  7} and with no government intervention other than the provision of some unemployment 
benefits, b = 0.2, entirely financed from payroll taxes, the chosen calibration implies that the equilibrium 
rate of unemployment, u, is 6.56%, the expected length of unemployment, \/6q{6),  is 0.91 quarter and 
the expected duration of a match, 1/AG(R),  is 12.93 quarters. These values are within the empirically 
plausible range reported by Shimer (2007).
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results are displayed in Table 2.
Table 2: Optimal policy under surplus splitting
/5 0 0.25 0.5 0.75
9 1.88 1.39 0.66 0.24
R 0.901 0.897 0.878 0.833
u(%) 4.98 5.64 7.42 9.72
n 0.682 0.665 0.602 0.473
y 0.937 0.929 0.906 0.867
Average Wage 0.926 0.934 0.934 0.918
b 0.576 0.434 0.365 0.323
T 0.0007 -0.0016 -0.0054 -0.0074
F 0.706 0.620 0.594 0.581
H 0.295 0.229 0.0612 -0.225
F - H 0.411 0.390 0.533 0.806
Welfare Loss (%) 0 0.36 1.78 4.91
Gross Job Flow 0.0682 0.0665 0.0602 0.0473
(1 -  u)r/ub (%) 2.33 -6.04 -18.55 -21.41
Welfare loss is computed as the proportional decline in consumption in the first-best case 
necessary to reach the new level of welfare. For example, when /? =  0.5, welfare is equal to 
what it would be in the first-best allocation, j3 = 0, with consumption decreased by 1.78%. 
In steady state, the gross job flow is given by u6q{6) or, equivalently, by (1 — u)XG(R). 
Finally, the last row reports the share of unemployment insurance expenses financed by 
payroll taxes.
When the Hosios condition holds, i.e. when (3 = 0.5, the output maximizing policy 
should not distort job creation or job destruction and, therefore, requires F  =  H. As 
shown in Table 2, such policy is not welfare maximizing with risk-averse agents. Thus, 
when workers have some bargaining power, there is a trade-off between output maxi­
mization and insurance provision. More precisely, the planner wants to reduce market 
tightness in order to decrease wages which, by relaxing the resource constraint, allows 
an increase in the level of unemployment benefits. He therefore set layoff taxes higher 
than hiring subsidies in order to reduce entry. An additional reason to decrease hiring 
subsidies is to further reduce the initial wage rate, Wo(l)5 to which 60% of the workers 
qualify.
Due to the resource constraint, the level of unemployment benefits decreases with the 
bargaining power of workers. Also, F  is so much higher than H  that it generates sufficient 
surpluses to finance entirely the unemployment benefits as well as some employment
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subsidies, reported as negative payroll taxes. However, for all values of /?, the magnitude 
of F  only corresponds to about two months of the average wage of the economy. This is 
more than sufficient to pay for the unemployment benefits given that, either, (3 is low and 
the expected length of unemployment is short, or, /? is high and the replacement ratio is 
low.
The reservation threshold R  declines with bargaining power in order to compensate 
for the imperfect provision of insurance and for the high length of unemployment induced 
by the low market tightness. But, this comes at the cost of a more sclerotic labor market 
characterized by a lower reallocation of workers from low to high productivity jobs, as 
shown by the lower gross job flow. The reduction in the rate of job creation being larger 
than that of job destruction, unemployment increases with (3. Output, which in steady 
state can be written as y = (1 —u) j^2(.R) 4 - J^ sdG(s) , declines because a smaller number 
of people work, i.e. unemployment is higher, and the average productivity of employed 
workers is also reduced due to a lower reservation threshold.
In other words, the downward adjustment in 6 and R, which enhances the provision of 
insurance, hinders the reallocation of workers from low to high productivity jobs, which 
reduces aggregate output. This is the essence of the trade-off between insurance and 
production. Also, it should be emphasized that a moderate amount of private savings 
is likely to reduce, but certainly not to eliminate, the demand for insurance. Thus, a 
trade-off would remain, albeit of a smaller magnitude, and the key qualitative insights 
about the optimal policy would presumably remain unaltered.
How would the optimal policy change if wages were re-bargained immediately after 
recruitment? In this case, newly employed workers would get wage w(l) as given by (43). 
In order to solve for the optimal policy with immediate wage renegotiation, it is important 
to note that the implementability condition for job destruction, (44), and the government 
budget constraint, (2 0 ), remain unchanged while the implementability condition for job 
creation now becomes:
(1 -  0 ) 1 ^ 1  + * - f  =  J L  (51)
Thus, the planner’s problem is still as above, (46), with wo(l) from (42) replaced by 
u;(l) from (43) and the job creation condition (47f) replaced by (51). The corresponding
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simulation results are shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Optimal policy under surplus splitting with immediate wage renegotiation
p 0 0.25 0.5 0.75
9 1 .8 8 1.39 0.65 0.23
R 0.901 0.899 0.889 0.851
u (%) 4.98 5.70 7.80 10.76
n 0.682 0.672 0.629 0.512
y 0.937 0.929 0.906 0.864
Average Wage 0.926 0.935 0.936 0.924
b 0.576 0.427 0.352 0.302
T 0.0007 0.0061 0.0146 0.0267
F 0.706 0.539 0.390 0.244
H 0.295 0.263 0.168 0.077
F - H 0.411 0.276 0.223 0.168
Welfare Loss (%) 0 0.39 1.93 5.47
Gross Job Flow 0.0682 0.0672 0.0629 0.0512
(1  — u)r/ub (%) 2.33 23.79 49.06 73.54
The allocation of resources is pretty similar to that of the previous case. The main 
difference lies in the level of the policy instruments F, H  and r. There are two reasons 
for that. First, from the implementability condition (51), the difference between hiring 
subsidies and layoff taxes has a larger impact on job creation than before. Indeed, with 
immediate renegotiation, these policy instruments have a smaller effect on wages and, 
hence, a larger effect on firms. This explains why F — H  does not need to be as large as 
before to reduce 9 to its desired level. The second reason is that hiring subsidies cease to 
increase initial wages and layoff taxes cease decrease them. Hence, when workers have a 
strong bargaining power, it is no longer necessary to maintain high layoff taxes and low 
hiring subsidies to prevent wages from being too high and unemployment benefits too 
low. Note that F — H  being smaller than before, a significant share of the unemployment 
benefits now needs to be financed from payroll taxes.
To gain additional insights about the key trade-offs underpinning the optimal policy, 
let us consider the following naive surplus splitting rule:
w(x) = 0[x -  t \ -I- (1 -  f$)[z +  b]. (52)
Before going further, it should be emphasized that the intermediary case where w(x) = 
(3[x—r+ c 0 ]+ ( l—j3)[z+b] is quantitatively almost identical to the immediate renegotiation
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case as the term rF , in (43), is small. Also note that, for a given allocation, the wage rate 
is lower under naive surplus splitting, (52), than under immediate renegotiation, (43), 
as market tightness and layoff taxes cease to have a positive impact. This generates a 
mechanical improvement in the level of insurance.
When solving for the optimal policy under naive surplus splitting, the implementabil­
ity conditions remain given by (51) for job creation and by (20) for the government budget 
constraint while, for job destruction, it becomes:
rF  A f 1f l  =  * +  6 +  T _  _ _ _ j f  (53)
The simulation results are presented in Table 4.
Table 4: Optimal policy under naive surplus splitting
p 0 0.25 0.5 0.75
e 1 .8 8 1 .8 8 1 .8 8 1 .8 8
R 0.901 0.902 0.905 0.909
u(%) 4.98 5.00 5.04 5.11
n 0.682 0.685 0.691 0.701
V 0.937 0.937 0.937 0.938
Average Wage 0.926 0.927 0.928 0.929
b 0.576 0.562 0.549 0.537
r 0.0007 0.0152 0.0302 0.0453
F 0.706 0.526 0.343 0.169
H 0.295 0.326 0.357 0.387
F - H 0.411 0 .2 0 0 -0.015 - 0 .2 2 1
Welfare Loss (%) 0 0 .0 1 0 .0 2 0.05
Gross Job Flow 0.0682 0.0685 0.0691 0.0701
(1  — u)r/ub (%) 2.33 51.30 103.66 156.63
Strikingly, market tightness 6 and the productivity threshold R  are almost indepen­
dent of the bargaining power of workers. This suggests that, without the general equi­
librium effect of market tightness on wages, there is hardly any trade-off between output 
maximization and insurance provision. Consequently, the main role of layoff taxes and 
hiring subsidies is to compensate for the failure of the Hosios condition to hold, i.e. to 
offset the distortions generated by the gap between the bargaining power of workers and 
the elasticity of the matching function. This explains why, when the Hosios condition 
does hold, i.e. when (3 = 0.5, layoff taxes and hiring subsidies are virtually equal to each 
other. The slight discrepancy that remains, and which result in payroll taxes covering
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103.66% of the cost of providing unemployment insurance, rather than 100%, is due to 
the positive impact of payroll taxes on wages. Hence, the government tries to increase 
those taxes a little in order to decrease wages which, through a relaxation of the resource 
constraint, allows an improvement in the level of unemployment benefits.
6.2 Com m itm ent: F ixed  W age
The previous subsection assumes that the dollar amount of the surplus from the match 
is split in fixed proportions between the worker and the firm. However, this leads to 
substantial wage fluctuations which, if firms can commit, seems inconsistent with the 
risk sharing that would be expected to occur between a risk-averse worker and a risk- 
neutral employer. In particular, if a firm and a worker discount the future at the same 
rate, i.e. r = p, then the firm will commit to paying a fixed wage, w, throughout the 
duration of the match and to a job destruction threshold, R.
The Bellman equations corresponding to the expected utility of an unemployed, U, 
and of an employed worker, W , are:
rU = v(z +  6) 4- 0q(0) [W — U] , (54)
rW  = v{w) +  XG{R) [U -  W ] , (55)
where, as before, u(.) stands for the instantaneous utility of consumption. The two
parameters of the contract axe determined ex-ante by Nash bargaining:
{w, R} = arg max [Wt -  U f  [Ji(l) + H -  V ]1H9, (56)
where the subscript i is used to stress that the wage and threshold bargained in match i 
do not affect the value of outside options, i.e. the values of U or V. Ex-ante bargaining 
implies that, if an agreement is not reached, the employer does not receive the hiring 
subsidy but does not have to pay the layoff tax.
The worker’s net salary is determined by:
v ( w ) - v ( z  + b) r_ P c
-  [r +  AG(R) + 6q(e)] —  ^ , (57)
while the job destruction threshold solves:
_ A f1, . . r +  XG(R) v(w) — v(z + b)
R = w + r  — r F    /  ( s - R ) d G ( s )  i  „ \ ----- -• (58)r + * J R r + XG(R) +  0q(0) v'{w) v '
These two expressions are derived in Appendix C. The last term of the decentralized 
job destruction condition (58) would not appear without commitment, cf. (15). This
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shows that firms use both margins to provide insurance to risk-averse workers: they 
pay a constant wage and they lower the job destruction threshold. Using the free-entry 
condition, it could easily be shown that the decentralized job creation condition is:
1 - R
r  +  A
+ H - F
m
(59)
The optimal policy could then be derived by adding the wage equation (57) as a 
constraint to the original problem. Thus, the planner should maximize (5) with respect 
to 0, R, b and w subject to (6 a), (6 b), (6 c) and (57). The three remaining implementability 
constraints, (58), (59) and (20), could be left out since they jointly determine F, H  and r  
which do not appear elsewhere in the planner’s problem. Table 5 displays the simulation 
results for the same calibrating of the model as before.
Table 5: Optimal policy under Nash bargaining with risk aversion
p 0 0.25 0.5 0.75
e 1 .8 8 1.59 1.06 0.52
R 0.901 0.898 0 .8 8 6 0.854
u (%) 4.98 5.32 6.14 7.52
y 0.937 0.933 0.921 0.897
w 0.926 0.933 0.937 0.933
b 0.576 0.448 0.361 0.294
T 0.0007 0.0007 0.0014 0.0034
F 0.706 0.600 0.485 0.315
H 0.295 0.255 0.155 -0.037
F - H 0.411 0.345 0.330 0.352
Welfare Loss (%) 0 0.24 1.07 3.19
Gross Job Flow 0.0682 0.0671 0.0633 0.0540
(1  — u )r /u b  (%) 2.33 2.92 5.76 14.04
Again, the case (3 = 0 corresponds to the implementation of the first-best policy.
As (3 increases, 0 and R  both decline in order to partially offset the increase in the 
gap between w and b + z. Indeed, a higher market tightness puts workers in a stronger 
bargaining position which is detrimental to insurance. Also, a lower reservation threshold 
improves the welfare of employed workers and can be compensated by a smaller wage 
rate. The decline in the rate of job creation being stronger than that of job destruction, 
unemployment increases with /?. Output falls. Due to the resource constraint, the level 
of unemployment benefits decreases with (3.
When (3 is low, F  is higher than H  in order to compensate for the failure of the
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Hosios condition to hold. As ft increases, this becomes a smaller concern, but insufficient 
insurance becomes a bigger one. The planner therefore wants to decrease market tightness 
which becomes the main reason why F  exceeds H.
Also, layoff taxes are rapidly declining in /? and are lower than in the surplus splitting 
counterpart to this problem, cf. Table 2. The reason is that, as could be seen from (58), 
firms spontaneously decrease the destruction threshold R  whenever insurance is less than 
perfect. Thus, layoff taxes have a smaller job to do to reduce the rate of job destruction 
to its optimal level. The surpluses generated by F  — H  nevertheless remain sufficiently 
large to finance almost all the unemployment benefits but leave no room for employment 
subsidies.
The wage and threshold could be determined by directed search, rather than by Nash 
bargaining. In such an environment, competitive market makers jointly choose the wage 
rate, the threshold and the length of queues, equal to 1 /6q(9), such as to maximize the 
expected utility of an unemployed worker subject to a free entry condition for firms; or 
more formally:
max pU subject to V  =  0 . (60)
{6,w,R}
This yields exactly the same equations as (57) and (58) with (3 replaced by 77. Thus, 
in Table 5, directed search corresponds to the case where = 77 =  0.5. As implied by 
Corollary 1 , directed search and the associated Hosios condition fail to implement a first- 
best allocation of resources in an economy with risk-averse workers as they fail to ensure 
a sufficient provision of insurance.
7 Moral Hazard
When workers have some bargaining power, there is typically a trade-off between output 
maximization and insurance provision. But, reducing the level of insurance might be 
a virtue if it increases the search intensity of unemployed workers. Indeed, concerns 
about the moral hazard effects of unemployment insurance have been at the heart of the 
literature on the topic. Hence, this section characterizes the optimal policy when job 
search monitoring is not available and, hence, when the unemployed freely choose their 
search intensity.
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7.1 D eterm ination  o f Search Intensity
Let s denote the search intensity of the unemployed. Vacant jobs and unemployed workers 
now get matched at rate31:
m  =  m(su, v), (61)
where the matching function satisfies the same properties as before. Vacancies become
filled at rate:
^  =  (62)
where market tightness remains defined as the ratio of vacancies to unemployment, i.e.
9 = v /u .32
Unemployed worker i who searches with intensity S{ finds a job at rate:
~(a \ Si m (su, v)q{9, s , = ----------------  (63)
s u 
= —9q{9, s). s
The Bellman equation associated with the expected utility of an unemployed worker is:
pU = v(z +  b) -  <j(si) +  q{9, s, s*) [W( 1) -  U] , (64)
where o denotes an increasing and convex cost of search, with cr(0 ) =  <t'(0 ) =  0 , and 
W (1 ) is the value of a new job to a worker. The first-order condition for search intensity 
is:
- a ' ( S i )  +  [ ^ ( 1 )  _  U ]  =  o . (6 5 )
Hence, using the symmetry which prevails in equilibrium, i.e. s* =  s, the search intensity 
of unemployed workers is implicitly determined by:
sa'(s) =  9q(9, s) [W( 1) -  U] . (66)
7.2 Surplus Splitting
The optimal policy with moral hazard could now be solved numerically. For this, I focus 
on the case where wages are determined by surplus splitting as this is the most transparent 
situation about the influence of the different parameters on wages.
As before, I consider the wage rate that would prevail under surplus splitting if workers
31 The intensity of job advertising made by firms with a vacancy is exogenously set to 1 as, even if 
endogenously determined, it would not be affected by any policy parameters; cf. Pissarides (2000, chapter 
5.3).
32Note that, by definition of the elasticity of the matching function 7 7 , dq^QS^ =  and,
hence, from (62), dq^ s) =  q^ - r j ( 6 , s ) .
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and firms were both risk-neutral. This gives:
w0( 1) =  P [1 +  c9 -  t -  \ F  +  (r +  A)H] +  (1 — ft) [z + b — cr(s)], (67)
w(x) = p[x + cQ — t + rF] -1- (1 — P) [z + b — cr(s)], (68)
where the initial wage, tuo(l), applies until a shock occurs. The existence of the search
cost cr(s) lowers the value of unemployment, which is the outside option, and hence
adversely affects wages.
Under these wage rates, the search intensity of a risk-averse worker is determined by:
W  = eq[6' S) p +  \ G{ R)  +  0q{e,s)  ’ (69)
where the average utility of employed workers is given by:
E  [u(w)] = 1 -  - E  [1 -  G(R)] 
p  +  A
v(w0( 1)) +  — [  v(w{x))dG(x). (70)
P +  A JR
These expressions are derived in Appendix D. The planner’s problem is as before, (46), 
with s as a new control variable and (69) as an additional constraint.33
For reference, I also solve for the optimal policy when the planner is able to freely 
set the wage of workers. Absent any constraints on the expression for the wage rate, this 
gives the best possible allocation that could be attained with endogenous search intensity. 
In that context, the first-order condition for search intensity is (69) with E[v(w)] simply 
replaced by v(w) where w is the wage chosen by the planner. Also, with a fixed wage, 
the decentralized job destruction and job creation conditions are given by (15) and (19), 
respectively.
Before solving for the optimal policy, it is necessary to recalibrate the version of the 
model which allows for moral hazard. The calibration is done in a context where P = 77 
and where the government does not intervene except to provide some unemployment 
benefits, b = 0 .2 , financed from payroll taxes; which is arguably a good sketch of the 
current U.S. situation. The scale parameter of the matching function, qo, and the lower 
bound of the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks, -0 , are set such that the quarterly rates 
of job creation and job destruction remain equal to 0.91 and 12.93, respectively. This
33The other changes are that search intensity should be included in the matching function, i.e. q{6) 
should be replaced by q(9, s ), and the search cost <r(s) should be subtracted for a mass u of unemployed 
workers from the objective function, i.e. the last term of the objective should be u [v(z +  b) — cr(s)] 
instead of uv(z +  b). Finally, z  should be replaced by z — a(s)  in the decentralized job destruction 
condition, (47e).
45
gives qo — 0.83 and ip = 0.49. The cost of search is assumed to be convex:
The constant k is calibrated such that s is normalized to 1 and 7  such that the elasticity 
of unemployment duration with respect to the benefit level is equal to 0.5, a reasonable 
estimate according to Krueger and Meyer (2002)’s survey of the literature on the topic. 
This yields k = 1.16 and 7  =  5.02. All the other parameters of the model are left 
unchanged.
The simulation results are presented in Table 6 .
Table 6 : Optimal policy under surplus splitting and moral hazard
p Best Wage 0.125 0.2171 0.25 0.5 0.75
e 2 .0 1 2.32 2 .0 2 1.89 0.94 0.91
R 0.861 0.859 0.862 0.862 0.846 0.835
u (%) 6.50 6.33 6.50 6.64 8.47 4.78
n 0.678 0.675 0.679 0.678 0.635 0.504
y 0.917 0.918 0.917 0.916 0.894 0.915
Average Wage 0.910 0.902 0.910 0.912 0.919 0.933
b 0.418 0.468 0.420 0.406 0.336 0.288
s 0.781 0.707 0.779 0.797 0.867 1 .2 2
T -0.0128 0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0013 -0.0062 -0.0036
F 0.997 0.923 0.843 0.822 0.732 0.398
H 0.420 0.495 0.433 0.407 0.194 0.056
F - H 0.577 0.428 0.411 0.415 0.538 0.342
Welfare Loss (%) 0 0.198 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 2 2 1.279 2.351
Gross Job Flow 0.0678 0.0675 0.0679 0.0678 0.0635 0.0504
( 1  -  u)r/ub  (%) -43.82 2.44 -2.17 -4.35 -19.92 -24.78
The first column reports the calibration for the optimal fixed wage, i.e. the "best wage", 
chosen by the planner. The welfare loss is now computed relative to this benchmark. 
Thus, for instance, the welfare generated by the optimal policy with surplus splitting 
when /3 =  0.5 is identical to the welfare of the optimal allocation with a fixed wage but 
with consumption of the employed and unemployed decreased by 1.279%.
When the worker has a low bargaining power, /? =  0.125, market tightness is higher 
than with the best wage. In fact, the planner wants to increase wages, and reduce 
insurance, in order to boost the returns to search. Hiring subsidies, which have a positive 
impact on initial wages, are also set at a very high level. This is exactly the opposite
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to what would be recommended without moral hazard where market tightness would be 
reduced in order to improve the provision of insurance.
Welfare is maximized for ft = 0.2171, where the optimal allocation is very similar 
to that implied by the best wage. Market tightness is nevertheless a little higher which 
increases the recruitment costs but reduces the provision of insurance which is slightly 
too high compared to the best wage benchmark. The optimal setting of the policy 
instruments r, F  and H  differs substantially from that of the benchmark. This is due to 
the differences in the implementability constraints, which are themselves caused by the 
different specifications of the wage rate.
When p — 0.2171, the low magnitude of the welfare loss, which is below 0.002%, 
suggests that, at the optimum, the surplus splitting rule hardly worsens the trade-off 
between insurance and production, compared to the optimal fixed wage case. Indeed, 
the forces pushing for more insurance, i.e. risk aversion, and less insurance, i.e. moral 
hazard, nearly offset each other. Hence, given the prevailing level of insurance, the policy 
parameters could be set such as to maximize the reallocation of workers from low to high 
productivity jobs. Indeed, at the optimal /?, the reservation threshold R  is close to being 
maximized.
For a higher bargaining power, market tightness does not need to be pushed upward 
as wages are already sufficiently high to reward search efforts. The previous intuitions, 
without moral hazard, dominate again and market tightness should be decreased in order 
to improve the provision of insurance. Thus, for high values of ft, the introduction of 
moral hazard does not really modify the qualitative conclusions reached in the previous 
section about the key characteristics of an optimal policy.
With immediate wage renegotiation, newly employed worker are paid w(l) as given 
by (6 8 ). The planner’s problem is obtained by adding the constraint for search intensity, 
given by (69) with w( 1) replacing itfo(l) in (70), to the corresponding problem of the
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previous section.34 The simulated optimal policy is shown in Table 7.
Table 7: Optimal policy with immediate renegotiation and moral hazard
p Best Wage 0.125 0.2127 0.25 0.5 0.75
e 2 .0 1 2.27 2 .0 1 1 .8 6 0.93 0.35
R 0.861 0.858 0.863 0.864 0.862 0.840
u (%) 6.50 6.36 6.53 6.70 8.82 12.76
n 0.678 0.673 0.681 0.681 0.663 0.596
y 0.917 0.918 0.917 0.916 0.895 0.850
Average Wage 0.910 0.902 0.910 0.913 0.922 0.918
b 0.418 0.466 0.419 0.402 0.328 0.280
s 0.781 0.710 0.781 0.802 0.876 0.909
T -0.0128 0.0035 0.0058 0.0068 0.0170 0.0334
F 0.997 0.891 0.778 0.736 0.496 0.281
H 0.420 0.498 0.455 0.434 0.294 0.170
F - H 0.577 0.393 0.323 0.302 0 .2 0 2 0.111
Welfare Loss (%) 0 0.185 0.003 0.030 1.383 5.311
Gross Job Flow 0.0678 0.0673 0.0681 0.0681 0.0663 0.0596
(1  — u)r/ub  (%) -43.82 11.00 19.68 23.60 53.72 81.46
The optimal allocation is similar to that without immediate renegotiation, but the optimal 
setting of the policy instruments is now different. These differences are similar to those 
between the corresponding tables without moral hazard; see Table 2  and 3. Welfare is 
maximized for (3 = 0.2127. Again, when workers have substantial bargaining power, 
the introduction of moral hazard does not modify the main conclusions of the previous 
section as the primary concern of the planner remains the under-provision of insurance 
to workers.
Finally, to get some further insights, I consider the naive surplus splitting rule:
w(x) = (3[x — r] +  (1 — P)[z + b -  cr(s)]. (71)
34 Appropriate adjustments for search intensity should be made as described in the previous footnote.
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The corresponding optimal policy with moral hazard is reported in Table 8.
Table 8 : Optimal policy with naive surplus splitting and moral hazard
p Best Wage 0.125 0.25 0.5 0.75
e 2 .0 1 1.73 1.76 1.79 1.81
R 0.861 0.827 0.835 0.848 0.860
u (%) 6.50 7.91 7.65 7.46 7.45
n 0.678 0.605 0.623 0.647 0.669
y 0.917 0.894 0.899 0.904 0.908
Average Wage 0.910 0.881 0.887 0.893 0.897
b 0.418 0.522 0.518 0.508 0.497
s 0.781 0.488 0.544 0.606 0.643
T -0.0128 0.0064 0.0172 0.0399 0.0627
F 0.997 1.047 0.861 0.539 0.251
H 0.420 0.463 0.480 0.523 0.564
F - H 0.577 0.584 0.381 0.015 -0.313
Welfare Loss (%) 0 1.824 1.291 0.820 0.601
Gross Job Flow 0.0678 0.0605 0.0623 0.0647 0.0669
(1  — u)r/ub (%) -43.82 14.33 40.13 97.38 156.56
The key problem of the planner is that naive surplus splitting generates too much insur­
ance and there is hardly any way to undo this as the wage rate is largely independent of 
the parameters under the planner’s control. There is a complementarity between market 
tightness and search intensity as they both increase the matching rate 6q{9, s). However, 
given the over-provision of insurance, search intensity is low and it is therefore not worth 
pushing market tightness upward. Also, since the unemployed are very inefficient at 
searching for jobs, the reallocation of workers from low to high productivity jobs is long 
and costly and, hence, the threshold productivity R  is reduced as it is now preferable to 
keep workers in low productivity occupations. However, as ft increases, the problem of 
over-insurance becomes less severe and welfare improves.
As the level of insurance cannot really be influenced, the main effect of layoff taxes 
and hiring subsidies is to correct for the failure of the Hosios condition to hold. Hence, 
when ft = 0.5, both are approximately equal to each other.
8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have investigated optimal policies in a dynamic search model with risk- 
averse workers. More precisely, I have focused on the joint derivation of the optimal level
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of unemployment benefits, layoff taxes, hiring subsidies and payroll taxes.
I began by abstracting from moral hazard in order to focus on the general equilibrium 
effects of the different policy instruments. I showed that the first-best allocation of 
resources can be implemented in a decentralized economy when workers are wage takers. 
In this situation, full insurance is provided and output is maximized. Layoff taxes are 
higher than hiring subsidies in order to offset the excessive entry of vacancies caused 
by the absence of bargaining power of workers. Moreover, the corresponding surplus is 
sufficiently large to finance nearly all the unemployment benefits and payroll taxes are 
therefore hardly needed.
However, layoff taxes and hiring subsidies should only be viewed as Pigouvian instru­
ments used to correct externalities, not as a general source of revenue to the government. 
Indeed, additional public expenditures should be entirely financed through higher payroll, 
or income, taxes and lower unemployment benefits, even in a second-best environment 
with endogenous participation.
The analysis being properly microfounded in terms of risk-averse workers, it allows the 
determination of an optimal, welfare maximizing, rate of unemployment, which goes be­
yond the well-known output maximizing rate of unemployment. The distinction between 
the two becomes particularly relevant when there is a trade-off between the provision 
of insurance and the maximization of production. For instance, the optimal rate of un­
employment is lower when workers are confronted with a non-insurable utility cost of 
unemployment. Intuitively, a reduction in the probability of unemployment is a substi­
tute to the provision of unemployment benefits.
When workers have some bargaining power, the planner wants to reduce wages in or­
der to relax the resource constraint and improve the level of unemployment benefits. In 
particular, this is achieved by reducing market tightness which lowers wages, as desired, 
but also hinders the reallocation of workers from low to high productivity jobs. Intro­
ducing moral hazard adds a counteracting force to the model. When workers have a very 
low bargaining power, it is typically desirable to increase market tightness and to boost 
wages in order to enhance the reward to the search effort of the unemployed. However, 
when workers have a more substantial bargaining power, under-provision of insurance, 
rather than moral hazard, remains the primary concern of the planner. Chetty (2008) 
has already argued that the issue of moral hazard might have been over-emphasized in 
the literature. The present chapter adds to this by showing that general equilibrium 
effects on job creation, job destruction and wages might be at least as important for the 
determination of optimal policies.
There are essentially two reasons which could justify setting layoff taxes higher than 
hiring subsidies; in which case the difference between the two could cover at least some 
of the costs of providing unemployment benefits. First, to compensate for the failure of
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the Hosios condition to hold; or, in other words, to reduce entry in order to save on the 
recruitment costs when the bargaining power of workers is lower than the elasticity of 
the matching function. Second, in order to reduce wages, by reducing market tightness 
and hiring subsidies, when the provision of insurance is insufficient. Importantly, as the
bargaining power of workers increases, the first reason becomes less relevant while the
second becomes more important. This is why layoff taxes exceed hiring subsidies in all 
realistic calibrations of the model and for any bargaining power of workers.
This shows that, without governmental intervention, labor markets with search fric­
tions generically implement an inefficient allocation of resources. With risk-neutral work­
ers, inefficiencies are only due to unbalanced search externalities associated with devia­
tions from the Hosios condition. Here, the inefficiency is much deeper and involves a lack 
of insurance against the risk of becoming unemployed.
Some important issues axe left for further research. First, an accurate empirical
knowledge of the main determinants of wages, at the macroeconomic level, is key for 
the optimal design of labor market policies.35 Knowing, quantitatively, how wages are 
affected by market tightness or by the different policy instruments is obviously essential 
if the planner wants to increase the provision of insurance at the smallest cost in terms 
of output. The precise specification of wages also crucially affects the implement ability 
constraints. For instance, if layoff taxes and hiring subsidies are passed on to workers 
through adjustment in wages, then they have a much smaller effect on the job creation 
and job destruction decisions of firms.
Throughout this chapter, I have only considered time invariant policy instruments. 
In fact, in a dynamic context, it would be interesting to allow the level of unemployment 
benefits to be affected by the length of unemployment and that of layoff taxes and hiring 
subsidies to depend on the age of the match, among other things. Also, in the proposed 
model, the length of unemployment does not directly matter, only its rate does.36 This 
could be relaxed by assuming that the level of human capital depreciates during an 
unemployment spell37 or, more simply, by assuming that workers have a preference for 
shorter spells even if this is associated with a higher probability of being unemployed. 
The length of unemployment being decreasing in market tightness, the resulting optimal 
policy would presumably advocate for a smaller reduction in the rate of job creation.
35Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) provide extensive evidence of the negative impact of unemployment 
on wages. However, their work does not control for the number of vacancies and, hence, cannot identify 
the impact of market tightness on wages.
36 The length of unemployment nevertheless has an impact on the speed of the reallocation of workers 
from low to high productivity jobs.
37See the related analyses of Pavoni (2008) and Shimer Werning (2006) who determine the optimal 
unemployment insurance policy with human capital depreciation.
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A Payroll Tax in First-Best Policy
Before deriving (25), it is necessary to rewrite the expression for the optimal value of b 
given by equation (9).
b = y — cOu — z( 1 — u)
= y — cOu — 
=  ( ! - « )
=  (1 -  u)
R - v(0)
1 -  77(0) 
y
1 — u
y
1 — u
- R
- R
\ /*!
c0 +  ^ — /  ( s -R )d G (s )  
P + A JR
77(0)
(1 - u )
1 - R
1 -  77(0 )
1 - R
c0( 1 — u) +  \G{R)(l  — u)------ —  c9u
p +  A
+  0<7(0) _p +  A q(0)_
The second line was derived by using the optimal job destruction condition (11) to get rid 
of z. The obtain the third line, and to get rid of the integral, I have used the expression 
for the steady state level of output y = (1 — it) ^G(R) +  sdG(s) and then rearranged
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the terms. Finally, to get the last line, I have used equation (12) to rewrite the second 
term of the third line and used the fact that, in steady state, XG(R)(1 — u) = Qq(0)u to 
rewrite the third term of the third line.
Substituting this expression for b in (24) and using again the expression for the steady 
state level of unemployment, XG(R)(1 — u) = 6q(6)u, yields equation (25).
B Wage Determination under Surplus Splitting
An entrepreneur expects a net present value V  from the stream of income generated by a 
vacancy which will eventually become filled; while an unemployed expects U. The initial 
value of a match to a firm and to a worker are denoted by Jo(l) and Wo(l)? respectively. 
The corresponding subsequent values, after an idiosyncratic shock has reduced the pro­
ductivity of the match to x , are J(x) and W(x).  Importantly, as it is assumed that the 
dollar amount of the match surplus is split in fixed proportions between the worker and 
the firm, the value functions of a worker, i.e. U, Vko(l) and W(x),  give his expected 
future earnings and abstract from risk aversion.
The Bellman equation for the value of a vacancy is:
rV  = - c  + q(0) [J0(l) + H - V ] ,
which is the same as before, cf. equation (17). The corresponding equation for the value 
of unemployment is:
rU = z + b + 0q(0) \w 0( l ) - U  .
The initial wage being denoted by Wo(l), the initial value of match to a firm and to a 
worker are, respectively, given by:
rJo(l) =  1 -  (w0(l) +  t )  +  A [  J ( s ) d G (8 ) - X G ( R ) F - X J Q(l),
Jr
rW0{l) = w0(l) + x [  W{s)dG(s) + X G ( R ) U - \ W 0{l).
Jr
Finally, the corresponding values for a subsequent match of productivity x, with wage 
w(x), are:
rJ{x) = x — (w(x) -I- r) +  A f  J(s)dG(s) — AG(R)F — AJ(x),
Jr
rW(x) = w(ix) + x [  W(s)dG(s) +  XG(R)U — XW(x).
Jr
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The surplus splitting rule from which the initial wage, Wo(l), is derived is:
( 1 - 0 )  W0( l ) - U  = P [J0(l) + H - V ] ,
where the firm receives the hiring subsidy in case an agreement is reached. The cor­
responding rule for an existing match that has just been hit by an idiosyncratic shock 
resulting in productivity x, and from which w(x) is derived, is:
(1 - P ) [ w ( x ) - 0 ]  =P [ J ( x )  + F - V \ ,
which takes into account the fact that, if the match dissolves, the firm needs to pay the 
layoff tax.
C Nash Bargaining with Commitment
Before solving the bargaining problem, it is useful to determine the value of the firm in 
match i at the job destruction threshold, Ji(Ri). It could be deduced from the equation 
for J(x),  (13), that:
Ji(x) =  +  MRi)-r +  A
Plugging this expression back into (13) evaluated at productivity Ri yields:
r  +  XG(Ri)
Thus:
and:
R i - { w i +  r)  +  —^  f  (s -  Ri)dG(s) -  AG(Ri)F 
T + A Jr,
dJi( l )  1
dwi r  + \ G ( R i ) ’
dJi{ 1)
dRi [r +  AG(ft)]'
a r 1
i ^ - ( w i  +  r) +  rF  + -----   /  ( s -R i )dG (s )
r + A JRi
where g(R) =  dG(R)/dR.
Similarly, it could be deduced from the value function of the employed worker, rWi = 
v(wi) +  XG(Ri) [U -  Wi], that:
dWi v'(wi)
and:
dwi r +  XG(Ri) ’ 
dWi Xg(Ri)
dRi [r +  AG(i^)f
[rU -  v(wi)] .
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Using the symmetry that prevails in equilibrium, i.e. w = Wi and R = R, together with 
the value of unemployment, (54), this last expression simplifies to:
dWi ^g(R) v(w) — v(z +  b)
=  ~ [r +  AG(J?)] r +  AG(R) +  9q{0)'
Finally, the first-order conditions for the wage Wi and the threshold R{ are obtained 
by differentiating the logarithm of the Nash product in (56). This yields:
(3 dWi 1 - /3  (  dJi( 1)
W i - U  dwi Jiil) + H - V  \  dwi
and:
/3 dWi 1 - /3  /  dJi( 1)
W i - U  dRi Ji{ 1) +  H  -  V  V dRi 
Using symmetry, i.e. dropping the subscript i , and substituting V = 0, J ( l ) + i /  =  c/q(0), 
W  — U = [v(w) — v(z -1- b)\/\p +  AG(R) +  0q(Q)\ and the above derivatives into these first- 
order conditions yields (57) and (58).
D Search Intensity under Surplus Splitting
When wages are given by (67) and (68), the value of employment to workers satisfies:
pW0(l) = v(ti/0(l)) +  A [ 1W(s)dG(s) + X G (R )U -X W 0{l),
Jr
pW{x) = v{w(x)) + A [  W(s)dG(s) +  XG(R)U — XW(x),
J r
where the former expression corresponds to newly employed workers and the latter to 
those who have already been hit by an idiosyncratic shock. Subtracting the former from 
the latter, I obtain:
W { X )  =  Wbd) - p +  A
Inserting this back into the expression for Wq(1), yields:
pW0(l) = 1 -  —^ T  [1 -  G(R)} p +  A t»(u;o(l))+-^-r f  v(w(x))dG(x)+XG(R) [U -  W0(l)] P + a J r
The value of unemployment for an average search intensity solves: 
pU = v{z +  b) -  a(s) +  0q{9, s) [W0(l) -  U] .
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Taking the difference between these last two value equations gives:
f1 _ JTX I1 “ ^ CK)]] w(wo(l)) + ^  l R v (w (x ) )d G (x ) ~ v(z + b) +  <r(s) 
W0(l) -  U = p + \G(R) + 8q(0,s)
Finally, this should be substituted into the first-order condition for search intensity:
s<T'(s) = 0q(O,s) [W0(l) — U] .
This yields (69) together with (70).
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lucrative position1. This is the creative destruction effect (Aghion and Howitt, 1994), on 
which we shall specifically focus in this chapter.
In an economy with creative destruction, newly formed matches benefit from the best 
technology available and, as a consequence, the highest revenues of the economy accrue to 
newly employed workers. As time passes, and as outside opportunities improve, the 
attractiveness of a job declines. We would therefore expect workers to engage into on-the-job 
search before their position becomes obsolete. However, to the best of my knowledge, this 
possibility has not seriously been considered yet. This is what I propose to do in this chapter.
We proceed by adding on-the-job search to the framework of Mortensen and 
Pissarides (1998) that has adapted the standard matching model of the labor market to allow 
for growth through creative destruction.2 Hence, as in their chapter, the productivity of a firm 
is assumed to be determined by its date of creation and technological progress characterized 
by the ever-increasing productivity of newly established firms. Jobs eventually become 
obsolete when the wage that an employer needs to offer in order to retain its workers reaches 
its productivity.
On-the-job search reduces the expected value of a match to the firm as its activity is 
destroyed when its employee resigns. As surplus sharing is assumed, this decreases the wage 
paid to the worker who therefore partially bears the expected cost of job destruction following 
a quit. Hence, workers only start looking for other jobs once outside opportunities have 
sufficiently improved.
It is important to emphasize that on-the-job search is allowed rather than imposed and, 
as a consequence, its occurrence shows that creative destruction provides a justification for 
the very existence on-the-job search. It is therefore natural and legitimate to consider on-the- 
job search in a model of growth by creative destruction.
In order to quantitatively assess the consequences of on-the-job search on the labor 
market equilibrium, we perform a calibration of the model. We obtain that the positive impact 
of growth on unemployment is considerably reduced, although not reversed, by allowing on- 
the-job search. A 1% rise in the rate of growth increases unemployment by 1.69 percentage 
point without on-the-job search and by only 0.10 with. What is even more surprising is that 
the main transmission channel at work in the traditional creative destruction model practically 
disappears when workers are allowed to seek jobs while employed. Indeed, the flow of 
obsolete jobs, which represents nearly half of job destructions without on-the-job search, 
becomes negligible with. In fact, it is replaced by a flow of job-to-job transitions. The 
intuition for this result is that unemployment ceases to be a necessary step before moving to a 
better paid position. Moreover, on-the-job search leads to an increase in the maximum life 
span of a match as workers have no incentive to quit their employer to seek for a better one as
1 Carre and Drouot (2004) show that in the context of growth by creative destruction, allowing for an “on-the-job 
learning effect” could lead to a positive impact of technological progress on employment.
2 The Mortensen Pissardies (1994) framework has already been extended to allow for on-the-job search; see, for 
e.g., Pissarides (1994) and Barlevy (2002). However, this has not been done in the context of growth by creative 
destruction.
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long as their income, net of search costs, is above the level of unemployment benefits. These 
consequences of on-the-job search considerably reduce the likelihood that a match survives 
until obsolescence.
It is interesting to note that these very strong effects are obtained even though 
employed job seekers represent less than 15% of the workforce and, in the benchmark 
calibration, they are significantly less efficient at searching for jobs than the unemployed.
The fact that, in the presence of on-the-job search, growth only has a small impact on 
the rate of unemployment is robust to a wide range of values of the elasticity of the matching 
function and of the bargaining power of workers. It is nevertheless not robust to high levels of 
unemployment insurance since on-the-job search rapidly disappears as growth increases. 
However, our main result remains very robust if the generosity of unemployment benefits is 
determined as a replacement ratio.
Creative destruction models of the labor market have often been criticized on the basis 
of the lack of empirical evidence of a positive impact of growth on unemployment. A first 
answer to those criticisms was provided by Postel-Vinay (2002) who argued that the short­
term dynamics of an economy with creative destruction are markedly different from those of 
the steady state. He showed that, following a sudden increase in the rate of growth, 
unemployment initially responds by a substantial decline. Thus, the positive impact of growth 
on unemployment is only a long-run phenomenon and it should be tested on that basis. By 
allowing for on-the-job search, we provide another defense of the creative destruction 
hypothesis. Indeed, the prediction that, even in the long run, there is almost no correlation 
between growth and unemployment is certainly easier to reconcile with the data than the 
strong positive correlation that typically arises without on-the-job search.
Hence, our findings could potentially qualify the results of Pissarides and Vallanti
(2006) who estimate that nearly all technological progress is of the disembodied form. They 
argue that even a moderate amount of embodied progress is not compatible with the negative 
impact of growth on unemployment which they find in their data. Also, Homstein et al.
(2007) propose an explanation for the rise in European Unemployment since the 1970’s based 
on an acceleration of embodied technological progress. It would be interesting to allow for 
on-the-job search in the context of their chapter, which might reduce their simulated rise in 
European unemployment.
This chapter proceeds as follows. The theoretical model is derived in Section 2. Then, 
a calibration is undertaken in Section 3; before a sensitivity analysis is performed in the 
following section. Finally, in Section 5, we briefly consider the consequences of having the 
level of unemployment benefits determined by a replacement ratio. This chapter ends with a 
conclusion.
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2 The theoretical model
2.1 Setup
Following Mortensen and Pissarides (1998), we shall assume that, in order to produce, 
a firm needs to employ one worker. When a firm fills its vacant position it adopts the most 
recent technology available. This choice is assumed irreversible and, hence, the same 
technology will have to be used throughout the existence of the match. Technological 
progress is therefore characterized by the ever-increasing productivity of newly established 
firms.
Irreversibility of investment implies that wages paid by firms erode over time in 
comparison with outside opportunities available on the labor market. This eventually leads to 
job obsolescence as the wage that an employer would need to pay in order to retain its worker 
exceeds the productivity of the match. The obsolescence age is denoted by T" .
It should be emphasized that in this chapter, as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1998), 
Postel-Vinay (2002), Michelacci and Lopez-Salido (2007) or Pissarides and Vallanti (2007), 
the technology is embodied in matches. Thus, existing technologies disappear as matches 
dissolve. An alternative, followed by Homstein, Kursell and Violante (2005, 2007), is to 
consider that technology is embodied in capital, implying that old capital can still be used 
after an employee has quitted. In other words, we assume that, once a position is vacant, 
adopting the latest technology is not costly. Importantly, under both formulations, 
technological improvement requires the formation of new matches. So, the economy cannot 
grow if workers do not move to more productive firms, as expected in the context of creative 
destruction3.
On-the-job search is allowed and some workers choose to engage into it. The 
unemployed are typically more efficient at searching for jobs than the employed. We 
therefore denote by s  the efficiency of employed job seekers, relative to the unemployed, in 
the search process; and we could reasonably consider that s  e [0,1]. Hence, market tightness 
is given by the following ratio:
Q= ~ r •> (1)
u  +  s - e
where v denotes the number of vacancies, u the number of unemployed and e the number of
employed job seekers. For simplicity, the working population is normalized to one. The
number of matches per unit of time is given by the following matching function:
m(u + S ’ e , v ) ,  (2)
3 If, on the contrary, capital can be upgraded within an existing match, then, from the perspective of this chapter, 
technological progress should be considered as disembodied.
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which is increasing and concave in both of its arguments, it is equal to zero if any of its 
argument is nil and it satisfies the standard Inada conditions. We further assume that it is 
homogenous of degree one, implying that the rate at which vacant positions become filled is:
-  - » T O '  ( )
Note that the function q is decreasing. The rate at which unemployed meet employers is:
^ i ± i e ^ =m(xe)
u + s e  = e m  ■ (4)
Clearly, the corresponding rate faced by employed job seekers is s0q{6) .
Productivity at time t on the technological frontier is denoted by p(t) . The 
productivity of a firm created at t  is determined by the best technology available at its 
creation; it therefore remains equal to p(z)  throughout the duration of the match. Assuming a 
constant rate of technological progress, g , productivity at the frontier evolves according to:
^ ) = e *' (5)
= p(t)e
where we normalize p(0) = 1.
We assume that the wage rate is determined by surplus splitting at each instant4. Let 
W(r,t) and J(r,t) denote the asset value (i.e. the present value of expected income) at / of a 
job match created at r to a worker and to a firm, respectively; similarly U{t) and V{t) stand
for the asset value at t of unemployment and of a vacancy, respectively. As we shall soon see,
W(r,t) and J(r,t) are both functions of the wage rate, w(r,t), which is itself indexed by the 
date of job creation, r , and current time, t . Surplus splitting implies that, at each instant, this 
wage rate is determined by:
W(z, 0  -  U(f) = p[W(T, t) + J(T, t) -  U(t) -  V(t)], (6)
where /? is the worker’s share.
For a job created at r ,  we denote the wage rate by wns(r,f) if the worker does not 
search on the job at time t and by ws(r,t) if the worker does search on the job at time t . We 
now characterize these two possible wage rates.
4 It is shown in the appendix that the equilibrium with surplus splitting at each instant is identical to the 
equilibrium with a fee-contract where the fee is determined by Nash bargaining at job creation. This is important 
since the fee-contract is by construction privately efficient. It follows that Shimer’s (2006) concern about the 
inefficiency of the surplus splitting rule with on-the-job search does not apply in the proposed framework.
To see this note that, in the context that Shimer considers, on-the-job search is imposed rather than allowed and, 
as a result, under Nash bargaining, a profitable deviation for the employer is to marginally raise the wage in 
order to increase retention. On the contrary, in this chapter, on-the-job search only occurs once the productivity 
of the match is sufficiently far from the technological frontier. Hence, the deviation suggested by Shimer is not 
profitable.
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2.2 Wage rate without on-the-job search
Without on-the-job search, the asset value at t of a job created at x to a worker 
satisfies the following Bellman equation5:
rW(r,t) = w”s (t, t) + 8\U(t) -  W(t, 0] + W(t, t) , (7)
where r is the discount rate and 8  the rate of the Poisson process that determines the 
occurrence of exogenous shocks that lead to job destruction6. This equation states that the 
interest perceived from employment over a unit of time, rW(r,t) , are composed of the salary,
wns (r, t) , the (negative) expected gains associated to a change of status from employed to 
unemployed, S(U(t) -W(r, t)) ,  and the capital gains, W(x,t) . This capital gain term is part of 
the Bellman equation as, even in steady state, the asset value of employment changes over 
time. Indeed, as a firm gets older, obsolescence gets closer and the value of employment 
evolves toward that of unemployment. Similarly, the asset value at t of a match made at x to 
a firm satisfies:
rJ(T,t) = p(r) -  w“ (r ,0  + S[V(t)-J(T,t)}+j(T,t) , (8)
where, from the assumption of irreversible investment, the productivity of a firm, p(x) , is 
determined by the technology available at its creation.
The asset value of unemployment solves:
rU(t) = p(t)b + eq(ff)[W(t,t)-U(tj\+U(l), (9)
where p(t)b denotes the opportunity cost of employment, which could be thought of as 
unemployment benefits, and W(tyt ) -U { t ) is the capital gain obtained if a job is found which 
occurs at the Poisson rate given by (4). The worker’s opportunity cost of employment, p(t)b , 
is increasing with time as, otherwise, we would not have a steady state with a constant rate of 
unemployment which would be counterfactual. Also, unemployment benefits could
reasonably be assumed to be equal to a fixed proportion of the average wage in the economy,
justifying the indexation on the current level of productivity.
Finally, the asset value of a vacant position satisfies:
rV(t) = -p(t)c  + q(e)[j(t,t) -  F(/)]+ V(t), (10)
where p(t)c is the flow cost of advertising the vacancy and is the capital gain
obtained when the vacancy is filled which occurs at the Poisson rate given by (3). Again,
stationarity requires the flow cost of advertisement to be indexed on productivity which is a
reasonable assumption to make. Imposing free entry, we must have V(t) = 0 at all time; 
implying:
5 • . dW(r,t)
The dot denotes a time derivative; thus: W \T,t) = -----------.
dt
6 It should be emphasized that the possibility o f exogenous shocks is allowed for realism since many matches 
dissolve before obsolescence and without the worker quitting for another job. This could reflect, for instance, 
taste shocks or adverse match specific productivity shocks.
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J(t,t) = p(t)c
<1( 0)
(11)
This equation states that the value of a new match to the firm must exactly compensate the 
expected cost of advertisement that needs to be incurred in order to fill the position.
The surplus sharing rule assumed for wage determination, (6), could be rewritten as:
(12)
Combining this sharing rule at time t  =  t  with the asset value of a newly matched firm, (11), 
we obtain:
P  c
1
This could be substituted into the equation for the asset value of unemployment, (9), to give:
P
(13)
rU{t) = p(t) b +
1 - p
c6 + t/(0 . (14)
The first term of the right hand side of the equation corresponds to the worker’s reservation 
wage. It is larger than the level of unemployment benefits since an unemployed worker can 
expect to obtain a lucrative job. Thus, the second term of the reservation wage is just the 
value of a new position to the worker, given by (13), multiplied by the rate at which such 
position is found, 6q{6) .
The wage rate is obtained by substituting the asset equations (7), (8) and then (14) into 
the sharing rule (12) and by noting that the sharing rule also applies to the capital gains. This 
gives:
Pw’'\T,t) = Pp{T) + {\~P)p{t) b +
1 - p
cQ (15)
The wage is a weighted average of the firm’s productivity and of the worker’s reservation 
wage. It typically increases at a rate that is lower than the rate of technological progress as the 
employer imperfectly compensates its employee for the improvement in outside labor market 
opportunities.
2.3 Wage rate with on-the-job search
The value at t of a job created at r  to a worker who is seeking for outside 
opportunities is given by:
rW(z,t) = w’(r,t)~ p(t)sa  + <5[t/(0 -  W(t ,/)] + sOq(0)l$V(t,t)~ lV(r, 0] + W(t, t) , (16) 
where p(t)scr denotes opportunity cost of on-the-job search to the worker which, for 
stationarity, is indexed to productivity. It is also reasonable to assume that search is more 
costly when employed job seekers are more efficient which justifies the cost being 
proportional to s . In comparison with the corresponding equation without on-the-job search,
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(7), two new terms are added. One is the cost of on-the-job search, p { t ) s c r , which could be
when moving to another job, W(t,t )-W(r, t) , multiplied by the Poisson rate at which such 
new jobs are found by employed job seekers, s6q{0). Similarly, for a firm, the asset value at 
t of a match made at t satisfies:
where free entry is assumed. The value of unemployment is still given by (14) and the sharing 
rule, (12), still holds.
Substituting (16) and (17) and then (13) and (14) into the sharing rule (12) and noting 
that this rule also applies to capital gains, the wage rate that prevails with on-the-job search is:
If employed job seekers are as efficient as the unemployed at searching for jobs, 5 = 1, then 
the wage is independent of outside labor market conditions, i.e. it is independent of 6 . This is 
explained by the fact that returning to unemployment yields unemployment benefits, but, 
unlike in the case without on-the-job search, it does not open the possibility of finding a more 
lucrative job, which has a value increasing in 0,  as this possibility already exists while 
employed. Thus, when s = 1, the worker’s reservation wage is equal to p(t)(b + <r) where cr 
is the cost of searching that does not need to be paid while unemployed which explains why it 
is part of the gain associated with returning to unemployment. When employed job seekers 
are not as efficient as the unemployed at searching for jobs, 5 < 1, then the worker’s 
reservation wage is a weighted average of the two extreme cases where 5 = 1, i.e. the two 
types of job seekers are perfect substitutes in the search process, and where 5 = 0, i.e. on-the- 
job search is not possible. Finally, by comparing (15) to (18) it is apparent that searching 
while working reduces the wage paid to the employee provided that:
As we shall see in the resolution of the model this turns out to be a necessary and sufficient 
condition for on-the-job search to take place before obsolescence.
2.4 Solving for the equilibrium
Importantly, as in Pissarides (1994, 2000 chapter 4), we are assuming throughout that 
the firm can observe and verify whether its worker is currently searching for another job or
7 If searching for a job is not more costly while employed than while unemployed, then the opportunity cost of 
on-the-job search is equal to zero, i.e. <7 = 0 .
assumed to be small relative to other variables7; and the other is the capital gain obtained
rJ(r,i) = p(r) -  ws (r,t) -  -  sOq{0)J{rft) + J(r,t) , (17)
(18)
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not.8 Thus, when a worker privately decides to start searching on the job at time t , his wage 
rate switches from wns (r, t) to ws(z,t) .
Comparing (7) and (16), it appears clearly that a worker chooses to search on the job 
at time t if and only if the corresponding benefits are greater than the costs:
ws(z,t)~p(i)s<7 + s6q(Q)\W(t,i)- W(z,t)]> wns{z,t). (20)
Using the expressions for the wage rate, (15) and (18), this condition simplifies to:
W(t,t) c0 + a  ^ W(z,t) 
p{t) 0q(6) pit)
In steady state, the left hand side is constant while the right hand side is decreasing in t . 
Indeed, the value of an existing match, W(z,t), approaches that of unemployment, U(t), as 
the job gets older. Thus, the growth rate of the numerator on the RHS is lower than g , the 
growth rate of the denominator. Note also that condition (21) is not satisfied at the job 
creation time, i.e. at / = r . It follows that, if on-the-job search ever occurs, it only takes place 
after a given amount of time spent in a match, denoted by T' where T' e [0,7""]. Thus, for a 
job created at z , there are two periods of interest:
• /G [ r , r  + 7"), when the worker is not searching;
• t e  [r + T \  r + T”) , when the worker is searching on the job.
This is intuitive as a newly employed worker who has recently found a job with productivity 
still close to the technological frontier is unlikely to search for outside opportunities. 
Conversely, a worker might choose to engage into on-the-job search as obsolescence 
approaches in the hope of obtaining a high productivity job without intervening 
unemployment.
In this economy, an equilibrium is characterized by values of (!T',Tn,6) such that:
• T' and T" maximize the value of employment to a worker for a given market 
tightness 0 .
• 0 is determined by a free entry condition, which implies that the value of a firm with 
a vacant position, given workers’ choice of T ' and T ", is equal to zero.
Assuming that a firm can observe and verify the search activity of its employee
implies that both the worker and the firm know the total value of the match surplus under any
contingencies. Since surplus splitting applies for any possible choice of T , the worker will 
choose the value of T' that maximizes the match surplus. His decision will therefore be 
efficient.9
8 As shown in Michau (2007), assuming that firms cannot observe the search activity of their employees 
dramatically increases the amount of on-the-job search which strengthens the main conclusions of this paper.
9 The efficiency of the present contracting arrangement is confirmed by the equivalence between the allocation 
of resources derived in this section and the allocation resulting from a fee-contract derived in the appendix.
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We now need to work with value functions in order to determine when the worker 
chooses to start searching, t  +  T ',  and to resign, t  +  T" , such that the value of his job is 
maximized. Since the surplus is shared in fixed proportions between the employer and the 
worker, the problem could also be analyzed from the firm’s perspective. It turns out to be 
analytically much simpler to maximize the employer’s surplus rather than the worker’s 
surplus.
The value of a match of vintage r  to a firm shortly after creation, t  <  t  +  T , is given
by:
t + T ’ t +T"
J(r,t) = J [p(r) _ wm{r,u)}iu + f ^ (r) _ (r> „)](*, .(22)
t  t + T '
Now, the first order condition for the optimal time to start searching on the job, t  +  T' , is 
given by:
w”5 (r, r + T') = ws (r, t  + T') + sfy(0)J(T, t  + T'). (23)
This equation states that on-the-job search begins when, from the firm’s perspective, the cost 
of having an employee who is not searching, i.e. the left hand side, equals the cost of 
employing a job seeker, i.e. the right hand side, where this latter cost comprises the 
instantaneous probability of losing the positive asset value of the job.
For the purpose of solving for the equilibrium of the model, the first order condition 
(23) could be simplified to:
(  n  \
e   ............... -  \ - e giu- T)
t + T '
e*r cO-ar =  0q (6 )  j b + scr + (1 -  s) ---— cO 
i - / ?  , du  ,(2 4 )\ - p
where the integral could be solved explicitly. It appears clearly from this equation that on-the- 
job search occurs if and only if condition (19), stating that the cost of on-the-job search is not 
too high, is satisfied10. As this condition is reasonable, it is natural and legitimate to allow on- 
the-job search in an economy with creative destruction.
Interestingly, even if the opportunity cost of on-the-job search is equal to zero, i.e. 
cr = 0, the worker does not start searching as soon as he is recruited. The intuition for this is 
that, by searching on-the-job, the worker imposes a cost on his current employer whose match 
might soon dissolve. But, under surplus splitting, this reduces the wage rate of the worker. As 
a result, the worker does not find it desirable to incur such wage cut when the productivity of 
the match is still close to the technological frontier.
Using the value function of the firm, (22), the first order condition for the optimal date 
of resignation, t  + T" , is:
p ( t )  =  w s ( t , t  + T"). (25)
Note that there is no problem of dynamic inconsistency. The firm wants to destroy the job 
when the wage rate reaches its productivity level, reducing the surplus to zero. Condition (25) 
simplifies to:
10 If (19) does not hold we can consider that T' = T" . In the rest of this chapter, we assume that (19) is 
satisfied.
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p{r) = p(T + T”) 6 + 5<t + (1-5)
\ - p
cO (26)
The condition of optimality states that the match ends when the worker’s reservation wage 
reaches the productivity of the match. Solving explicitly for T ”, using the formula for 
productivity growth, (5), we obtain:
r = - l n  
8
1
b + scr + ( l - s )
\ - p
cO
(27)
An interesting result is that when both types of job seekers, i.e. the unemployed and the 
employed, are equally efficient in the search process, i.e. 5 = 1, the maximum life span of a 
job is independent of market tightness11, 6 . Indeed, as returning to unemployment does not 
increase the likelihood of finding a more lucrative job, a worker remains in employment until 
unemployment benefits reach the productivity of the firm net of search costs. On the contrary, 
when on-the-job search is not allowed or when employed job seekers are not as efficient as 
the unemployed at finding jobs, i.e. s < 1, then the maximum life span of a job is decreasing 
in market tightness. This is explained by the fact that market tightness, which improves 
employment prospects, has more value to an unemployed, who is searching very efficiently, 
than to an employed job seeker. Finally, note that, for a given market tightness, the maximum
19life span of a job is increased by permitting on-the-job search .
Finally, the equilibrium market tightness, 6 , is determined by equation (11) which 
could be written as:
1
1 - 0 q(0)
l
-J '
—( r+S)u l - e b +
\ - P
cO du
T"
+  J *r
- ( r+6)u-s6q(0Xu-T ') l - e g« b + scr + ( \ - s )
1 - / 3
cO
(28)
du
where, again, the integrals could be solved explicitly.
11 This result generalizes under variable search intensity. If, rather than being fixed at 5 ,  search intensity is 
allowed to increase smoothly over time, then, assuming that searching while employed is not more costly than 
while unemployed, it can be shown that search intensity tends to 1 as the match reaches the obsolescence age 
(see Michau 2007).
12 In the standard creative destruction model without on-the-job search, the maximum age of a match at 
destruction, Tn, is determined by p{f) = Wns (r, T + T ”) , giving:
/  \
r = - l n  
g
1
b +
\ i - f i
C0
which is lower than the value implied by (27) whenever (19) holds.
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The equilibrium is characterized by {T',T”,6) , which is the solution to the system 
composed of equations (24), (27) and (28). The wage rate is then given by (15) for 
t e |> ,r  + r ')  and by (18) for / e [ r  + T \ t + T").
2.5 Job flows and equilibrium rate of unemployment
The rate of unemployment13, u , and the number of employed job seekers, e , could be 
deduced from the job flows induced by the model. Job creation could either be due to the 
hiring of an unemployed, which occurs at rate 6q{0)u{t), or to the hiring of an employed job
seeker, at rate s6q(6)e(t). Thus, the number of new jobs created at time t , C(t), is given by:
C(t) = fy(0)[u{t) + se{t)] . (29)
The flow of obsolete jobs at t is equal to the number of job created at t - T " , 
C ( t - T "), multiplied by their survival probability from t - T " to t which we shall now
compute. For a job created at time t  , the probability to survive until t  +  T ' is equal to e_<sr 
since the arrival of job destruction shocks is given by an exponential distribution with 
parameter S .  Opportunities to move to another job are distributed according to an 
exponential distribution starting at time t  + T ' and with parameter s0q{6). Thus, in order to 
survive until time t  +  T" , the job should not be destroyed, which is satisfied with probability 
e_<5r, and the worker should not find another job, which is satisfied with probability 
e-sa,mr-r) events being independent of each other, the probability to survive until
t  + T" is given by Thus, the obsolescence flow is equal to
Job destruction could either be due to an exogenous adverse shock, to job 
obsolescence or to the resignation of an employed job seeker, with corresponding flows equal 
to S(\-u( t )) ,  C(t - T ^ e -51^ ~sGqmT ~T) and sGq(6)e(t), respectively.
The flow into unemployment is either due to obsolescence or to the occurrence of 
exogenous shocks, whereas the outflow is due to the hiring of unemployed workers. Hence, 
the evolution of unemployment is determined by:
u(t) = -  T") + S( 1 -  u(t)) -  Qq{6)u(t) . (30)
The flow into the set of employed job seekers is equal to the number of jobs created at t - T '  
that survive until t, C ( t - T f), whereas the corresponding outflow is either due to 
exogenous shocks that lead to job destruction, to the resignation of employed job seekers who 
receive outside offers, or to obsolescence. Thus, the evolution of the number of employed job 
seekers is given by:
i(0  = e a'C{t -  T') -  Se(t) -  s6q(9)e(t) -  e- sr-*a'«'xr -r >C(, -T") .  (31)
The working population being normalized to one, the rate o f unemployment is also the number o f  
unemployed.
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The rate of unemployment and the number of employed job seekers in steady state 
equilibrium, i.e. with C(t) = C , u(t) = u and e(t) = e for all values of t , are obtained by 
simultaneously solving (29), (30) and (31).
3 Calibration
In order to quantitatively assess the effects of on-the-job search on the labor market 
equilibrium, we now calibrate the model and run numerical simulations. Empirical studies 
have provided some support for a constant elasticity of matching (Petrongolo Pissarides 
2001). This implies that q is of the form q{6) = k6~a where k is a constant to be determined 
and a  is the constant elasticity of the matching rate with respect to the unemployment rate. 
This elasticity, a , is set equal to 0.5, close to the mid-range of estimated values in several 
countries (Petronogolo Pissarides 2001). The matching surplus is assumed to be split equally 
between the employer and the worker, i.e. /? = 0.5. This implies that the Hosios condition 
holds and that, without on-the-job search, the search equilibrium is efficient. The annual rate 
of interest, r , is taken to be equal to 4%. Following Shimer (2005), the opportunity cost of 
unemployment b is set equal to 0.4, which is reasonable if it mainly consists of 
unemployment benefits.
As in Shimer (2005), the flow cost of posting a vacancy, c, is calibrated such that, for 
the benchmark parameterization, market tightness 6 is normalized to l .14 This gives c =
0.456. The exogenous rate of job destruction 6, the scale parameter of the matching function 
k and the efficiency with which employed job seekers look for jobs s  are jointly calibrated 
such that the transition rates from employment to unemployment, from unemployment to 
employment and from job to job are, respectively, equal to 0.104, 1.800 and 0.116. These 
values are taken from Menzio Shi (2008) and correspond to the US economy from 1951 to 
2006 for the first two transition rates and from 1994 to 2006 for the last one.15 This yields 
S = 0.104, k = 1.800 and s  = 0.609. Finally, the cost of on-the-job search a  is calibrated 
such that the number of employed job seekers represents 10% of the workforce, a 
conservative estimate. This implies <r = 0.027. This benchmark calibration is derived for a 
rate of technological progress g  equal to 2%, as in Pissarides Vallenti (2007). Note that this 
calibration implies an average job duration of 4.5 years. The values of the parameters of the 
model are reported in Table 1.
14 In the discussion, we associate each parameter to one moment; but clearly different parameters interact among 
each other and the calibration is performed such that all the calibrated parameters c, S, k, s  and a  jointly match 
the desired moments.
15 Menzio and Shi (2008) report quarterly transition rates which were multiplied by 4, to obtain annual rates, for 
the present calibration. The first two rates imply an unemployment rate of 5.5%, which approximately 
corresponds to the US average from 1951 to 2006.
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Table 1: Parameters
r 8 b c (7 s P a k
0.04 0.104 0.4 0.456 0.027 0.609 0.5 0.5 1.800
We now focus on the impact of the rate of growth g  on the equilibrium of the model 
and especially on the rate of unemployment. We therefore compare the equilibrium for 
growth rates of 2 and 3%. In order to analyze the consequences of on-the-job search, 
corresponding results are also reported when s  = 0, i.e. without on-the-job search. The results 
are reported in Table 2.
Table 2: Simulated equilibrium values
u e V e r jiir
5 = 0.609
g  = 0.02 0.0546 0.100 0.116 1.00 5.3 26.0
g = 0.03 0.0556 0.137 0.134 0.96 4.0 17.7
5 = 0
g  = 0.02 0.0894 0 0.086 0.96 - 8.8
g = 0.03 0.1063 0 0.097 0.91 - 6.8
It is also interesting to compute the job flows induced by the model. These are displayed in 
Table 3.
Table 3: Job flows
Total job 
creation 
(destruc­
tion) flow
Job creation Job destruction
Hiring of 
unem­
ployed
Hiring of 
employed 
job seekers
Exogenous
shocks
Obsolescence
Resignation of 
employed job 
seekers
C 6q(6)u sQq(Q)e 8{ \ -u ) g-sr’-seqmT’-r)^ s6q{6)e
5 = 0.609
g  = 0.02 0.2080 0.0983 0.1097 0.0983 1.9 • 10"12 0.1097
g  = 0.03 0.2458 0.0982 0.1476 0.0982 1.6 • 10"8 0.1476
5 = 0
g  = 0.02 0.1580 0.1580 0 0.0947 0.0633 0
g  = 0.03 0.1825 0.1825 0 0.0929 0.0896 0
We observe that allowing on-the-job search considerably reduces the positive impact 
of growth on unemployment; indeed a one percentage point increase in the rate of economic 
growth increases the rate of unemployment by only 0.10 percentage point with on-the-job
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search instead of 1.69 without. What is even more interesting is the modification of the labor 
market dynamics that occurs when workers are allowed to seek jobs while employed. When 
on-the-job search is not permitted, 5 = 0, the main explanation for the positive correlation 
between growth and unemployment is the flow of obsolescence which, as can be seen from 
Table 3, is responsible for nearly half of the job destructions. Allowing on-the-job search does 
not only reduce the obsolescence flow, it almost suppresses it. This is due to the combination 
of the large increase in the maximum life span of a match, T”, and of the possibility to move 
to a better paid job without intervening unemployment.16 Thus, in this context, a new match 
has a very low probability to survive until obsolescence.
We observe that the obsolescence flow is replaced by the flow of job-to-job 
transitions. This latter flow, contrary to the former, does not feed unemployment. In fact, the 
small positive impact of growth on unemployment that remains is not due to job 
obsolescence. Instead, faster growth increases the value of unemployment, which decreases 
the total surplus of a match to the worker and, from surplus splitting, to the firm. This 
decreases market tightness and, therefore, the hiring of unemployed workers. This 
modification of the transmission channels at work shows that on-the-job search profoundly 
changes the dynamics of the matching model with creative destruction.
It is also interesting to note that the possibility of on-the-job search has important labor 
market consequences although only a minority of employees choose to engage into it, i.e. e 
remains below 15%, and their job seeking efficiency is smaller than that of the unemployed, 
i.e. s < 1.
As can be seen from Table 2, allowing on-the-job search decreases the equilibrium 
rate of unemployment. This is essentially due to the decrease in the obsolescence flow. 
Indeed, on the job creation side, the rate at which unemployed are hired hardly changes as 
market tightness hardly changes. The evolution is therefore due to the large modifications that 
occur on the job destruction side.
Note that an alternative strategy would have been to recalibrate the model without on- 
the-job search such as to match the transition rates between employment and unemployment. 
This would have guaranteed an identical rate of unemployment in both versions of the model,
i.e. with and without on-the-job search. However, it turns out that, absent on-the-job search, 
the obsolescence flow is so high that a negative rate S of exogenous job destruction would be 
needed to match the rather low empirical rate of job destruction (while simultaneously 
matching the other moments of the calibration).
It is nevertheless possible to have an idea of what this strategy would have yielded if 
available by setting the exogenous destruction rate S equal to 0. In this case, the rate of 
unemployment increases from 6.74 to 8.50% as growth increases from 2 to 3%. The impact of 
growth on unemployment is therefore slightly larger than without recalibration, i.e. it is equal 
to 1.76 percentage point instead of 1.69. This is not surprising as, with zero exogenous job
16 The average duration of a job being less than 5 years, the latter effect is quantitatively more important than the 
former in explaining the disappearance of the obsolescence flow.
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destruction, the obsolescence flow is even larger than before as it is the unique source of job 
destruction.
As the outcome of a creative destruction model with on-the-job search contrasts 
sharply with that of a model without, our results cast a new light on some applied work 
realized on the topic. Pissarides and Vallanti (2006) argue that nearly all technological 
progress is of the disembodied form. They estimate from a panel of OECD countries that the 
effect of a one percentage point increase in the rate of growth on the rate of unemployment is 
equal to -1.49 percentage point in the United-States and to -1.31 in the European Union. 
Using a matching model of the labor market that allows for both embodied and disembodied 
technological progress, they argue that even a moderate amount of creative destruction could 
not be compatible with the observed negative correlation between growth and unemployment. 
The positive impact of growth on unemployment induced by the creative destruction effect is 
so strong that it could hardly be compensated by the negative impact induced by the 
capitalization effect. They conclude that creative destruction plays no role in the steady state 
dynamics of unemployment. Clearly, allowing for on-the-job search should alter those results 
in favor of the creative destruction hypothesis. Although some disembodied technological 
progress would still be needed to explain the negative correlation found in the data, a fair 
amount of growth by creative destruction could presumably coexist without absorbing the 
capitalization effect.
Also, Homstein et al. (2007) argue that half the rise in European Unemployment since 
the 1970’s could be explained by the combination of labor market rigidities and an 
acceleration of embodied technological progress. Although we do not consider any interaction 
with policies, our findings suggest that allowing for on-the-job search might reduce their 
simulated rise in European unemployment17. Further research on this issue would certainly be 
very interesting.
4 Sensitivity analysis
In the previous section, when performing the calibration, the elasticity of the matching 
function a  and the bargaining power of workers p  were both exogenously set to 0.5 and the 
opportunity cost of unemployment b was set to 0.4. Although plausible, these values remain 
subject to controversies in the literature. In this section, we therefore investigate whether the 
impact of growth on unemployment remains small for other plausible values of these 
parameters.
17 It should nevertheless be noted that their model differs from ours in that technological progress is embodied in 
capital rather than in matches.
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4.1 Sensitivity to a and /?
We begin by exploring the sensitivity of the impact of growth on unemployment with
respect to a  and f t . The results are reported in Table 4, where the on-the-job search model
1 8was recalibrated as described in the previous section for each new pair of a and /?. The 
effect of growth on unemployment was estimated as growth increases from 2% to 3%. The 
corresponding numbers without on-the-job search, i.e. s = 0, are reported in bracket (the 
calibration is the same, for each a and /?, as for the corresponding number with on-the-job 
search).
Table 4: Impact of growth on the rate of unemployment (in percentage points)
a
P
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
0.5 0.203
(1.884)
0.150
(1.781)
0.103
(1.689)
0.059
(1.606)
0.019
(1.532)
0.6 0.214
(1.958)
0.159
(1.865)
0.109
(1.782)
0.063
(1.706)
0.020
(1.637)
0.7 0.234 0.177 0.124 0.076 0.031
(2.026) (1.942) (1.865) (1.794) (1.729)
0.8 0.399 0.332 0.271 0.215 0.163
(2.090) (2.013) (1.941) (1.875) (1.813)
0.9 1.248 1.147 1.056 0.971 0.893
(2.154) (2.082) (2.015) (1.953) (1.894)
Note: For each a  and /?, the table reports the impact of an increase in the rate of growth from 2 to 3% on the rate 
of unemployment (in percentage points) when on-the-job search is allowed and, in bracket, when it is not.
This sensitivity analysis suggests that the impact of growth on unemployment remains very 
low, except for high values of the bargaining power of workers. But, even in this last case, 
allowing on-the-job search nearly halves the impact of growth on unemployment.
18 For each pair of a  and /?, the parameters S, c, a, s  and k have jointly been recalibrated such as to match the 
aforementioned empirical moments and the normalization 0 =  1; while r and b remained fixed at 0.04 and 0.4, 
respectively, throughout this exercise. Note that the model cannot be recalibrated for /? below 0.49 as the 
bargaining power of workers would be so low that even a zero cost o f on-the-job search would not be enough to 
induce 10% of the workforce to seek jobs while employed (while simultaneously matching the other empirical 
moments). However, corresponding results without recalibration show that a lower bargaining power of workers 
reduces the impact o f growth on unemployment and, hence, strengthens our main result.
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4.2 Sensitivity to b
Let us now turn to the opportunity cost of employment, b . The chosen calibration for 
this parameter could potentially have a large impact on the resulting equilibrium. Indeed, in 
order to keep the obsolescence flow to a very low level, it is necessary that workers prefer to 
search for jobs while remaining in employment rather than choose to become unemployed. If 
the opportunity cost of employment b is high, workers on low productivity jobs will quickly 
choose to resign, generating a substantial obsolescence flow.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between b and the impact of growth on unemployment 
where, again, the on-the-job search model was fully recalibrated for each value of b (with a 
and /? both equal to 0.5).19 The solid line reports the relationship with on-the-job search and 
the dashed line without.
Figure 1: Impact of growth on unemployment as a function of the opportunity cost of employment
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The model could not be calibrated for b smaller than 0.37. Indeed, when b is very low, 
workers remain so long in a match before starting to seek for outside opportunities that, even 
when on-the-job search is costless, i.e. even when a = 0, the fraction of employed job seekers 
is below 10%. Similarly, the model could not be calibrated for b larger than 0.74. When 
unemployment benefits are very generous, workers prefer to search while unemployed in 
order to save the cost of on-the-job search a. This implies that T” is close to T' and, hence, 
the obsolescence flow is large. Indeed, for b higher than 0.74, the obsolescence flow is larger
19 The effect o f growth on unemployment was computed as growth increases from 2 to 2.1%. The resulting 
number was then multiplied by 10 in order to be interpreted as the impact o f a 1% increase in the growth rate. 
For high values o f b, the estimation o f the marginal effect o f growth on unemployment turns out to be more 
precise close to the rate o f growth at which the model was calibrated, i.e. close to 2%.
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than the empirical rate of job destruction, which would require a negative rate 8 of exogenous 
shocks.
The result that on-the-job search considerably reduces the impact of growth on 
unemployment is very robust for values of b up to 0.6. However, such is not the case for 
larger values. Perhaps surprisingly, for b higher than 0.66, the impact of growth on 
unemployment is larger with on-the-job search than without. To understand this result very 
clearly, we report the full labor market equilibrium for b = 0.74. Table 5 gives the calibrated 
parameters, Table 6 the labor market equilibrium and Table 7 the corresponding job flows.
Table 5: Parameters
r 8 b c CT s P a k
0.04 0.003 0.74 0.173 0.166 0.609 0.5 0.5 1.800
Table 6: Simulated equilibrium values
u e V e r
5 = 0.609
g = 0.02 0.0546 0.100 0.116 1.00 4.09 4.79
g  = 0.021 0.0650 0.087 0.117 0.99 4.04 4.60
g  = 0.03 0.1386 0 0.126 0.91 - 3.65
s = 0
g  = 0.02 0.1087 0 0.109 1.00 - 4.59
g = 0.021 0.1119 0 0.111 0.99 - 4.47
g  = 0.03 0.1386 0 0.126 0.91 - 3.65
Table 7: Job flows
Total job 
creation 
(destruc­
tion) flow
Job creation Job destruction
Hiring of 
unem­
ployed
Hiring of 
employed 
job seekers
Exogenous
shocks
Obsolescence
Resignation of 
employed job 
seekers
C 6q(6)u sQq(6)e 8 ( \ -u ) e-8r'-seq{0\r-r)Q s6q{G)e
5 = 0.609
g = 0.02 0.2080 0.0983 0.1097 0.0029 0.0954 0.1097
g = 0.021 0.2112 0.1163 0.0949 0.0029 0.1134 0.0949
g  = 0.03 0.2376 0.2376 0 0.0026 0.2350 0
5 = 0
g  = 0.02 0.1955 0.1955 0 0.0027 0.1928 0
g = 0.021 0.2002 0.2002 0 0.0027 0.1975 0
g  = 0.03 0.2376 0.2376 0 0.0026 0.2350 0
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When the opportunity cost of employment b is high, workers fairly rapidly decide to 
return to unemployment in order to find another job without incurring the extra cost of on-the- 
job search o. This translates into a low value of T” which generates a substantial 
obsolescence flow, as could be seen from the upper part of Table 7. When g is equal to 2%, 
the calibration of the model nevertheless ensures that 10% of the workforce is composed of 
employed job seekers, i.e. £ = 0.10, and that the job-to-job transition flow remains 
substantial. As a result, more than half the reallocation of workers from low to high 
productivity jobs occurs without intervening unemployment and, hence, for g  = 0.02, the rate 
of unemployment is much smaller when on-the-job search is allowed than when it is not, as 
seen in Table 6.
When growth increases to 2.1%, a match becomes obsolete even more rapidly than 
before, while on-the-job search only becomes slightly more attractive. Thus, T" decreases by 
more than T  and, hence, the total number of employed job seekers declines. A higher rate of 
growth g leads to a larger aggregate flow of reallocation of workers from low to high 
productivity jobs and, furthermore, a larger share of this reallocation process occurs through 
obsolescence. This leads to a very large increase in the rate of unemployment.
For a growth rate of 3%, even when on-the-job search is allowed, it does not occur. 
The rate of unemployment is therefore independent of the possibility of on-the-job search. 
Since, for g = 0.02, unemployment was much smaller with on-the-job search than without, it 
trivially follows that the impact of an increase in growth on the rate unemployment is much 
larger when on-the-job search is allowed.
In a nutshell, the main result of the chapter, that on-the-job search considerably 
reduces the impact of growth on unemployment, ceases to hold for high values of b because 
on-the-job search disappears as growth increases. To the extent that we do not expect higher 
growth to be associated with a lower number of employed job seekers, a high value of b does 
not seem very sensible in the present context.
5 Replacement ratio
Throughout our analysis, we have assumed that the opportunity cost of employment is 
just a fraction, b , of the productivity of the economy at the technological frontier, p(t) . In 
this section, we relax this assumption by considering the possibility that the level of 
unemployment benefits at the time of job destruction is determined as a replacement ratio, y . 
It should be noted that, here, the opportunity cost of employment is assumed to consist 
exclusively of the forgone unemployment benefits and does not include any value of leisure.
The focus of this section is on the maximum life span, T" , that a job can reach in this 
context. We derive the analytic result that, under plausible assumptions, a match could
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survive forever and, hence, there is no job obsolescence flow. This suggests that our previous 
numerical results are, fundamentally, very robust.
Solving the model in this case is complicated by the fact that the level of 
unemployment benefits is a function of the last wage and, hence, of the last date of job 
creation, r , and of job destruction. Nevertheless, proceeding as earlier to determine the wage 
rate and assuming20 that the employed and the unemployed are equally efficient at searching 
for jobs, i.e. 5 = 1, and that they face the same corresponding costs, i.e. a  = 0, it is 
straightforward to show that the wage rate with on-the-job search is determined by:
w1 (r, t) = Pp(r) + (1 -  P)b{r, t, t), (32)
where b(r,D,t) denote the level of unemployment benefit at t when the worker’s previous 
job was created at r and destroyed at D.  At destruction time, the level of benefits is 
determined by the replacement ratio21, y  < 1, so:
b{r, t + T”,t + T”) = M r ,  t + T”). (33)
Combining (32) and (33), we have:
w(t, t + T ”) = - f  p { t ) . (34)
i —( i - P ) r
But, this implies that, for all values of T" :
p(t)  > vv(r, t  + T”) . (35)
Hence, the first order condition for T", (25), is never satisfied and the match could survive 
forever.22
This result is quite intuitive. Indeed, when search is not more costly while employed 
than while unemployed, the opportunity cost of having a job is the forgone flow of 
unemployment benefits. But, if these are lower than the income from work, then the surplus 
from the match is always positive and it could survive forever.
Finally, it should be emphasized that, although the obsolescence flow disappears in 
this version of the model, we still expect growth to have a small positive impact on 
unemployment. Indeed, faster growth reduces the surplus from a match, which decreases 
market tightness and, hence, the outflow from unemployment.
20 This assumption is much milder under variable search intensity as, in this case, when job search is equally 
costly for the employed and for the unemployed, at obsolescence employed job seekers are as efficient at 
searching for job as the unemployed (see footnote 11).
21 It is also important that, after job destruction, the level o f unemployment benefits does not increase too fast 
over time, as, otherwise, the worker would never remain in employment. A sufficient condition is that the level 
of unemployment benefits increases at the same rate as the wage rate, had the worker remained in employment.
22 Thus, contrary to what Figure 1 might suggest, the main result of this chapter could be robust to high levels of 
unemployment benefits, provided that they are defined as a replacement ratio.
80
6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have analyzed the labor market consequences of allowing on-the- 
job search in the context of growth by creative destruction. We have shown that workers 
voluntarily choose to engage into on-the-job search when they have the possibility to do so 
and, hence, we have argued that it is natural and legitimate to allow on-the-job search in 
matching models with creative destruction. Indeed, the dynamics of the model are 
fundamentally changed by this modification.
The positive impact of growth on unemployment is considerably reduced by allowing 
on-the-job search. Our calibration exercise reveals that the effect of a one percentage point 
increase in the rate of growth raises the unemployment rate by 1.7 percentage point without 
on-the-job search and by 0.1 with. What is even more striking is that the underlying 
transmission channels change as the flow of obsolescence, which is a major cause of job 
destruction without on-the-job search, practically vanishes. It is replaced by a flow of job-to- 
job transitions. In fact, the positive impact of growth on unemployment that remains is due to 
the decrease in the match surplus induced by a rise in growth which decreases market 
tightness and, hence, the hiring of unemployed. Our main conclusion is that, rather than 
contributing to unemployment, creative destruction induces a direct reallocation of workers 
from low to high productivity jobs.
These results are pretty robust, except for high values of the opportunity cost of work. 
We have also shown that, when the level of unemployment benefits is determined by a 
replacement ratio, then, under plausible assumptions, a match never becomes obsolete. This 
analytical result suggests that our numerical findings are, fundamentally, very robust.
A number of issues are left for further research. While, in this chapter, we have 
focused exclusively on steady states, matching models of the labor market with growth by 
creative destruction have also been used to analyze the process of economic restructuring at 
the business cycle frequency (Caballero and Hammour, 1996; Postel-Vinay, 2002; Caballero, 
2007). It would therefore be interesting to investigate how on-the-job search modifies the out- 
of-steady-state dynamics of the model. Following Homstein et al. (2007), another extension 
would be to analyze the effects of labor market policies within the framework presented in 
this chapter.
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A Fee-contract
The purpose of this appendix is to show that the equilibrium allocation of resources 
under surplus splitting at each instant is identical to the allocation with a privately-efficient 
fee-contract where the fee is determined by Nash bargaining at job creation.
Under a fee-contract, when a matched is formed, the worker makes a transfer P{r) to 
the firm, for a job created at time r ; he then gets paid his marginal product p{z) throughout 
the existence of the match. The amount of the transfer is determined by Nash bargaining. 
Thus, the worker effectively buys the job.
We use the same notations as in the main body of the chapter, except for die asset 
value of unemployment, of employment to a worker and of a vacancy which are now 
respectively denoted by U(t), W(r,t) and V(t). Thus, the asset value of unemployment 
solves:
rU(t) = p(t)b + 9q(0$V(t,i)-P(t)-U(t 'h+U(t).  (Al)
Similarly, the asset value of a vacant position to the employer satisfies:
rV(t) = -p{t)c + q(9)[p(t) -  K(/)]+ V(t) . (A2)
Finally, the asset value of employment to a worker is given by: 
rW(x,i) = P(j) + 8^J(t) - W ( t,o]
+ max |o, s 9q(9)^V (t,t) — P(t) — p(i)so~}+ W (r,/)
where the maximization reflects the fact that the worker needs to decide whether or not to 
search on the job.
Clearly, from (A3), an employed worker searches on the job at time t if and only if 
the benefits from doing so are greater than the costs:
s&i(e)[iV(t, t) -  P(t) -  W(T,t)] > p(t)s<r; (A4)
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or, equivalently:
W (t , t ) -P ( t )  <7 ^ W(T,t)
pit) Bqid) pit)
In steady state, the left hand side is constant while the right hand side is decreasing in t . It 
follows that, for a job created at r , there are two periods of interest:
• t e  [r, r  + T '), when the worker is not searching;
• t g [ t  +  T ' , t  +  T ”) , when the worker is searching on the job.
The value of a match of vintage r  to a worker at time t < t + T  is therefore given by:
Wir,t) = rjV < "« -"[p (r)  + <5i7w}fe
j [ p(r) _ p(x)stT + suix) + s8qi8)[W{x,x) -  P{x)]\lx. (A6)
t + T '
+
t + T '
+ e -{r+8*T+r-t)-sa,{exr-r)jj^T +
From time t to r + T' the worker gets paid his marginal product of labour, p(z) , and could 
be hit by an idiosyncratic productivity shock, at rate S ,  which forces him to return to 
unemployment. From time t  +  T' to t  + T” the worker searches on-the-job, which costs 
p(t)scr, in the hope of getting a new job at the technological frontier, which occurs at rate 
s6q{6). Finally, a match that survives until t  + T” becomes obsolete and the worker returns 
to unemployment.
Finally, the amount of the transfer is initially determined by Nash bargaining :
max[j?U t) -  Pit) -  U{t)]‘ [/>(/) -  V i t ) f fi, (A7)
The first bracket contains the surplus of the worker and the second contains that of the 
employer. The first-order condition is:
Pit) = (1 -  f l p i t ,  t) - 17(/)]+ PVH). (A8)
By imposing the free-entry condition, V(t) = 0, on (A2), we obtain:
P(t) = P + + . (A9)
qi8)
Combining this expression with (A8) yields:
(1 -P ) ty i t , t ) -U i t ) ]  = £ ^ - .  (A 10)
Also, combining (A8) and (A10) gives:
23 We are assuming that the threat point of employed job seekers is the value o f unemployment, U ( / ) ,  which 
means that workers first resign from their current position before they bargain with their new employer. With a 
fee-contract, it might be more realistic to assume that their threat point is the value of their current job, W(r,t) . 
However, this would make on-the-job search even more attractive which would presumably strengthen our main 
conclusions. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that unemployment is the outside option when wages are 
bargained at each instant which is equivalent to the fee-contract.
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p
i - p m
Substituting this into the value of unemployment, (Al), gives:
rU(t) = p(t) b + -@— c9
1 ~ P  .
+ U(t),
(A ll)
(A 12)
Rearranging terms, the value function of the employed worker, (A6), could be written 
as follows:
W(T,t) =
t + T'
eJ  „ -(r+ W x -t)
t + T'
+ - ( r + S ^ x - t )
p(r) -  rU (x) + U (x) J& 
(r + 5)U (x) -  U (x)]g6c
t
t + T "
+ I  e
t +T'
-(r+8Xx-t)-sQq{0^x-(T+T'))
t +T"
\lx.{p(r) -  p(x)scr -  rU(x) + U(x) + s6q{6)\W(xtx) -  P(x) — U(x)] pc .(A 13)
(r + S + sQq(0))U (x) -  U (x)]c&+  e -{r+SXT+T‘- t)  J  e - ( r+S+s0g(0))(x-(T+T')) 
t+ T '
+  e < r+ S^ ^ T ’- T ^ l J { j  +  J " } e - ( r + S * T + T '- t)
The second and fourth terms are straightforward to integrate. It could then easily be checked 
that the sum of the second, fourth and fifth terms is simply equal to U(t). Finally, substituting 
equations (A ll) and (A 12) into the first and third terms, we have:
t + T ’
i r ( M ) =  I
'f
r+7
+ U(t)
- ( r + S ^ x - t ) p{z)-p{x) b +
1 - P
cQ
t+T’
+ j e
r r
- { r + 8 X x - t ) - s B q m x - ( T + T ' ) ) p (r ) -p (x )
dx
Z> + 5cr + ( l-5 )
i - p
cG dx. (A 14)
Workers choose V  and T" such as to maximize W(r,t) . Differentiating (A 14) yields 
the first-order conditions (24) and (27). Finally, market tightness is pinned down by (A10) 
which could be combined with (A14) to give (28). Thus, equations (24), (27) and (28) 
characterize the equilibrium of the economy both with surplus splitting at each instant and 
with a privately-efficient fee-contract where the fee is determined by Nash bargaining at job 
creation.
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The disability insurance program relies on imperfect information on health to provide 
a decent income to those who are likely to be truly disabled. However, it is clearly not 
possible to provide perfect insurance against the disability risk as some agents who are 
truly disabled fail to qualify. Thus, systematic eligibility to old-age pensions beyond a 
certain age is justified as another, complementary, way of providing insurance. Indeed, 
this is what motivated Bismarck to invent pension programs as early as 1889.
In 2007, the U.S. Social Security system provided income to almost 50 million individ­
uals for a total cost of $585 billion (4.2% of GDP) of which 9 million received disability 
benefits1 for a total cost of $99 billion (0.7% of GDP) (SSA 2008). By contrast, in 2007, 
the total cost of unemployment insurance was only $32 billion, about a third of the size 
of the disability insurance program. Despite these gigantic numbers and the potentially 
large welfare implications of the permanent disability risk (Chandra Samwick 2006), very 
little is known about the optimal design of insurance against this risk in a dynamic con­
text with imperfectly observable health. The aim of this chapter is to characterize such 
an optimal policy, to provide the key intuitions and quantitative insights and, finally, to 
give an order of magnitude of the potential welfare gains to be expected.
Let us now describe our theoretical framework. The government could rely on its im­
perfect information on health to enhance the provision of insurance against the disability 
risk by giving higher consumption to those who seem to be unable to work. More pre­
cisely, those who seem to be in poor health are "tagged"2 as disabled and therefore eligible 
for this higher consumption level. However, tagging is imperfect and some classification 
errors are unavoidable. Hence, some workers who are able to work are awarded the tag, 
while others who are truly disabled are rejected. Recognizing this problem, the planner 
still wants to provide the able and tagged with incentives to work. Thus, the optimal 
allocation is found by setting up a dynamic mechanism design problem where the able, 
whether tagged or not, are induced to work until some retirement age to be determined. 
Intuitively, providing incentives to the tagged is more costly, as their outside option is 
more attractive, and, hence, it is optimal to let them retire earlier than the untagged. 
Since the adjustment is done on both margins, retirement age and consumption levels, 
the able and tagged should also get higher pensions.
By this channel, the optimal policy provides some support for the implementation of a 
health-dependent retirement age. However, it should be emphasized that this retirement 
age depends on health as observed by the government but only applies to the able, who 
are, by definition, in good health.
The first-order conditions to this problem relate inverse marginal utilities across ages
17 million of those where disabled workers, which represents about 4.4% of the population between 
the ages of 25 and 64. The other beneficiaries are the spouses and children of disabled workers.
2 The term was originally introduced by Akerlof (1978).
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and across states, i.e. being tagged or untagged. Thus, the need to preserve incentives 
prevents the standard equalization of marginal utilities of consumption. The optimal 
allocation is characterized by back-loaded incentives. The consumption of the able is 
increasing with age and jumps when a tag is awarded. The optimal policy also makes use 
of the difference in timing between the award of the tag and the occurrence of disability. 
The idea is that someone untagged who claims to be disabled is likely to say the truth 
if he becomes tagged shortly after stopping to work but is probably lying if he remains 
untagged for long. The former should therefore be rewarded with high consumption while 
the latter should be punished. To illustrate these features and to have a more quantitative 
sense of the main characteristics of the optimal policy, we calibrate the model with U.S. 
data and perform a numerical simulation.
One of the important differences between the current U.S. situation and the optimal 
policy is that the able who are tagged are currently not induced to work whereas they 
should be until some early retirement age. When such incentives are provided, it becomes 
desirable to lower the strictness of the disability test in order to decrease the number of 
truly disabled who are denied the tag. Our estimation suggests that these changes would 
generate welfare gains of about 0.2% of consumption. We also show that it is important to 
implement the optimal health-dependent retirement age as inducing the able and tagged 
to work until the general retirement age would be excessively costly and could result in 
a welfare loss.
These numerical results are obtained assuming that the strictness of the disability test 
is chosen to minimize the total number of classification errors, but allowing for a preference 
between rejection and award errors. Although, this is a natural and realistic benchmark, 
we might be interested in the optimal policy when the strictness of the disability test at 
each age is directly under the control of the planner. We show that, in this setup, the 
first-best allocation of resources could asymptotically be implemented. The idea is to set 
a very high threshold after the retirement age, so that the untagged are almost surely able 
to work, and to severely punish those who claimed to be disabled in the past. While it 
might not be realistic to believe that such an extreme policy is implementable in practice, 
this result nevertheless suggests that significant welfare gains can be obtained by setting 
the disability threshold strategically and, hence, by moving beyond the minimization of 
classification errors which characterizes the current U.S. policy.
It is important to emphasize that, in this chapter, we exclusively focus on the de­
termination of the optimal incentive-feasible allocation. We do not investigate how it 
could be implemented in a decentralized market economy where the government could 
only use fiscal instruments instead of choosing individuals’ consumption directly. Note 
that, while optimal allocations are typically unique, there usually exist multiple ways of 
implementing them. Thus, in general, results about allocations are more robust than
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about implementation.
This chapter builds on two strands of the literature. First the seminal work of Dia­
mond and Mirrlees (1978) determines the optimal provision of social insurance against 
the risk of permanent disability with unobservable health. As inducing the able to work 
is costly, they find that the general retirement age should be smaller than the first-best 
retirement age.3 Their work therefore gives a justification for the provision of old-age 
pensions as an imperfect insurance against the risk of permanent disability.
Despite its generality, the Diamond Mirrlees (1978) model has never been used quanti­
tatively to investigate optimal retirement policies. Thus, one contribution of this chapter 
is to provide some quantitative results based on the Diamond Mirrlees approach to re­
tirement. More generally, while, following Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003), 
important developments have been made on the optimal provision of social insurance 
against the stochastic evolution of workers’ skills, only few quantitative results have been 
obtained. An important exception is Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) who found that, with 
unobservable health, the welfare gains generated by the possibility to tax savings amount 
to 0.5% of consumption. Although they focus on the risk of permanent disability, as we 
do, their model only allows for an intensive margin to labor supply and, hence, it cannot 
say anything about the optimal retirement age.
The second strand of the literature on which we build traces back to Akerlof (1978) 
who argued that, in the presence of asymmetric information, incentive compatibility con­
straints could be relaxed by relying on some publicly available information correlated 
with agents’ private information. This general principle naturally applies to disabil­
ity insurance and retirement programs where health is the hidden information which 
the government can nevertheless imperfectly observe. Indeed, Diamond and Sheshinski 
(1995), Parsons (1996) and Salanie (2002) showed that welfare could be improved by 
giving more to those who seem to be disabled, even if the government’s information is 
very imperfect. In particular, the work of Parsons (1996), which insists that the able who 
are tagged should be incentivized to work, is closely related to this chapter. However, all 
these models are static and do not give any quantitative evaluation of the welfare gains 
to be expected from the imperfect observability of health.
Thus, our work combines these two approaches to optimal social insurance by intro­
ducing imperfect tagging into the dynamic mechanism design approach of Diamond and 
Mirrlees (1978).
While, following the seminal contribution of Shavell and Weiss (1979), there has been 
a considerable literature on optimal unemployment insurance, little is known about the 
optimal design of disability insurance. In addition to the work mentioned above, relevant
3Cremer, Lozachmeur and Pestieau (2004a) made a similar point in a simplified setup which allows 
for heterogeneous productivity among workers.
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contributions include Benitez-Silva, Buchinsky and Rust (2006) who rely on a careful 
empirical analysis of the tagging process to propose an optimal statistical screening rule 
which would result in fewer classification errors. Kleven and Kopczuk (2009) consider 
an environment where the government needs to impose some complexity into the system 
in order to obtain imperfect information on health. This has the adverse consequence of 
reducing take-up. They therefore characterize the optimal trade-off between complexity 
and take-up. Low and Pistaferri (2008) propose a structural model of labor supply in a 
life-cycle setting where workers are subject to both disability and productivity shocks. 
Relying on an empirical estimation of their structural parameters, they argue that in­
creasing the strictness of the disability test would enhance welfare.
This chapter is also related to the work of Cremer, Lozachmeur and Pestieau (2004b,
2007). In their setup workers are heterogeneous in both productivity and health. Labor is 
supplied along the extensive margin which allows them to endogenize the retirement age. 
They argue that welfare can be improved by resorting to disability testing. However, 
to gain tractability, they considerably simplify the dynamic structure of the model by 
assuming that agents are ex-ante heterogeneous in terms of their ability to work, instead 
of having the uncertainty about disability gradually unfolding over time. Also, they 
assume that disability testing is perfect and that the only reason why the government 
makes a limited use of audits is that they are costly. By contrast, we have no such costs 
in our model as these might be negligible compared to the welfare gains generated by 
imperfect tagging.
In a way, our contribution is to look at the welfare gains generated by the integration 
of disability insurance and pension programs, but restricting attention to permanent dis­
abilities. Along similar lines, Stiglitz and Yunn (2005) argued that large benefits could be 
expected from the integration of unemployment insurance and pension programs. While 
we focus on imperfectly observable health, a number of papers have recently argued in 
favor of allowing policies to rely more extensively on observable characteristics correlated 
with hidden information such as productivity. For example, it has been shown that sig­
nificant welfare gains could be generated by making taxes dependent on age (Weinzierl
2008), on gender (Alesina Ichino Karabarbounis 2008) or even on height (Mankiw and 
Weinzierl 2007).
In section 2, we present the theoretical model. We first describe the setup, then turn 
to the planner’s problem before giving the first-order condition characterizing the optimal 
policy. Then, in the following section, we calibrate the model. Section 4 is devoted to the 
numerical simulation and to the description of the corresponding welfare gains. Finally, 
in section 5, we describe how the first-best allocation of resources can be implemented if 
the government sets the strictness of the disability test strategically. The chapter ends 
with a conclusion.
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2 Model
This section describes the theoretical framework used to determine the optimal Social 
Security system with imperfectly observable health. We first present the setup, then 
give the planner’s problem and, finally, present the conditions which characterize the 
optimum.
2.1 Setup
All agents face a deterministic life span equal to H. Time is continuous, which is neces­
sary to obtain a first-order condition for the retirement age. Resources could be safely 
transferred from one period to the next at an exogenous interest rate. For simplicity, 
we take this interest rate to be equal to the agents’ discount rate p. Everyone derives 
instantaneous utility u(c) from consuming c, where u' > 0 and u" < 0.4 At a given age, 
people are either able or disabled. Only the able can work. Their productivity evolves 
deterministically over time and is equal to 7 t for a worker of age t. We will later assume, 
in the calibration section, that j t follows an inverted U-shape. Labor supply is indivis­
ible5, which is a necessary assumption in a model of endogenous retirement. Working 
generates an instantaneous utility cost of b.
As the main justification for the provision of pension is to insure workers against the 
loss of their ability to work, we assume that disability hits people stochastically over 
time and that it is an absorbing state. The corresponding c.d.f. is denoted by F(t) and 
the p.d.f. by /(£), where t E [0, H], Thus, at age t a fraction F(t) of the population is 
disabled.
In order to have a well-defined social insurance problem, with ex-ante identical indi­
viduals, we shall assume that the planner attaches a zero weight on those who became 
disabled before starting to work.6 Such unfortunate individuals should certainly be taken 
care of, but outside the Social Security system which we investigate. This reflects the 
current U.S. situation where eligibility to Social Security requires some employment his­
tory.
4Finkelstein, Luttmer and Notowidigdo (2009) have recently provided some evidence that the marginal 
utility of consumption of the elderly declines as health deteriorates. However, we do not yet know 
whether the marginal utility of consumption differs between periods of employment and leisure. Thus, 
for simplicity, our specification assumes a constant marginal utility of consumption across all states.
5It would be fairly straightforward to add an intensive margin. Indeed, in a similar setup, Golosov 
and Tsyvinski (2006) assume a continuous labor supply. However, in models that include both margins, 
such as Rogerson Wallenius (2008), Prescott Rogerson Wallenius (2009) or Chapter 4 of this thesis, most 
of the action occurs at the extensive margin. Furthermore, Liebman Luttmer and Seif (2009) provide 
some empirical evidence that most of the labor supply response to changes in the level of Social Security 
benefits occurs at the extensive margin.
6When determining the planner’s optimal allocation, this is equivalent to imposing the normalization 
F(0) =  0.
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With a diminishing marginal utility of income, the first-best allocation of resources is 
characterized by the provision of full insurance against the disability risk. Consumption 
should therefore be constant across all states and, hence, independent of whether an 
individual is able to work or not. Able workers should eventually retire to enjoy some 
leisure and typically choose to do so once their productivity becomes small.
If health is private information, this allocation of resources is not incentive compatible 
as able people have an incentive to masquerade as disabled in order to retire earlier 
and to save the disutility cost of working. This has lead Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) 
to characterize, within the above framework, the optimal provision of Social Security 
with unobservable health. They found that the consumption level of disabled should be 
sufficiently low to induce the able to work. Furthermore, incentives are back-loaded, i.e. 
the disabled should be provided with higher consumption if they stopped working at a 
more advanced age. But the most remarkable feature of the optimal policy is that it puts 
everyone into retirement before the first-best retirement age. The intuition for this result 
is that there is eventually so many disabled that it would be too costly, from a welfare 
perspective, to push their consumption level down in order to induce the able to work.
It could, however, be objected that the assumption of unobservable health is too 
extreme. More realistically, the government can obtain some imperfect information on 
the work ability of its citizens. It can run a medical test and "tag" as disabled those 
who fail the test. However, as the information is imperfect, some errors are made leading 
to the occurrence of gaps and leakages. Gaps occur when some disabled individuals are 
untagged; while leakages occur when some able are tagged.7
Note that it would certainly be welfare enhancing for the government to use more 
detailed information on health. For instance, it could assign each disability applicant a 
probability of being truly unable to work. However, for reasons which are beyond the 
scope of our analysis, the US Social Security system, as in many countries, relies on 
a simple tagging process where individuals are either classified as disabled or not. We 
therefore follow most of the literature on the topic and constrain the government to rely 
on a simple tagging process.
More formally, let 9 denote the outcome of the test for a given individual. Thus, 9 
could be thought of as his apparent health. Its c.d.f over the population is Ga (9) for the 
able and Gd (9) for the disabled. The respective p.d.f.s are denoted by Qa (9) and go{9). 
An individual is tagged as disabled if his 9 falls below a threshold 9 which determines
7In most of the existing literature on misclassifications in disability insurance programs (see, e.g., 
Benitez-Silva, Buchinsky and Rust, 2006), rejection (award) error is referred to as the probability of 
being disabled (able) conditional on being untagged (tagged), and type I (II) error as the probability 
of being untagged (tagged) conditional on being disabled (able). We, in contrast, define gaps as the 
number of individuals who are disabled and untagged, and leakages as the number of individuals who 
are able and tagged. Since there is a mass 1 of individuals, gaps is equivalent to the probability of being 
disabled and untagged, and leakages to the probability of being able and tagged.
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the disability standard. Thus, an able individual is tagged with probability Ga (9) and a 
disabled with probability Gd(9). Following Diamond and Sheshinski (1995), we assume 
that Ga first-order stochastically dominates Go, he. Ga (9) < Gd{9) for all 9 and that 
the two distributions satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio condition, i.e. 9a{Q)/9d(Q) 
is increasing in 9. Furthermore, we assume that, for a given individual, 9 remains fixed 
throughout his life except for a drop when he becomes disabled. When determining the 
disability standard 9, the government faces a trade-off between the number of gaps and 
leakages. See Figure 1.
Leakages Gaps
Figure 1: Trade-off between gaps and leakages
Note that the share of disabled is very small among young individuals, but is much 
larger among senior people. Thus, as age increases, leakages become a smaller source 
of concern, while the opposite is true for gaps. We therefore assume an age-dependent 
threshold, i.e. equal to 9t at age t, which is non-decreasing with age. Hence, at age t, the 
number of gaps is equal to [1 — GD(9t)\F(t) and that of leakages to G,i(0t)[l — F(t)].
We are now in a position to derive the joint p.d.f. of the ages at which people become 
disabled and tagged. Note that the structure of the problem implies that being tagged 
is an absorbing state. Let i and j  stand for the ages at which an individual becomes 
disabled and tagged, respectively. We can consider that i = H  if someone dies while still 
able and j  = H if he dies untagged. Let f{ i , j )  denote the joint p.d.f. of (i, j). From 
Bayes’ law:
(!)
where f(i) is the previously defined exogenous p.d.f. of ages at which people become 
disabled. With an obvious abuse of notation, the p.d.f. of getting tagged at age j  given
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that disability occurs at i, for 0 < i < H, is given by:
/ O N )  =  <
GA0 o) if j  =  0
9a 0 j) %  if j  < i
GD(9 i ) -G A 0 i )  if j  = i 
9d0 j) ^  if i < j  < H
1 — Gd 0 h )  if j  = H
(2)
A fraction G a (0q) of individuals obtain the tag at time 0. To understand the second 
and fourth cases, i.e. j  < i and i < j  < H, note that the only way by which an 
agent could become tagged if he does not simultaneously become disabled is that the 
threshold 6j increases sufficiently so that his own constant 9 falls below the threshold. 
For an able worker, this occurs with probability Ga{9j+£) — Ga0j)  over a time interval 
of length e. The corresponding probability density is equal to — Ga{9j) /e
with e tending to 0. The same argument applies for a disabled. The third case, j  — i, 
gives the probability of becoming tagged when the disability occurs. This is equal to the 
probability of being tagged once disabled, Gd (9{), minus the probability of being already 
tagged before becoming unable to work, Ga (9{). Thus, the p.d.f. is degenerate
since a mass of agents become disabled and tagged simultaneously. In fact, this sounds 
sensible as the occurrence of disability should certainly lead to a deterioration of the 
apparent health observed by the government. Finally, the last case, j  = H, corresponds 
to the probability of dying untagged. For completeness, note that for someone dying 
able, i = H, (2) simplifies to:
f ( j \ i  = H ) = {
Ga (90) if j  =  0 
S A ^ f  if j < H  
1 - G a (0h ) if j  = H
(3)
Here, the last three cases of (2) boil down to a single one, i.e. j  = H.
Importantly, we will assume throughout this chapter that able individuals do not 
know the value of their fixed 6. All they know is whether they are eligible for the tag 
or not. While this assumption is somewhat restrictive, it is reasonable that, conditional 
on remaining able to work, agents cannot predict when they will become eligible for the 
tag. Note that the alternative benchmark, where people would know their 9, would imply 
that they could predict at age 25 when they would become eligible for the tag conditional 
on remaining able. One way to think about our assumption is that people get a private 
medical check-up every year and that their doctor advises them to apply for the tag once
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they become eligible for it. In other words, the fixed8 6 is just an irrelevant modeling 
device and all that matters at age t is the threshold 6t together with the probability of 
being awarded the tag, which is equal to GAifit) for an able person and to Go{0t) for a 
disabled. It is important to emphasize that this approach provides a reduced form that 
captures the dynamic trade-off between gaps and leakages; it certainly does not pretend 
to give a realistic representation of the very complicated process by which the true and 
apparent physical condition of an individual evolve over time.
The problem of the social planner is to maximize the expected utility of workers at 
time 0 subject to the resource constraint and to the incentive compatibility constraints 
which ensure that the able choose to work. The imperfect information on health should 
make it possible to increase welfare by relaxing the incentive compatibility constraints. 
Note that, as the planner attaches a zero weight on individuals who became disabled 
before time 0, all agents could be considered to be initially able to work. Ex-post, a given 
individual is characterized by when he became disabled, i.e. age i, and when he became 
tagged, i.e. age j ,  where the ex-ante probability density of being individual (i , j ) is given 
by as defined in (1).
One of the key control variables of interest in this chapter is the retirement age of 
the able.9 In order to exploit the imperfect information on health, the planner will make 
this retirement age conditional on when someone got tagged, i.e. conditional on j .  We 
denote by RT(j)  the retirement age of an able worker who got tagged at age j . Those 
whose apparent health is lower, i.e. lower 6, will be tagged earlier. This implies that j  is 
a sufficient statistic for the apparent health of the able and tagged and, hence, R T ( j ) is 
a health-dependent retirement age. Even the untagged will eventually retire when their 
productivity becomes low as they want to enjoy some leisure. We denote by RU  the 
retirement age of the untagged.10
It is important to emphasize that the tagged who are able to work do not retire 
immediately. Instead, those tagged at age j  are induced to work until RT(j),  provided 
that they remain able to work until that age. Parsons (1996) insisted that with only 
imperfect information on health, and therefore the possibility of leakages, there is no 
reason to force all the tagged to become inactive. This is not unrealistic and, indeed, 
in many countries, those officially registered as disabled are offered incentives to work, 
which could be seen as an illustration of this. Obviously, this requires commitment from 
the government which might be tempted to untag those who reveal that they are able to
8Also, note that, strictly speaking, 6 is only fixed with respect to the distributions gA{0) and <m(0)» 
but that these distributions could well shift over time. In particular, we might expect the apparent 
health of both the able and disabled to deteriorate as people get older, which is not a problem provided 
that both distributions shift by the same amount. Similarly, the threshold 6t is only increasing relative 
to gA{0) and gD(0).
9 The disabled trivially retire when they lose their ability to work.
10 Clearly, those who only get tagged after RU  retire at RU.
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work.
The remaining control variables are the consumption levels corresponding to the 
different histories. Where appropriate, these should be allowed to depend on the age 
at which disability occurred or at which the tag was awarded. However, the planner 
only observes j  while z is revealed by the incentive compatible policy. Hence, after 
an able worker retires, the planner cannot know whether he remains able to work or 
not. Therefore, when determining the optimal consumption levels, all retired agents 
could be considered disabled. Thus, an agent qualifies for the consumption of a disabled 
from age r  =  min {z, RT(j)}  if tagged at j  < RU or from age r = min {z, RU} other­
wise, where r stands for his effective retirement age. The planner needs to determine 
the consumption at age t of the able who are untagged, (t)} te[0 R U y  °f the able 
who became tagged at j , {cj4T(i, RU^ tey RT(j)y the untagged who retired at r,
{cDU(t,r)}  and of the retired at r  and tagged at j ,  {cgr (r, j ) } re[0tRU]je(r,H]
and {cTT(ri j ) } j£[QRU)re\jRT(j)Y ^ t  case, for reasons that will subsequently be­
come clear, we distinguish whether the individual retired first, r < j ,  or was tagged either 
first or when retiring, j  < r. Note that these last two consumption functions, c2T(r,j)  
and dpT(r,j), should also depend on age, t. However, as the discount rate is equal to the 
interest rate, there is nothing to be gained from distorting their consumption levels over 
time. In other words, in this case, age does not provide any information on whether the 
agent is able to work or not and allowing consumption to depend on age would not help 
the social planner to relax any incentive compatibility constraint.
Let v(i, j)  stand for the ex-post lifetime utility of an (z, j)  individual who became dis­
abled at i and tagged at j.  If an agent retires before becoming tagged, i.e. min {z, RU} < 
j ,  his utility is:
v(i, j)  = /  e~pt [u(cAU(t)) -  b] dt (4)
Jo
+ f  e~ptu(cDU(t, mm{i,RU}))dt
J  min{i,iZf/}
r H
+ e ptu(c^,T(min {i, RU} ,j))dt.
Jj
From age 0 to min{z, RU} the worker is able and untagged, he consumes c^u {t) at age 
t and gets disutility b from working. From age min {z, RU} to j ,  he is disabled and 
untagged and gets the corresponding consumption level where, again, from the perspec­
tive of the planner the agent became disabled at min {z, RU}. Finally, from age j  to 
H, his consumption level is that of a disabled and tagged who became disabled first. 
Now, if an agent becomes tagged before retirement or if he becomes disabled and tagged
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simultaneously, i.e. j  < min {i, RU}, his utility is:
v (hJ) = [  e~pt [u{cAU( t ) ) - b ] d t  (5)
Jo
/•min {i,RT(j)}
+ /  e~pt [u{cAT{t,j)) -  b] dt
J j
+ [  e~ptu(c%T {min {i ,RT{j)}  , j))dt.
J min{i, RT(j)}
From age 0 to j ,  the worker is able and untagged; from j  to min {z, RT{j)},  he is able 
and tagged; and from min {i, RT{j)}  to H, he is disabled and tagged. Note that the able 
and tagged are induced to work until age min {z, RT(j)}  and, hence, get disutility b from 
work.
2.2 P lanner’s problem
The planner solves the following problem:
p H  p H
maxE[v{i,j)] = /  v{i, j)f{i ,j)didj  (6)
Jo Jo
subject to:
• Resource constraint,
• Incentive compatibility constraint at age t for the untagged, Vt E [0, RU),
• Incentive compatibility constraint at age t for those tagged at j ,
Yj e  [0,RU)yt  6 [?, RT(j)).
The control variables are cAU{•), cAT{•), cDC/('), c£T(*), cJpT{’), RT{-) and RU.11 The full 
planner’s problem is given in the appendix. The objective of the planner is to maximize 
the ex-ante expected lifetime utility, where each individual has probability f { i , j ) of 
becoming individual (z, j)  with lifetime utility v{i,j). The resource constraint imposes 
that the expected lifetime consumption of individuals does not exceed the amount that 
they are expected to produce, where the working agents, those getting disutility b from 
work in (4) and (5), produce 7 t units of consumption goods at age t (see equations (A2) 
and (A3) of the appendix). The first set of incentive compatibility constraints imposes 
that the untagged who are able choose to work until RU. Similarly, the second set of
11 Importantly, the planner does not control the disability standard < 9t > which is exogenously
determined. This assumption will be relaxed towards the end of the chapter.
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incentive compatibility constraints ensures that, even when tagged at j ,  the able still 
choose to work until RT(j).  Note that this last set of constraints is formally identical 
to the one imposed by Diamond and Mirrlees (1978), as, once an agent is tagged, the 
government cannot rely on any additional information about his health and therefore acts 
as if health was completely unobservable.
The difference between cDT(r,j) depending on whether the individual retires first, i.e. 
cgr (r, j )  for r < j  , or becomes tagged at retirement or before, i.e. c^T(r,j)  if j  < r, is 
explained by the fact that the latter consumption level enters the incentive compatibility 
constraint of the tagged while the former does not.
It should be emphasized that the generality of the planner’s problem implies that, 
once the optimal allocation has been derived, there is no additional screening mechanism 
which could further improve welfare. In Parsons (1996) and Kleven Kopczuk (2009), 
individuals applying for the tag cannot know in advance whether they are going to be 
successful or not. However, the disabled have a higher probability of being awarded the 
tag than the able. Thus, a high cost of applying for disability benefits, through fees or 
complexity, could be used as a screening device to reduce, or even eliminate, leakages. 
However, this possibility does not arise in our framework where agents know the outcome 
of the test, thanks to their private doctor for instance, before applying.
2.3 First-order conditions
The planner’s problem can be solved using Lagrange multipliers. If we take the utility 
levels of the various agents to be the control variables, rather than their consumption 
levels, then the objective and the incentive compatibility constraints are linear while the 
resource constraint is convex. Hence, the corresponding first-order conditions are both 
necessary and sufficient. Since the planner is trying to provide social insurance optimally 
against a certain type of stochastic evolution of workers’ skills, it should not be surprising 
that most of these conditions take the form of inverse Euler equations. Indeed, Golosov, 
Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003) showed that inverse Euler equations characterize the 
optimum in a wide class of social insurance problems.
The remaining first-order conditions correspond to the optimal retirement age. In 
that respect, the key feature of our model is that labor supply is indivisible. As we know 
since Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), this could lead agents to determine their labor 
supply from lotteries in order to convexify their production possibility set. However, 
this possibility does not apply to our framework which, following Diamond and Mirrlees 
(1978) or Mulligan (2001), could be seen as a "time averaging" model where agents can 
convexify their labor supply problem by alternating spells of work and leisure.12 More
12See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006, 2008 and 2009) for detailed comparisons, and some equivalence
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specifically, an agent will supply labor when his productivity is high13 and enjoy leisure, 
during retirement, once his productivity has deteriorated.
Finally, we conjecture that all the incentive compatibility constraints are binding. 
If they were not, then welfare could be improved by lowering the consumption level of 
the able.14 Our numerical implementation confirms that all the Lagrange multipliers are 
positive.
The consumption levels at t of the able and disabled who became tagged at age j  are 
related by:
d
dtu'(cAT{t ,j))
m (7)
1 ~ F(t)
As, once the tag has been awarded, the government does not have any further information 
on the health of the people, this condition corresponds to the original inverse Euler 
equation derived in Diamond and Mirrlees (1978). The general intuition for these inverse 
Euler equations is that, to preserve incentives to work, resources shifted to the next 
period must increase the utility in the good state, i.e. Able, as much as in the bad 
state, i.e. Disabled15. Note that, as a result, more resources need to be allocated to 
the good state, where marginal utility is low, than to the bad state, where it is high. 
However, this transfer of utilities across time should be done at minimum cost to the 
government. The expected resource cost of a marginal increase in utility at a given 
time should therefore be equal to the expected resource cost of a marginal decrease in 
utility at another time. But note that the inverse marginal utility of consumption is 
precisely the increase in consumption associated to a given marginal increase in utility, 
i.e. l/u'(c) = 1 /(du/dc) = dc(u)/du where c(-) =  u_1(-). This explains why consumption 
should optimally follow an inverse Euler equation. Finally, the last difficulty is that 
condition (7) is written in continuous time which implies that the terms are grouped in a 
specific way. It says that the increase in the resource cost of a marginal postponement of 
utility conditional on remaining in the good state, i.e. the left hand side, should exactly 
compensate the expected drop in the marginal resource cost of utility associated with 
a change of status from able to disabled, where the coefficient on the right gives the 
probability density with which a tagged agent becomes disabled given that he was able
results, between lotteries and time averaging models of indivisible labor.
13Note that, even if workers have low productivity when young, we do not allow them to postpone 
entry into the labor market. One external justification for this is human capital accumulation, which 
makes early work at low productivity an investment into the future thanks to on-the-job learning effects. 
Hence, postponing entry does not increase the starting productivity of a worker and age 0 could be seen 
as a normalization of the age at which work begins.
14 See the appendix of Golosov and Tsyvinski (2004) for a formal proof in a simpler context a la 
Diamond-Mirrlees with unobservable health.
15 Remember that the incentive compatibility constraints are linear in utilities.
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up to then.16 Note that the lower is this probability, i.e. the more unlikely it is that 
an agent who worked until t truly becomes disabled at t , the lower should c^T(t, j)  be 
for a given path of c^T{t,j). This improves incentives to work at little cost in terms of 
insurance.
The boundary condition associated with (7) is:
,D T / (8)
At age RT(j)  the agent retires and, hence, consumption could be smoothed without 
adverse incentive effects on labor supply.
The optimal retirement age RT(j)  of an able worker who became tagged at age j  
solves:
b _  fn\ 
u'(cAT( R T ( j ) J ) ) ~ " /RrUy ( )
The agent keeps working until his marginal rate of substitution between leisure and 
consumption equals his marginal product of labor. Indeed, the marginal utility cost of 
working one more unit of time is b while the marginal product from doing so is lRT(j) at 
age RT(j).
The consumption levels of the able and disabled of age z, who are not tagged, are 
related by:
di u'(cAU(i)) u'(cAU{i)) u'(cDU{t,i))_ (10)
X
1 -  G D(8t) /(*)
for any t > z. The interpretation is similar to that of equation (7), except that the 
coefficient on the right stands for the probability density with which an agent became 
disabled at age z given that he was previously able and that he will only be tagged after 
t. Note that the lower is this probability, i.e. the more unlikely it is that an agent truly 
became disabled at z given that he is still untagged at t, the lower should cPu (t, z) be. 
This new insight shows how the imperfect tag should be used in a dynamic setup to 
extract information on the true health status of individuals. The boundary condition
16 All this might be simpler to see if condition (7) is written in terms of utilities:
dc'(uAT( t , j ) )  _  | j f ^ A T n  ~w j , . . d t u  /(*)
^  ~  ic \u c {v,rp { t , j ) )  J i
where consumption levels are backed out from utilities using the function c(-) =  u_1(-); for instance, 
c(uAT( t , j )) =  u_1(uAT(t, j ) )  — cAT( t , j ) where uAT( t , j ) is the utility at age t  of an able who became 
tagged at j .
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associated with (10) is:
cAU{RU) =  c°u (t,RU),Vt  e [RU,H], (11)
Again, there is nothing to be gained by distorting the consumption level of individuals 
after retirement.
Similarly, the consumption levels of the disabled and tagged who became disabled 
first and of the able and untagged are linked by:
d 1
di u'(cAU(i))
1
(12)
X
9a0 , ) %  [1 -  m )  + [Goih) -  GU&)J fU) + 90$,)%- i m  -  F(i)J
where we must have j  > i. The coefficient on the right stands for the probability density 
with which an agent became disabled at i given that he was previously able and that 
he becomes tagged at j .  Again, the lower is this probability, i.e. the more unlikely it is 
that an agent truly became disabled at i given that he gets tagged at j ,  the lower should 
c£)T{iij) be. The corresponding boundary condition is:
cau{RU) =  <%r (RU,j),Vj  e [RU,H].S>T (13)
Together with (11), this implies that being awarded the tag after retirement does not 
make any difference to those who worked until the maximum retirement age RU.
Note that, for a given i , the last two inverse Euler equations, (10) and (12), hold for 
any t > i and any j  > z, respectively. This means that the expected drop in the marginal 
cost of providing utility induced by a change of status from able to disabled should be 
constant over time. Thus, the fact that the right hand side of (10) is equal for any t > i 
could be seen as another set of inverse Euler equations. Similarly for the right hand side 
of (12) which is independent of j.
The consumption levels of the newly tagged, able and disabled, are related to that of 
the able and untagged by the following condition:
1
u'{cAU{j))
1 1
u'{cAT(j,j))
(14)
[GD(d,) -  g a & )] m
9A(ei ) ^ [ l - F ( j ) } +  GdM - G a V,)  f ( j )dj
where the coefficient on the right corresponds to the probability density with which an
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agent becomes disabled at age j  given that he was previously able and that he becomes 
tagged at j .  This says that, at the optimum, the resource cost of a marginal increase 
in utility in the two states observed by the planner, i.e. tagged and untagged, should 
be equalized. Interestingly, although not dynamic, this condition, which was originally 
derived by Parsons (1996) in a simpler static context, relates inverse marginal utilities. 
This shows that the planner wants to equalize across time and states the marginal resource 
cost of providing utility to the agents. This general principle nests the standard inverse 
Euler equation derived by Diamond and Mirrlees (1978), condition (7), the first-order 
condition of Parsons (1996), condition (14), as well as the two first-order conditions 
which are specific to this chapter, (10) and (12).
Finally, the first-order condition pinning down the optimal retirement age of the 
untagged is:
u'(cAU(RU)) = lRU' ^
Again, as for condition (9), the interpretation is that, at the retirement age, the marginal 
rate of substitution between leisure and consumption should be equal to the marginal 
product of labor. Note that the formal derivation of (15) relies on the conjecture that 
lim RT(j) = RU which is both intuitive and consistent with (15) together with (8), (9)
j —*RU
and (14).
The Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint is equal to u,(cAU(RU)). 
The Lagrange multiplier of the incentive compatibility constraint of the newly tagged is
u ' (ca u { R U ) )
and that of the previously tagged is17
(17)
Binding constraints imply that the multipliers are positive and, hence, that the con­
sumption of the able who are tagged should initially be higher than that of the untagged 
and it should then be increasing over time. It is indeed common in dynamic contract 
theory that back-loaded incentives are optimal as they maintain incentives to work over 
time. Similarly, the Lagrange multiplier of the incentive compatibility constraint of the 
untagged is
which implies that the consumption of the able and untagged should also be increasing
17These multipliers axe associated with constraint (A7) of the appendix for s =  j  and s > j ,  respec­
tively.
u'(cAT{jJ))  u'icMij)) (16)
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over time.
We now have a full set of conditions determining the optimum allocation.
P roposition  1  The optimal Social Security system with imperfect tagging is character­
ized by the first-order conditions (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15) together 
with the resource constraint, (A4), the incentive compatibility constraints for the untagged, 
(A6), and for the tagged, (A7).
To gain additional insights about this Social Security system we need to perform a nu­
merical simulation. But, before that, the model needs to be properly calibrated.
3 Calibration
This section describes the calibration of the distributions and parameters of the model. 
The discussion is divided into four parts: agents’ skill profile, their preferences, the 
distribution of the disability age and, finally, the trade-off between gaps and leakages.
3.1 Skill profile
All individuals are assumed to enter the labor market at the age of 25 and die on their 
80th birthday. Following Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006), productivity 7 1 at each age t is 
determined by fitting a quadratic approximation through the data in Rios-Rull (1996). 
The resulting skill profile is characterized by a productivity of 1 at age 25 and 75, i.e. 
7 25  =  7 7 5  =  1) an<l by a peak of 1.47 at age 50, i.e. 7 5 0  ^  1-47.
3.2 Preferences
Agents are assumed to exhibit constant relative risk aversion so that:
c1 -<t> _  1
u(c) =  (18)
We pick the coefficient of relative risk aversion (j> = 2. The annual discount rate p, which 
also equals the annual interest rate, is set at 0.02. The fixed cost of working b is calibrated 
such that, in the unobservable health case, the able retire at age 65. This exercise yields 
b = 1.092.
3.3 D istribution  o f the disability age
To determine the likelihood of being disabled at age t , F(t), we take cross-sectional 
data from the 2003 wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) that surveys a
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representative sample of the U.S. population.18 We make use of the following question:19
"Do you have any physical or nervous condition that limits the type of work
or the amount of work you can do ?"
Specified answers are "yes" and "no"; accordingly we define any respondent who answers 
"yes " as disabled. At each age, the probability of being disabled is then set equal to the 
fraction of people answering "yes", using cross-sectional weights to correct for over- or 
under-representation of certain groups. The result is depicted in Figure 2. To obtain a 
smooth estimation of the disability distribution, we fit an exponential function through 
the resulting time series with the data points weighted by the number of observations for 
each age.
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Figure 2: Distribution of disability
At face value, our definition of disability may seem rather mild. However, it is to be 
stressed that, in our model, disability should not be interpreted too narrowly. Indeed, any 
individual whose productivity is virtually equal to zero should be considered as disabled. 
With, for instance, less than 40% of all 75-year-olds unable to work, it yields, if anything, 
numbers which are below what one might plausibly expect. Moreover, these figures are 
in line with those used in related papers (see, e.g., Golosov and Tsyvinski 2006).
18This is the same data source as used by Low and Pistaferri (2008). Other authors such as Benitez- 
Silva, Buchinsky and Rust (2006) chose to work with the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) instead. 
However, this is not an alternative for us as it only covers individuals over the age of 50.
19 As is the case with most other studies in the field, the underlying presumption here is that self- 
reported disability status is a valid measure of true disability status. This hypothesis finds support in 
Benitez-Silva, Buchinsky, Chan, Cheidvasser and Rust (2004).
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3.4 Trade-off betw een gaps and leakages
The test outcome for both disabled, #d(0)5 and able, <m(0), individuals is assumed to be 
normally distributed with a difference in means equal to (i and a standard deviation of 
l .20 Although the actual means of the two distributions are inconsequential (cf. footnote 
8), for clarity, we adopt the normalization that they sum up to 0. Thus, the means of 
</a(0) and <?£>(#) are /i/2 and —/i/2, respectively.
To obtain an estimate of /i, information is required on individuals’ ability to work, i.e. 
able or disabled, as well as their disability benefit status, tagged or untagged. For this, the 
disability data from above are combined with information on the sources of individuals’ 
revenue (which for 2003 are provided in the 2005 wave of the PSID). Everyone above the 
age of 65 is excluded from the sample, as these people have reached the full retirement 
age and are shifted to the retired worker portion of the U.S. Social Security system.21
Disability benefit status, i.e. tagged or untagged, is a random variable following a 
Bernoulli distribution, where the probability of being tagged depends on an individual’s 
age t E {25,..., 65} and on his ability to work. As an agent of age t is awarded benefits 
when his test outcome is below 0tl we have:
/  65
Pr(Tagged|Age =  t, Ability) =  3> I ^ ^ 6 sX(s = t) — ^Z(Able) + ^X(Disabled)
\ s = 2 5  2  2
where <£>(•) is the c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution and T(-) is the indicator 
function which is equal to 1 if the condition in brackets is satisfied and to 0 otherwise. 
Rearranging terms, a simple probit regression of disability benefit status on a set of 
age dummies and ability status can be employed to back out an estimate for /z and 
\ 9t f . Doing so, we obtain fi = 1.2329. As shown in Figure 3, the estimated path
I J t€  [25,65]
of the threshold, 0t, is increasing with age. The McFadden’s pseudo R 2 for this regression 
is 19.9%.
20 Alternatively, we could fix /z and calibrate the standard deviation. However, fixing the variance is 
particularly suitable in our context as with /z =  0 the problem collapses to the unobservable health case 
treated by Diamond and Mirrlees (1978).
21 Within the sample of people aged 25-65, a small proportion of individuals receive other types of 
Social Security benefits, such as retirement, survivor’s or dependent benefits. We exclude them on the 
grounds that the U.S. Social Security program may place disabled individuals with certain employment 
histories or family structures in a Social Security category other than disability benefits. Hence, we 
cannot know whether, absent these other benefits, they would get disability benefits.
j ,  (W)
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Figure 3: Disability standard
Note that both our theoretical model and empirical strategy rely on the assumption 
that the difference in means, n, is the same at every age. To establish the validity of 
this claim, we run a probit regression where /x is allowed to be age-specific. It can be 
seen from Figure 4 that the resulting estimates do not exhibit any systematic pattern 
with respect to age. Indeed, when we test the hypothesis that /x is constant, we obtain a 
p-value of 0.813.
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Figure 4: Difference in means
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4 Numerical results
In order to provide some quantitative insights about the optimal Social Security system 
with imperfect tagging, this section presents a numerical simulation of the model and an 
evaluation of the corresponding welfare gains. But, before turning to the results, we need 
to describe how the disability standard for each age t , 0t, is set.
4.1 M inim izing gaps and leakages
We consider the benchmark case where the path of the disability standard is set such as 
to minimize the total number of gaps and leakages, but allowing for a preference between 
the two. This preference is captured by defining a price of gaps, pc, and of leakages, p l , 
where, for instance, a higher price of gaps, i.e. pc > Pl , implies that gaps should be 
avoided more than leakages.
More formally, the disability standard is set by solving:
min [  \pcF{t)  [l -  GD(0t) + P l  [1 -  F(t)] GA{0t) \d t ,  (20)
{ 0 t } t e \ o , H]  J O
where F(t) 1 — Goifit) and [1 — .F(t)] GA0t) correspond to the total number of gaps 
and of leakages at age t, respectively. In fact, this reduces to a static optimization problem 
for any given age, which yields the following first-order condition:
PGF(t)gD(9t) = p L [ 1 -  F(«)] gA{0t). (21)
The marginal benefit from increasing 0t is less gaps, the marginal cost more leakages. At 
the optimum, these, weighted by their respective prices, have to equate. Making use of 
the normality of the distribution of the test outcome, <m(0) and 9d{0), we have:
h = -  In m + — In PG
L Pl
(22)
Recall that the probit regression (19) from the last section yields the age-specific 
estimates for the disability standards displayed in Figure 3. To see whether these are 
consistent with the minimization of gaps and leakages, we add an age-specific error term
We then 
te of 1/p =
m
1 - F ( t )to (22) and run an OLS regression of 0t on the fitted values22 of In 
test the hypothesis that the slope coefficient is equal to our previous estimai 
1/1.2329 =  0.8111 and obtain a p-value of 0.028. In fact, the point estimate of the slope 
coefficient is 0.6907 which suggests that, to minimize the number of classification errors,
22We use the smoothed representation of F(t)  as displayed in Figure 2 since the decision to award the 
tag should be based on the disability distribution prevailing in the entire population.
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the disability threshold should increase slightly more rapidly with age than it currently 
does. However, if we run a constrained regression, which imposes that the slope coefficient 
should be equal to 1 / f i = 1/1.2329 =  0.8111, we obtain the smooth line in Figure 3. As it 
provides a good fit to the empirically estimated 6t, we shall consider that the minimization 
of gaps and leakages is a good approximation to the current U.S. Social Security policy.
Finally, the constant coefficient of the constrained regression implies a relative price 
of gaps and leakages equal to 1.1998. Hence, in our subsequent evaluation of the welfare 
gains, we shall consider that the current disability standard in the U.S. is given by (22) 
with a relative price of gaps and leakages of 1.2.23
The numerical simulation reported below assumes that the planner controls the rela­
tive price Pg / P l  and sets it to maximize welfare. A simple grid search reveals that the 
optimal price ratio is approximately equal to 2.5.
The minimization of gaps and leakages corresponds to a natural benchmark where the 
government makes a non-strategic use of its imperfect information on health. Further­
more, several arguments may be advanced in support of such a policy being constrained 
optimal. For one, the government might not be able to directly control doctors because 
their professional ethics may dictate them that they should make as few classification 
errors as possible. If so, the role of the government will be reduced to specifying the 
relative importance of gaps and leakages. Alternatively, one may think that the only 
tagging policy that is politically acceptable is one that minimizes gaps and leakages.
4.2 N um erical sim ulation
All numerical simulations are achieved by solving a discretized version of the system of 
equations which characterizes the optimal allocation. The disability standard used for 
the reported simulation is determined from (22) with p g / p l  — 2.5.
The consumption of the able and untagged, is plotted in Figure 5. Increasing
consumption with age renders incentives back-loaded. This has the dual advantage of 
not only inducing the old and able to work, but also the young and able since by working 
they maintain the prospect of high consumption when old. As previously discussed, 
this consumption pattern is imposed by the incentive compatibility constraint for the 
untagged.
23This measure gives an idea about the total number of tagged individuals in the population. Since 
take-up is not systematic, it is not readily comparable to other estimates found in the literature which 
are exclusively based on the applicants to disability insurance.
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Figure 5: Consumption of the able and untagged
The maximum retirement age of the economy, that of the able and untagged, RU, 
is 67.3 years. This is relatively high compared to the corresponding age of 65 prevailing 
with unobservable health. In fact, with partially observable health the consumption level 
needed to induce the able and untagged to work is not so high. As a result, their marginal 
rate of substitution between leisure and consumption is relatively low and it is optimal 
to let them retire rather late.
Figure 6 depicts cDU(t, r), the consumption of a disabled and untagged individual as 
a function of his current age t and of the age r at which he ceased to work24 (henceforth, 
"disability age"), with t >r .  Once an untagged agent has become disabled, his consump­
tion is falling with age and is minimal at H. To understand this pattern, which follows 
from condition (10), note that the planner wants to give high consumption to the truly 
disabled while deterring the able from claiming to be unable to work. To find the best 
compromise between these two goals, the planner exploits the fact that a truly disabled 
is unlikely to remain untagged for long. Thus, consumption is initially high to provide 
insurance. It then decreases over time as this lower consumption is unlikely to affect the 
truly disabled but would be likely to apply to an able person who claimed to be disabled. 
The very low consumption levels near H  serve as a threat and are therefore not welfare 
reducing.
24 Remember that individuals stop to work either when they become disabled or when they reach the 
retirement age. In this last case, from the perspective of the mechanism design problem, they can be 
considered as disabled from this retirement age onwards.
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Figure 6: Consumption of the disabled and untagged
Figure 7 gives the consumption of an able and tagged as a function of his current age t 
and of the age j  at which he became tagged (henceforth, "tag age"), with t > j.  For any 
given tag age, consumption is increasing over time. Again, the need to maintain incentives 
to work now and in the future makes back-loaded incentives particularly attractive.
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Figure 7: Consumption of the able and tagged 
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Figure 8 shows the retirement age of the able and tagged, R T (j ), as a function of the 
age j  at which the tag was awarded. The informative nature of the tag implies that the 
proportion of disabled will always be higher among the tagged than among the untagged. 
Higher consumption should therefore be provided to the disabled and tagged which means 
that even higher consumption is needed to induce the able and tagged to work. But this 
increases their marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. It is 
therefore not surprising that the optimal retirement age for all tagged is lower than that 
of the untagged.
RU
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Figure 8: Retirement age
To understand why the retirement age is a U-shaped function of the tag age, recall 
from condition (14) that the expected marginal resource cost of providing utility should 
be the same whether the agent is newly tagged or untagged. But, initially, the tagged are 
very likely to be able to work and, hence, cv4T(j, j)  should follow the shape of cAU(j), i.e. 
they are both increasing in j. But this makes back-loaded incentives so costly that it is 
optimal to reduce the retirement age. Later, when the tagged are more likely to be truly 
disabled, with age rising, the increase in c^T(j,j)  also contributes to match the increase 
in cAU{j). Hence, the increase in cAT{j, j)  can be kept smaller, making back-loaded 
incentives cheaper and allowing the retirement age to be raised. This intuition concurs 
with the concave shape of cAT{j,j), which is apparent along the diagonal in Figure 7. 
Note that a reasonable approximation of the optimal policy might be to implement an 
early retirement age of 62 for all those who got tagged before 57.
Figure 9 shows cDT(r,j), the consumption of the disabled and tagged who ceased to
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work at r and became tagged at j. Two sections are clearly distinguishable: c^T(r, j), r > 
j ,  on the left and c§T(r, j), j  > r, on the right. This discontinuity is due to the incentive 
compatibility constraint for the tagged which only applies on the left. It should be 
emphasized that, while previous graphs were displaying instantaneous consumption levels, 
this one reports permanent consumption levels. Indeed, individuals consume cDT(r,j) 
from max{r, j} until they die at H.
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Figure 9: Consumption of the disabled and tagged
As argued above, it is desirable to provide back-loaded incentives to the able and 
tagged. But, having an increasing consumption level for the able is not the only way to 
do so. Alternatively, the consumption of the disabled could be made higher, the later 
they cease to work. This explains why, for a fixed tag age j ,  c^T(r,j) is increasing in r.
For an individual who is disabled and untagged, consumption after retirement will 
be lower the later he becomes tagged. This follows from (12). The intuition for this is 
similar to that for cDU(t,r). If someone is truly disabled, he is likely to be awarded the 
tag shortly after stopping to work. In this case, the insurance motive commands a high 
consumption level. A low consumption level for the disabled who only get tagged much 
later serves as a threat to the able and untagged who might be tempted to deviate.
Turning to the diagonal of Figure 9, it is apparent that a higher consumption level 
is awarded if disability occurs before the award of the tag. To understand this, note 
that a newly tagged worker who deviates gets consumption c^T(-) immediately, while an 
untagged worker who deviates initially obtains c£>c/(-) and is only likely to rapidly qualify
Disability age Tag age
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for c£T(-) if he is truly disabled. Thus, c§T(-) could be made higher than c^T(-) while 
still inducing the able to work.
It can be checked that the only situation where agents are not happy to be tagged as 
soon as they become eligible, is when disability and eligibility occur simultaneously. The 
solution to this problem is to impose a compulsory health check to individuals who have 
just become disabled. For this solution to work, the outcome 6 of the test for a given 
individual should be exogenous to his action. A (computationally feasible) alternative 
would be to impose additional constraints to the planner’s problem ensuring that indi­
viduals are always happy to be awarded the tag as soon as they are eligible. This would 
eliminate the discontinuity of cI>T(-). However, imposing extra constraints does not seem 
essential and would come at the cost of reduced welfare.
4.3 W elfare gains
Our numerical simulations allow us to evaluate the welfare associated with the optimal 
policy. To get an idea about the gains generated by imperfect tagging, we take the 
unobservable health case, analyzed by Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) and Golosov and 
Tsyvinski (2006), as the reference. We also consider the first-best allocation which gives 
us an upper bound to the welfare gains that could be obtained.
A key characteristic of the Social Security system that we propose is that it implements 
a health-dependent retirement age.25 In order to assess the importance of this feature, we 
also compute the welfare obtained when the retirement age of the able has to be the same 
for all. More formally, the planner’s problem remains the same except that we impose 
RU = R T ( j ) =  R, Vj G [0, H\. The optimal retirement age is then pinned down by the 
following condition,
1 - G A(0R) +  f R A -
u'(cAU{R)) Jo u'(cAT(R,j)) =  7 (23)
which replaces (9) and (15). A weighted average of the marginal rates of substitution 
between leisure and consumption should be equal to the marginal rate of transformation.
A policy yields welfare gains of x% if its level of welfare can be matched in the 
unobservable health case by proportionally increasing consumption by x% in every state 
of the world. The results are reported in the following table.
25 Again, it should be stressed that the retirement age is dependent on health as observed by the 
government but that it only applies to the able, who are, by definition, in good health.
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Table 1: Welfare gains compared to unobservable health
Fixed Health-dependent First-best
retirement age retirement age
Pg / P l  = 2.5 0.45% 0.64% 2.98%
Pg / P l  = 1.2 0.41% 0.56% 2.98%
In the first line the planner sets the optimal price of gaps and leakages.26 If, however, 
doctors are out of control and the government has to stick with the current disability 
standards, then the relevant results are that of the second line. The welfare gains gener­
ated by the imperfect information on health are moderate but non-negligible. More than 
two thirds of these gains could be reaped with a fixed retirement age.
Clearly, from equation (22), as most people are able to work, the disability standard is 
quite low when almost equal weights are put on gaps and leakages, i.e. when Pg / P l  — 1.2. 
This implies that few people are tagged and, hence, only a limited use of the imperfect 
information on health could be made. This explains why the corresponding welfare gains 
are larger with Pg / p l  = 2.5.
The welfare improvements generated by the optimal policy could come from two 
sources: improved insurance against the disability risk or improved incentives to work. 
The following statistics on the average retirement age, for the case p g / pl  — 2.5, suggest 
that at least some of the gains come from better incentives to work.
Table 2: Retirement age
Unobservable
health
Fixed 
retirement age
Health-dependent 
retirement age
First-best
Average retirement age 61.5 61.9 62.2 64.1
Maximum retirement age 65 65.4 67.3 68.4
The average retirement age is the average age at which people cease to work, conditional 
on being able at 25. In all four scenarios, almost a quarter of the population retires as 
disability occurs. In the health-dependent retirement age case, about two thirds of the 
remaining three quarters of the population reach the maximum retirement age RU, which 
is smaller than the first-best retirement age as relatively high consumption is needed to 
induce the able and tagged to work until RU .
We have so far focused on the, rather theoretical, unobservable health benchmark. 
While the current U.S. Social Security system already uses imperfect information on
26Note that the optimal relative price with a fixed retirement age is also approximately equal to 2.5.
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health, one of the key differences between the planner’s policy and that observed in the 
U.S. is that the able and tagged are currently not incentivized to work.27 To evaluate 
the welfare gains generated by this feature of the optimal policy, we solved a modified 
planner’s problem where the constraint RT(j) = j , for all j  E [0, RU), is added.
Compared to the unobservable health case, the optimal policy under the constraint 
that all tagged retire immediately, yields a welfare gain of 0.46% when Pg / p l  = 12.28 
Using the numbers from Table 1, it follows that, with the current disability standard 
unchanged, the gains from inducing the able and tagged to work are small with a health- 
dependent retirement age, about 0.10%, and negative with common retirement age for all, 
about -0.05%. In this latter case, the costs of inducing work until the general retirement 
age are so large that they more than absorb all the benefits from encouraging work in 
the first place. This shows that inducing the able and tagged to work is only desirable 
up to a point, i.e. up to an early retirement age.
If the optimal relative price of gaps and leakages of 2.5 could be enforced, then the 
optimal policy is associated with a welfare gain of 0.18% compared to the immediate 
retirement of the tagged policy. It is therefore desirable to decrease the strictness of the 
disability test but, crucially, the able and tagged should be induced to work.29 Indeed, 
with Pg / p l  = 2.5, the policy of immediate retirement of the tagged generates a welfare 
loss of 0.45% compared to the unobservable health case. This illustrates the possibility 
that no information on health could be preferable to some badly used information. The 
problem with Pg / P l  = 2.5 when RT(j) = j  is that about 30% of the population retires 
when awarded the tag. To compensate the sharp reduction in labor supply that this 
entails, the general retirement age needs to be pushed up to 72.1, which results in an 
average retirement age of only 61.0.
In addition to the 0.18% that could be gained by inducing the able and tagged to work, 
another major welfare enhancing change recommended by the optimal policy consists in 
making a more strategical use of the gap in timing between the occurrence of disability 
and the award of the tag. However, lacking a good benchmark representation of the 
current U.S. situation, the corresponding welfare gains are harder to evaluate.
27The UK has recently experimented with a policy, Pathways to Work, encouraging employment 
among disability recipients. Preliminary evaluations suggest very high returns on investment both to the 
beneficiaries and to the taxpayer (Adam Bozio Emmerson Greenberg Knight 2008). However, a similar 
policy in the U.S., Ticket to Work, failed to increase participation (Autor Duggan 2006, 2007).
28The optimal relative price with immediate retirement of all tagged is p g / p l  =  0.9. The corresponding 
welfare gain, compared to unobservable health, is 0.47%.
29 A number of other studies on the topic, such as Low and Pistaferri (2008), have reached the opposite 
conclusion that the strictness of the test should be increased. However, these only consider a ceteris 
paribus change in the disability standard, while we simultaneously allow for other changes to the current 
U.S. policy such as increased incentives to work for the tagged. As implied by the previous footnote, 
without such changes the disability standard should indeed be decreased slightly.
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5 First-best implementation
We have so far considered the optimal Social Security system when the government 
chooses a path of 9t that minimizes the total number of classification errors but allowing 
for different prices of gaps and leakages. Although this is a rather natural choice for the 
disability threshold, we might be interested in determining the optimal allocation when 
9t is under the control of the planner. In fact, it turns out to be possible to implement 
the first-best, perfect information, allocation asymptotically by setting the thresholds 
strategically. Remember that in a first-best allocation perfect insurance is
te[o,H]
provided and, hence, all agents enjoy a constant consumption stream, cFB, while the able 
keep supplying labor until they reach the first-best retirement age, R FB.
To prove that such an allocation can be asymptotically implemented, we propose a 
policy that does the job.30 The planner should optimally award the tag as follows:
—oo if t £ [0, R FB)
§ t = <  0 if t = R FB , (24)
k +oo if t e { R FB,H]
where 6 is a constant to be determined. Hence, the only uncertainty is whether people get 
tagged at the general retirement age, R FB, or immediately after. Using this simple device, 
it is possible to deter deviations by setting consumption appropriately. In particular, we 
set:
cAU(t) = c,Vt e [0,RFB), (25)
cDU{t,r) =  c, Vr € [0, RFB), Vt € [r, RFB] (26)
c ^ ( r , j )  = f  S i t r £ l ° ’RFB) !aldj > RFB (27)
1 c otherwise
for some constant c and S. The consumption of the able and tagged is irrelevant and does 
not need to be specified as people can only get tagged after retirement. Note that the 
consumption level 6 only applies to those who retired before RFB, who therefore claimed, 
rightly or wrongly, to be disabled, and who failed to get tagged at R FB. But, thanks 
to the monotone likelihood ratio property satisfied by gu($) and go(9), for a sufficiently 
high threshold 9, it is almost exclusively able people who fail to get tagged at RFB. Thus, 
if they claimed to be disabled before RFB, it is possible to punish a random subset of 
them by setting a sufficiently low value of 8.
P roposition  2 A policy characterized by (24), (25), (26) and (27) could be used to
30 The precise characterization of such a policy, and in particular of the optimal path of 6t , is not 
unique. However, the underlying logic is always the same.
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implement, asymptotically, the first-best allocation of resources. For that, choose 5, as a 
function of c, to be the highest value such that all the incentive compatibility constraints 
of the untagged are satisfied. The consumption level c should then be determined from the 
resource constraint. The first-best allocation obtains as 6 —► +oo, which implies <5 —> 0 
and c —> cFB.
In a nutshell, the optimal policy is to shoot the liars. In particular, it should be empha­
sized that the low value of 6 is not welfare reducing as it is essentially off the equilibrium 
path. Note that every eligible person is trivially happy to be awarded the tag. Also, in 
this context, there is nothing to be gained from a health-dependent age of retirement.
The reason why the first-best allocation can only be implemented asymptotically is 
that <7a(0) and go(9) have the same support. Thus, no matter the severity of the test, 
the government can never be entirely sure that someone untagged is able to work. If, 
on the contrary, the upper limit of the support of <?£>(#)> say Op, is lower than that of 
<M(0), then the first-best policy can be exactly implemented by setting 0 = 9D, 6 = 0 and 
c = cFB. In other words, if there exists a disability test which only able people could fail, 
then the optimal policy is to shoot the previously allegedly disabled who fail the test at 
age RFB.
An interesting feature is that the first-best allocation can always be asymptotically 
implemented, independently of the quality of the information on health. In terms of our 
previous calibration, where gA(6) and £/£>(#) are both assumed to be normal, all that is 
required is that the difference in means be strictly positive, i.e. p, > 0. More generally, 
this shows that a small departure from the assumption of unobservable skills, which is 
pervasive in New Dynamic Public Finance, could have considerable consequences for the 
determination of the optimal policy.
Proposition 2 is reminiscent of a similar result derived by Mirrlees (1974, 1999) in the 
context of moral hazard.31 While the formal, mathematical, argument is very similar, it 
is interesting to note that this result is applicable to a hidden information framework in 
which the private information, on health, is partially observable by the government.
It should be emphasized that the first-best implementation heavily relies on the as­
sumption that workers believe that their probability of being awarded the tag, conditional 
on remaining able up to age R FB, is G a (9). In other words, they do not have any private 
information about when they might become eligible. While, as a first-order approxi­
mation to reality, this assumption is reasonable, a small departure from it could have 
important consequences when implementing the, extreme, first-best policy. Indeed, an 
able individual whose apparent health is already very bad at age 50 might be tempted to 
deviate being confident that he will get tagged at RFB.
31 See also Varian (1980).
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While it might not be reasonable to believe in the practical relevance of the first- 
best policy, the result nevertheless suggests that the government can obtain substantial 
welfare gains by moving beyond the minimization of gaps and leakages. For instance, if 
the disability threshold was increasing even more rapidly with age than it currently does32, 
then the tag would often be awarded late in life. This would be welfare enhancing as the 
threat of not being tagged when old deters the temptation to claim to be disabled when 
young while few young and able workers would be tagged which makes it unnecessary to 
give them special rewards for participating to the labor market.
6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have characterized, within a general framework, the optimal Social 
Security system in a dynamic setting with imperfectly observable health. In order to 
induce the able to work, while providing insurance to the truly disabled, the planner 
offers back-loaded incentives and makes a strategic use of the difference in timing between 
the occurrence of disability and the award of the tag. The able who are tagged should 
be encouraged to work. But, as they are eligible for generous disability benefits, it 
is necessary to give them higher consumption and higher pensions than if they were 
untagged. It is therefore also desirable to let them retire earlier than others. Indeed, 
our simulation finds a general retirement age of 67.3 for the untagged and close to 62 for 
those tagged before age 57.
In many industrialized countries, both disability insurance and pension programs are 
subject to financial distress. It is commonly argued that the strictness of the disability 
test should be raised, to deal with the former problem, and that the statutory retirement 
age should be increased, to deal with the latter. A different solution emerges when the two 
problems are treated jointly rather than in isolation. To increase labor supply, the key is to 
offer the able and tagged proper incentives to work until some early retirement age. This 
would even make it desirable to decrease the strictness of the test which, by reducing 
the number of gaps, would improve the provision of insurance to the truly disabled. 
Moreover, additional welfare gains could be obtained by moving beyond the minimization 
of classification errors and by setting the disability standard and consumption levels 
strategically.
In this chapter, we have derived the optimal incentive-feasible allocation by relying on 
the revelation principle. It would now be very interesting to know how it could be imple­
mented in a decentralized economy with private capital markets. Golosov and Tsyvinski 
(2006) showed that asset-testing could be used to implement the optimal allocation with 
unobservable health. Things might not be as trivial with imperfect tagging. If the policy
32 Note that this is equivalent to raising the price of gaps relative to that of leakages as age increases.
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instruments needed for implementation turn out to be excessively complex, then imple­
mentation constraints might have to be added to the planner’s problem. Diamond and 
Mirrlees (1986) show a potentially useful direction by solving the same problem as in 
their previous paper but imposing that the consumption of the able should be constant 
over time, reflecting the impossibility of implementing age-dependent payroll taxes.
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A The planner’s problem
As explained in the text, cf. equation (6), the planner maximizes the ex-ante expected 
lifetime utility of agents subject to a resource constraint and to a set of incentive com­
patibility constraints which insures that those who are able to work choose to do so until 
they reach the relevant retirement age. In this appendix, we give explicitly the equations 
of the planner’s problem. His objective, which could be derived using (1), (2), (3), (4),
(5) and (6), is to maximize:
E[v{iJ)} = 
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p R U  p H  r p H
+ \  *  M  e"
+ I ru U^ ^ RU' ^
dj
x
df) r i df)
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p R U  r p H
+ l  U e" dt
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Note that, when deriving this expression, care should be taken of the fact that 
is not a standard probability density function. In particular, a mass of agents become
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disabled and tagged simultaneously. This justifies the existence of a specific term, i.e. 
the last term of (Al), corresponding to these people.
The resource constraint could be derived in the same way. Let z(i,j)  stand for the
lifetime budget deficit generated by individual (i, j). The counterpart to equation (4),
for min {z, RU} < j , is:
z{i,j) = / e~pt [c*u {t) -  7 J  dt (A2 )
Jo
+ f  e~ptcDU(t,mm{i,RU})dt 
J min{i,/Z{/}
rH
+  / e ptCpT ( m m { i ,  RU} , j)dt.
J i
Similarly, the counterpart to (5), for j  < min {z, RU}, is:
z {hj) = [  e~pt [cAU(t) -  71\ dt (A3)
Jo
/•min { i ,RT(j)}
+ /  e~pt [cAT( t , j ) -  7t] dt
J j  
r H
+ / e ptc ^ m in  {i, RT{j)} , j)dt.
Thus, the resource constraint is:
•// rH
E lz ih j ) \=  f  [  z (h j) f(h j)d id j  < 0. (A4)
Jo Jo
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The full expression is:
C r i
/  e~<* [c ^ (t)  -  7(] 1 -G a (0 () [ 1 - ^ W l *
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J  J  ^  {°AT^ ^  ~  9A^ j ~^dJ ^  ~~ dtd^
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The incentive compatibility constraint inducing the able and untagged of age s G [0, RU) 
to work is:
f  r i
/  e-" [u(c^(t)) -  6] 1 - G A(6t) [1 - F( t ) ] dt
J S
rRU r RT<J) ^
j j  e pt [u(cAT(t, j)) -  b] 9a {0j)-^ -  [1 -  F(t)] dtdj
(A6)
/ RU rHj '  e~ptu(cPu( t , i ) ) \ l - G D(6t) f(i)dtdi  
J  e->*u{cPu(t, RU)) [[l -  GA{Bt)] [1 -  F(t)] +  [l -  GD(6t)] [F(t) -  F(Ft/)]] dt
/ RU r H r pH -|Ji [ /  e~Ptdt\ u c^DT^3))9D{0j)-^-f{i)djdi
/"[/' ’JRU Uj
*H r rH
+  j  I I  e~ptdt 
dOi
+
+
dj
*RU rRT(j)  r rH
X \9A(0j)-T2 [1 -  F(j)l +  GD[es) -  GA(9j) f ( j )  +  Q D iO j)-[F(j)  -  F(RU)}
dOr
dj
dj
df )  ■
u(c%T (i,j))gA 0 j ) —j r  f(i)didj
rnu  n i v n
J ™  [ F  u ^ i R T U ) ,  j))gA( B ^  [1 -  F(RT(j))\ dj
I  [ j f  u(c? T ( j ’ j ) )  IG d {^ ) ~  Ga{^ )] m d j
> F e-^u(,P u {t, s)) [[l -  GA{8t)] [1 -  F(t)] +  [l -  GD(0,)] [^(*) -  F(s)}
+ L  [/ e_pirf4j u (cdt (s j ) )
dt
x
df )  r i df)
g A h ) - £  [1 -  f tf ) ]  +  [GniBi) -  Ga G,)] f ( j )  + [ F «  -  F(s)] dj.
The left hand side just corresponds to the expected utility of an able and untagged of age 
s. It could be written more compactly as E [v(i,j)\i > s , j  > s] = j f  f sH v(i,j) f(i ,j)d id j.  
The right hand side is equal to the expected utility that these agents would obtain by 
deviating and claiming to be disabled. They would get consumption cDU(t, s) until tagged 
at j  > s and CqT(s , j )  thereafter.
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Finally, the able who obtained the tag at age j  should be incentivized to work until 
age RT(j). The corresponding constraint at age s > j  is:
r
e pt [u(cAT(t,j)) -  b] [1 -  F(t)] dt
fETU) [ rH 1 
J  I J' e pidt u(c%T(i,j))f(i)di
[ f H e~ptdt1 u(c°T(RT(j), j))  [1 -  F(RT(j))} 
U r t u ) J
H
> I. -pidt
(A7)
Since, once an agent is tagged, the government cannot rely on any additional informa­
tion about his health, this constraint is formally identical to the incentive compatibility 
constraint imposed in Diamond and Mirrlees (1978).
The planner’s problem is to maximize (Al) with respect to cA[/(-), cAT(•), cDC/(*), 
cgT(-), c£T(-), RT(-) and RU subject to (A5), (A6) Vs G [0,RU) and (A7) Vj G 
VsGtf.JZTO'))-
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Chapter 4
Dynamic Optimal Redistributive Taxation 
with Endogenous Retirement
Abstract
While the participation decision is discrete in a static context, i.e. to work or 
not to work, such is not the case in a dynamic context where workers choose the 
fraction of their lifetime that they spend working. In this chapter, I therefore 
characterize the optimal redistributive policy in a dynamic environment with both 
an intensive and an extensive margin to labor supply. The government should 
optimally design a history-dependent social security system which induces higher 
productivity individuals to retire later. Redistribution should be done through the 
social security system rather than with a non-linear income tax.
1 Introduction
Labor supply indivisibilities, such as those caused by fixed costs of working, are pervasive. 
This creates an extensive margin to labor supply which forces individuals to make a 
participation decision. This choice is inherently discrete in a static context, i.e. to work 
or not to work, but not in a dynamic framework where agents choose the fraction of their 
lifetime that they spend working or, equivalently, their retirement age.
The implications of the extensive margin for optimal taxation have been analyzed 
rather extensively in a static environment (see, for instance, Diamond 1980, Saez 2002, 
Immervoll Kleven Kreiner Saez 2007, Chone Laroque 2005, 2008, Laroque 2005, Beaudry 
Blackorby Szalay 2007, Blundell Shephard 2008). Importantly, this literature has pro­
vided some support for the implementation of tax credits, such as the Earned Income 
Tax Credit in the US. However, abstracting from the dynamic aspect of workers’ labor 
supply problem seems to be more than a simplifying assumption. Indeed, it fundamen­
tally changes the nature of the participation decision by, artificially, making it discrete. 
More generally, the importance of dynamic issues for the optimal design of taxes has long 
been recognized in economics, at least since Vickrey (1939).
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Furthermore, the positive analysis of taxation has recently emphasized the relevance of 
the dynamic framework with an extensive margin (see Mulligan 2001, Ljungqvist Sargent 
2006, 2008, Prescott Rogerson Wallenius 2009, Rogerson Wallenius 2008). In particular, 
it provides a natural explanation for the discrepancy between the well-documented small 
elasticity of labor supply along the intensive margin and the large effects of taxation 
needed to rationalize a number observed macroeconomic phenomena, such as the differ­
ence in the total amount of hours worked between Europe and the US1. As explained by 
Prescott (2006), micro elasticities along the intensive margin are small precisely because 
the adjustment occurs along the extensive margin.
The goal of this chapter is therefore to determine the optimal redistributive policy 
in a dynamic environment where workers are heterogeneous in productivity. I allow for 
two dimensions to the labor supply decision: the number of hours of work conditional 
on participation, i.e. the intensive margin, and the retirement age, i.e. the extensive 
margin. I first rely on the revelation principle to determine the optimal incentive-feasible 
allocation of resources, in the spirit of Mirrlees (1971). I then show how the optimum 
can be implemented in a decentralized economy with a history-dependent social security 
system. Finally, I perform a numerical calibration of the model to illustrate the main 
features of the optimal policy.
Allowing for the dynamic nature of workers’ participation decision has substantial 
policy consequences. First, the career length of workers should be increasing in their 
productivity. Hence, the retirement age should be a key input of the fiscal system which 
can take the form of a history-dependent social security system. In general, the proposed 
optimal social security system leaves the shape of the period-by-period income tax sched­
ule indeterminate as any tax change can be undone by adjusting the history-dependent 
transfers received after retirement. Also, a large amount of redistribution is done within 
the pension system. While this is already the case in practice, there has, so fax, been 
little theoretical justification for seeing social security as more than a savings device. It 
should nevertheless be emphasized that, while the optimal incentive-feasible allocation is 
unique, it is possible to find other ways of implementing the optimum without relying on 
a social security system.2
The issue of the optimal design of a social security system with heterogeneous agents 
and endogenous retirement has, so far, been largely overlooked. Two important excep­
tions include the pioneering work of Diamond (2003, chapter 6) as well as Sheshinski
P rescott (2002, 2004) implicitly invokes the existence of employment lotteries to justify a high elas­
ticity of labor supply. But, as noted by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006), it is more natural, and equally 
effective, to assume an extensive margin in a dynamic setup.
2A trivial alternative consists in replicating the direct truthful mechanism used to find the planner’s 
optimal allocation of resources. Thus, agents would be asked their productivity profile when they enter 
the labor market and the government would choose accordingly the time path of their consumption and 
of their labor supply.
129
(2008). In both cases, the source of heterogeneity is the disutility of labor, which could 
be interpreted as a fixed cost of working, rather than productivity. Their main finding 
is that agents with a low disutility of labor retire later than others and that some of the 
income generated by their extra activity is redistributed to those having a high disutil­
ity of labor. However, they restrict themselves to three period models and, hence, their 
conclusions should be seen as qualitative.
Cremer, Lozachmeur and Pestieau (2004) also look at optimal social security with 
endogenous retirement. Workers can only be of two or three types which differ in produc­
tivity and in disutility of labor. They show that the retirement age is distorted downward 
for everybody except for workers with the highest productivity and lowest disutility of 
labor. Again, their results should be seen as qualitative.
Of related interest, Gorry and Oberfield (2008) solve a dynamic optimal taxation 
problem in a life cycle framework with both an intensive and an extensive margin to 
labor supply. Their framework consists of a representative agent who must be taxed to 
finance an exogenous amount of government expenditure. Importantly, the only fiscal 
instrument allowed is a standard non-linear income tax. Hence, the policy which they 
drive is only constrained optimal. This explains why the "no distortion at the top" 
principle does not hold in their context.
There has recently been a growing literature on dynamic optimal taxation with het­
erogeneous agents. The main focus has been on the provision of insurance against skill 
risks. However, this literature has been unable to provide a general characterization of the 
optimal allocation of time between work and leisure, which seems paradoxical given the 
central importance of labor income taxes in the static optimal taxation literature. Hence, 
numerical simulations of optimal policies have only been possible in simplified setups. For 
instance, Golosov Tsyvinsky Werning (2006), Kocherlakota (2005) and Weinzierl (2008) 
restricted the number of time periods to two or three, Albanesi Sleet (2006) focused 
on independently and identically distributed shocks, Diamond Mirrlees (1978), Golosov 
Tsyvinski (2006) and Chapter 3 of this thesis had a permanent disability shock and 
Kapicka (2006) does not allow for savings. Also, Battaglini and Coate (2008) could 
characterize the optimal labor income tax in a dynamic redistribution problem with sto­
chastically evolving skills; but they had to assume risk neutrality in order to kill any 
desire to provide insurance. This chapter complements this literature by determining the 
optimal distortions to labor supply in a dynamic context without uncertainty.3
I begin by describing, in section 2, the structure of the economy. The optimal 
incentive-feasible allocation is derived in section 3. I then show in section 4 that a
3Note that, with an intensive margin only and constant productivity throughout the lifetime of 
individuals, the dynamic optimal taxation problem is not particularly interesting as it is just a replication 
of the static optimal taxation problem.
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history-dependent social security system can implement the optimum in a decentralized 
economy. Section 5 contains a numerical simulation of the optimal policy. This chapter 
ends with a conclusion.
2 Model
Individuals face a deterministic life-span equal to H. Utility is additively separable 
between consumption and leisure. Agents derive an instantaneous utility u(ct) from 
consuming q  at age t, where u' > 0, u" < 0 and limu(c) = —oo. They work until some
c—►()
retirement age R  and get disutility v(lt) from supplying lt units of labor at t, where
t>(0 ) =  0 , «'(0 ) =  0 , v' > 0 and v" > 0. They also have to incur a fixed cost of working 
b > 0 which, for simplicity, is assumed to be constant over time. Lifetime utility V  is
Note that the value of leisure is normalized to zero when individuals are not working, i.e. 
from age R  to T.
productivity index a and faces a deterministic productivity profile {7t(c0}te[o,/q' Thus
become clear, I need to assume that productivity at each age is weakly increasing in the
of two agents are not allowed to cross at any point in time. Although reasonable, this 
assumption rules out, for instance, football players who, contrary to the vast majority of 
the population, get their highest salary when young.
The specification of utility in (1) entails both an intensive and an extensive margin to 
labor supply. Clearly, conditional on working, agents need to choose a number of hours 
of work; this is the intensive margin. As the disutility cost of working v is increasing and 
convex, without fixed costs of working, agents would choose to work until their death,
4We therefore abstract from the way resources are shifted over time. In an overlapping generation 
framework, the model would therefore be compatible with a fully funded social security system, where the 
interest rate corresponds to the returns to capital, and with a pay-as-you-go system, where the interest 
rate is determined by the rates of growth of population and output.
5A natural candidate specification, which is used in the calibration of the model, is to have a base­
line productivity profile 7 t, common to all workers, multiplied by the individual-specific productivity 
parameter a ; thus 7 t (a) =  c*7 t .
time separable. Continuous time is assumed, which is convenient to derive the endogenous
retirement age R . The future is discounted at rate p. Thus, individuals have the following
preferences:
Resources can be transferred across time at an exogenous interest rate4 which, for 
simplicity, is taken to be equal to the discount rate p. Each agent is characterized by a
an a-worker produces output 7 f(a) if he supplies one unit of labor at age t. As will
productivity parameter of the agent5. More formally, a > a' implies 7 t(a) > 7 t(c/) for all 
t with a strict inequality for at least one t. Thus, the deterministic productivity profiles
131
i.e. R = H. However, the fixed cost of working creates a labor supply indivisibility which 
induces agents to make a participation decision at each age; this is the extensive margin.
In a static context, this indivisibility generates a non-convexity in the workers’ pro­
duction possibility set which, as argued by Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), could be 
overcome by resorting to employment lotteries together with a complete set of markets 
for consumption claims. A criticism to this theoretical argument is that lotteries are 
just not available to most household. However, in a dynamic context, agents can instead 
convexify their production possibility set by alternating spells of work and leisure while 
trading a risk-free asset to smooth their consumption over time. This directly applies 
to the framework of this chapter and we therefore have a "time averaging" model of the 
labor supply a la Diamond Mirrlees (1978) or Mulligan (2001). Ljungqvist and Sargent 
(2006, 2009) have shown that, in continuous time, lotteries and time averaging models 
of indivisible labor are equivalent when productivity is constant and quantitatively very 
similar otherwise.
Thus, the key decision that agents have to make at the extensive margin is the fraction 
of their lifetime spent working. Our specification of utility in (1) implicitly assumes that 
agents prefer to work at the beginning of their life-span, from age 0 to R, and retire at 
the end, from R  to H. This is the only possibility with a declining productivity profile 
as agents choose to work when their productivity is highest. This is one possibility 
among others with constant productivity as agents are indifferent about the timing of 
their work decision provided that the present value of their income6 remains unchanged. 
However, the retained specification is more problematic with a quadratic productivity 
profile which should induce agents to also enjoy some leisure at the beginning of their life 
while their productivity is still low, as in Rogerson Wallenius (2008). It could nevertheless 
be objected that rising productivity at early ages reflects some on-the-job learning effects 
and, hence, postponing entry does not increase the starting productivity of a worker. In 
other words, age 0 is a normalization of the age at which work begins.7
The extensive margin is therefore associated to the determination of the retirement 
age R, which is a continuous choice variable that could be pinned down by a first-order 
condition. This stands in sharp contrast with the extensive margin of the static optimal 
taxation literature which, by forbidding employment lotteries, leads to a truly discrete 
participation decision.
While the above framework has recently been central in the macroeconomic literature 
dedicated to the positive analysis of the effects of taxation, the aim of this chapter is to 
conduct the corresponding normative analysis. But, before specifying the optimal policy
6 Strictly speaking, it is only with no discounting, p =  0, that this present value is entirely determined 
by the fraction of time spent working.
7In general, the timing of the work decision is also influenced by the difference between the interest 
rate and the discount rate and by the time profile of the fixed cost of working.
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problem, I need to determine the informational structure of the economy.
The planner observes output yt produced at each instant but does not observe the 
corresponding labor supply lt; the two being related by yt = 7 t{a )k for an o-worker. 
Instantaneous consumption q  is also observable which is equivalent to assuming that 
savings could be monitored and, hence, taxed. Finally, the planner knows the retirement 
age R  of each agent.8 Full commitment is assumed.
3 Optimal allocation
This section relies on the revelation principle to determine the optimal allocation of 
resources, while the next section turns to the implementation of the optimal policy in a 
decentralized economy. Thus, for now, the planner’s problem is to design a direct truthful 
mechanism where each agent is asked to report his type, o, and where telling the truth 
is the optimal strategy.
A worker claiming to be of type a  receives a consumption stream {Q(a)}te[0,T]’ 1S 
required to work until age R(a) and needs to produce a flow of output {yt (a) }tGj0,/?(«)) 
while working. Hence, the welfare of an cn-worker claiming to be of type a' is given by:
V(a'; a) = j "  e-ptu{ct(a'))dt -  ' e“^  v +  & dt, (2 )
where I have used the fact that an a-worker needs to supply yt(a ') / j t(a) units of labor 
to produce output yt{a'). For the mechanism to be truthful, we need:
V(oc] a) > V ( ol\ a), for all a  and a'. (3)
An equivalent way of expressing this incentive compatibility condition is that, for any
given a, V(a';a)  must be maximized when a' — a. I therefore impose the necessary
first-order condition:
dV (a:a ) ^— — —  =  0, for all a. (4)
da'
Differentiating (2) with respect to a' and using the fact that9 V\(a'\ a') =  0, as implied
8With constant productivity, the actual timing of work is not determined, only the total amount of 
work done is. In this case, I assume that the government knows at any single point in time whether an 
agent is working or not. But, this might seem to be at odds with the assumption that lt is not observable. 
To overcome this difficulty, we can consider that lt stands for effort while working. Alternatively, I need 
to assume, following Mulligan (2001), that there is a maximum frequency at which agents can switch 
between work and leisure and that "the ‘indivisibility’ is at least as long as the tax accounting period".
9V{(a'] a)  denotes the derivative of V  with respect to its zth argument.
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by (4), I obtain:
da'
_|_e - p R ( a ' )
yt(a') \  1 , ( yt{a')
I t  ( « )  \ 7 i ( “ )
j/fl(a-)(Q')\  _ v (  yma')(g') \  ,5x
7H(g')(a')/ V  7fl(g')(“) )  da!
The first-order condition (4) characterizes a maximum if and only if Vi (a7; a) > 0 for 
a' < a  and Vi(ar; a) < 0 for a' > a. The disutility of labor being increasing and 
convex in the amount of labor supplied, v(x) and xv'{x) are both increasing in a: . 10 Also, 
remember that a! > a implies 7 t (a/) > 7 t(a). Hence, the two bracketed terms in (5) have 
the same sign as (a' — a) whenever 7 *(o') ^  7 t(a) and are otherwise equal to zero. This 
leads to the following lemma. 11
Lem m a 1 A sufficient condition for the first-order condition (4) to characterize a max­
imum is
^ M > 0 a n d i m > 0. (6)
da da
Thus, if (6) holds, the very complicated incentive compatibility condition (3) reduces 
to the much simpler first-order condition (4). Note that this simplification would not 
be possible if the productivity profiles of different workers were crossing over time. In­
deed, the second-order condition (6) implicitly relies on the fact that, in (3), it is always 
the downward incentive compatibility constraint which is binding. The corresponding 
economic intuition is that redistribution is typically done from high to low productivity 
agents; but with crossing profiles it is nor clear who should benefit and who should lose 
from redistribution.
The lifetime utility of an a-worker who is telling the truth is:
pH pR{<*)
V (a )=  / e~ptu(ct(a))dt -  / e~pt [v (lt(a)) + b\dt, (7)
Jo Jo
where k{a) = yt(a)l'yt(a). Differentiating this function and using the first-order condi­
tion (4), the incentive compatibility constraint (3) could be expressed as:
rR(a) 1 Hry fry)V ’(a)  =  J  e - ^ a y w a ) )  J t L l d t .  (8 )
10This implies that the Spence-Mirrlees condition is satisfied.
11 This sufficient second-order condition could have alternatively been derived by imposing the pos- 
itivity of the cross derivative of V { a ' \ a ) at a , i.e. Vi2 {a;a)  >  0. Indeed, totally differentiating the 
first-order condition (4) gives V h faja) 4- Vi2 (a;a)  =  0 and, hence, the standard second-order condition 
for a maximum V ii(a ;a ) <  0 is equivalent to Vi2 (o;;Q!) >  0.
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The economy-wide resource constraint is:
p a  pH(a)  p H
/  /  e~pt7 t ( a ) l t (a ) d t  — / e~ptCt(a)dt
Jo Jo Jo
f (a)da  > E , (9)
where /  is the density function of the distribution of the productivity index a  across 
the population with support [0, a] and E  denotes an exogenous amount of government 
expenditures that must be financed. The bracketed term on the left-hand-side of (9) 
corresponds to the budgetary surplus generated by an a-worker. Finally, the planner’s 
objective is to maximize social welfare, expressed as a Bergson-Samuelson functional:
[ \ ( V ( a ) ) f ( a ) d a ,  (10)
Jo
where ^  is an increasing and concave function weighting the lifetime utility of individuals 
according to the redistributive objective. ^  is typically specified as:
* 0 0  = V ’rSf
with k, E (—oo, 1] determining the social aversion to inequality. The two most common 
benchmark are the utilitarian preferences, k = 1, where the planner only cares about the 
sum of individual utilities without any special concerns about their distribution across 
the population and the Rawlsian case, k = — oo, where the welfare of society is equal to 
the utility of the worst-off individual.
Note that, without an intensive margin, the incentive compatibility constraint (8) 
would boil down to imposing an equal lifetime utility for everyone. Indeed, as could be 
seen from (2) with v equal to 0, an individual’s utility would not be affected by his type 
and, hence, it would not be necessary to give high productivity workers an informational 
rent to induce them to reveal their productivity parameter a. It follows that, with an 
extensive margin only, any second-best allocation is also the first-best allocation with 
Rawlsian social preferences.
The planner’s problem is to maximize social welfare (10) subject to the resource 
constraint (9) and to the incentive compatibility constraint (8) holding for each a. This 
gives an optimal control problem with ct(a) and lt(ct) as control variables and V(a) as 
the state variable and where R(a) is implicitly determined from (7). It could be solved 
using Pontryagin’s maximum principle.
The first-order conditions to the problem imply that consumption should remain con­
stant throughout the life of individuals, i.e. Ct(a)  = c(a) for all t. This is not surprising 
as, without uncertainty, the inverse Euler equation characterizing the optimal allocation 
of resources in a dynamic optimal taxation problem is identical to the standard Euler
135
equation (Golosov Kocherlakota Tsyvinski 2003).12 Thus, the interest rate being equal 
to the discount rate, there is nothing to be gained by distorting consumption over time. 
This implies that the optimal policy would not be affected if consumption or, equivalently, 
savings were not observable.
Let A > 0 denote the multiplier associated to the resource constraint and fi(a) the 
multiplier associated to the incentive compatibility constraint of the a-worker. The first- 
order condition to the problem corresponding to the state variable is:
/ ( a ) .  (12)~ A « )  =
We also have the two transversality conditions:
MO) =  fi{a) =  0. (13)
Note that it could easily be proved that p is always non-positive (Werning 2000). The 
first-order condition associated to the intensive margin is:
A 7t(“ ) “  TTu'(c(a)) _
Similarly, the corresponding condition associated to the extensive margin is:
A f(a)+/i(a)---- 1 , \ lR(a)(a)v'(lR(a)(a)) = 0.
7*(a)(a ) da
(15)
We now have a complete characterization of the solution to the planner’s problem.
P roposition  1 The optimal allocation of resources |i? (a ), {2/t(a)}te[o,ft(a)) > c ^ )}  ^
is characterized by the first-order conditions (12), (13), (14) and (15) together with the 
constraints of the planner’s problem (8) and (9) and the lifetime utility function (7).
Of course, if the sufficient second-order condition (6) of Lemma 1 is not satisfied, then 
the above first-order conditions might well be meaningless.
Let us define Tl(a , t) as the wedge along the intensive margin for an a-worker of age 
t as:
7 > )  (1 -  r ‘( M ) )  =  (16)
12 At a deeper level, this is a consequence of the uniform commodity taxation theorem of Atkinson and 
Stiglitz (1976). Indeed, preferences are separable between consumption and leisure and consumption at 
different dates could be seen as different commodities which should, therefore, not be taxed differently.
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Similarly, I define the extensive wedge r e(a) for an a-worker as:
7 W a ) l* « ) (« )  t1 -  r » )  =  t,(^ a ) ) + 6 - (1?)
These two equations state that, absent any distortions, i.e. Tl(a,t) = 0 and r e(d) =  
0, the marginal product of labor should be equal to the marginal rate of substitution 
between leisure and consumption where, for the extensive margin, the disutility from 
retiring marginally later is v(lR^(a))  +  b and the corresponding marginal product is 
'IR(a){a )^R(a){a )• Simple algebra using the first-order conditions for the intensive and 
extensive margins, (14) and (15), respectively, reveals that:
=  ~ w S  , }  m2 d7i Q) + ‘‘(“ W M  - (18)A/(q) [7t(a)l da
and:
_e( Ma ) 1 d/y R(a) (^) j , ( u
r ( a ) -  x f ( * ) lR{a)(a ) f r Ra * ) } 2 d a
As fi(a) = 0, the no distortion at the top principle holds along both margins. Similarly, 
as / i (0) =  0, the labor supply of the lowest productivity agent is not distorted provided 
that there is no bunching at the bottom of the income distribution13. Finally, wedges 
are strictly positive along both margins for any other value of a  for which the first-order 
conditions hold.
Without an intensive margin, the utility of individuals would be independent of their 
productivity and no-one would get an informational rent. The optimal retirement age 
would therefore equalize the marginal rate of substitution to the marginal product of 
labor, i.e. equation (17) would hold with r e(a) =  0 for all a. Thus, in the present context, 
even the wedge along the extensive margin is due to the existence of the intensive margin. 
Distortions are necessary to induce people to reveal their type and it is preferable to have 
two small distortions rather than a single large one.
4 Implementation in a decentralized economy
Now that I have characterized the optimal allocation, I turn to the description of a 
possible way of implementing this allocation in a decentralized economy using realistic 
fiscal instruments.
Optimal consumption should be constant over life, which naturally occurs when agents 
can trade a risk-free asset. Capital taxes are therefore not needed, which considerably
13 Bunching is likely to occur at low income levels as the optimal allocation for low productivity agents 
might be characterized by a corner solution imposing that they do not supply any labor.
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simplifies the problem. As shown by Weinzierl (2008), a history-independent income 
tax cannot, in general, implement the optimal allocation, even if it is allowed to be 
age-dependent. The intuition for this is that a direct truthful mechanism implicitly has 
memory which reduces the amount of distortions needed to raise a given amount of 
resources; whereas a memory-less income tax is constrained to create distortions in every 
time period. To implement the optimum, we therefore need a fiscal instrument which 
is history-dependent until, at least, the retirement age. A natural candidate is a social 
security system which, in many countries, already takes the history of labor supply into 
account to determine the level of pensions.
Let us now solve the implementation problem.14 I denote the optimal allocation by 
,c* (a)|  ^ . To lighten notations, let yR stand for a given
history of labor supply, i.e. yR = j-R , {yt}te 0^ # ) |,  and yR*(a) stand for the optimal
history of the a-worker, i.e. yR*(a) =  |-R*(a), {yt(a)}t€[o,/i*(«))}• ^et us define DOM  
as the set of labor supply histories compatible with a socially optimal allocation. More 
formally:
DOM  =  {yR : yR = yR*(ct) for some a  E [0, o;]} (20)
We now define the function c : DOM  —*■ R such that:
c{yR'{a)) =  c*(a). (21)
The second-order condition (6) of Lemma 1 implies that this function always exists. To 
make the implementation problem as simple as possible, I assume for now that agents 
get all their lifetime income when they retire. This social security payment received by 
workers at retirement is set equal to:
rs (  if yR e DOM , ,
<?*(/) =  1 " • ( » )I 0 otherwise
This solves the implementation problem.
P roposition  2 The social security system Q* implements the optimal allocation 
{ j / * » , c » } a6[0a].
Proof. First, adopting a labor supply strategy yR outside DOM  cannot be individually 
rational as 0 consumption at any point in life generates a lifetime utility of — oo. Let
yR*(a'), with a ' E [0, ci], be the labor supply strategy of an a-worker. By construction,
14 The presentation is closely related to that of Grochulski and Kocherlakota (2008).
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y R * ( a ' )  £  D O M .  The a-worker will choose his consumption level by solving:
max
Ct I “ e_p!Ktl§)+6
r H
subject to e~pR^ Q * (y R*(a')) > / e~ptCtdt.
Jo
dt (23)
The solution to the problem implies a constant consumption level, which, from the budget 
constraint, must be equal to:
OP PR
(24)
But, by definition of the social security system, (20), (21) and (22), this is just c{yR*(a')) — 
c*(a'). It follows that choosing among {yR, c} given that yR £ DOM  is equivalent to 
choosing among reporting strategies in a direct truthful mechanism. An a-worker there­
fore chooses yR*(a) for his labor supply and consumes c*(a). m
Although it is commonly argued that redistribution should be one of the main objec­
tives of a well designed pension system (Barr Diamond 2008), there is little theoretical 
justification for this. In particular, it is a priori not clear that an optimal income tax 
is not sufficient to achieve the desired level of redistribution. Proposition 2 contributes 
to this debate by implying that, indeed, equity concerns should be dealt with within an 
optimally designed social security system with endogenous retirement.
I shall now illustrate the fact that Q* could be seen as a reduced form of a more realistic 
social security system. Current policies are typically designed such that individuals pay 
income taxes throughout their career and receive an annuitized pension after retirement.
P roposition  3 For any income tax function T, the optimal policy can be implemented 
by giving retirees an annuitized pension P*, where:
[c(yR) 1 eppH ~  Sq e pt [yt - T ( y t ,t)\ dt if yR £ DOMp * ^ y ^  — / e~PR- e ~ P H ,  P J 0 " v i /n -/j -j v t? ^ ~ *— (25)
[ 0 otherwise
Proof. Choosing yR ^ DOM  is still not desirable. For yR £ D O M , the combination of 
the income taxes T  and of the annuitized pensions P* satisfies:
f  e-<* [yt -  T (yt, t)] dt + f  e~<*P'{yR)dt = 
Jo Jr
(26)
So, the worker’s budget constraint is not affected by the change from Q* to (T, P*) and, 
hence, (T, P*) also implements the optimal allocation. ■
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Clearly, the proposed policy is not fully identified. In particular, any income tax change 
could be offset within the social security system such as to leave the resulting allocation 
unchanged.
It has been extensively argued in the static optimal taxation literature, that the 
existence of an extensive margin to labor supply justifies the implementation of tax 
credits such as the Earned Income Tax Credit of the US or the Working Tax Credit 
of the UK. The proposition above shows that a tax credit is not necessary to implement 
the optimum in a dynamic context. Indeed, in the above framework any specific non­
linear income is inconsequential since its effects are undone by the pension payments 
made after retirement.
I have so far assumed that agents can trade a risk-free asset at the exogenous interest 
rate p. If necessary, they can even use their future social security payment as a collateral 
to be able to borrow sufficiently to achieve perfect consumption smoothing. If, on the 
contrary, agents do not have a perfect access to the credit market, then the optimal policy 
can be fully identified.
P roposition  4 I f capital markets are dysfunctional and only the government can borrow 
and lend at the interest rate p, then the unique optimal policy is (T*, P*) with the optimal 
age-dependent income tax determined by:
T ‘ (y;(a),t) = y ;{ a ) -c '(a ) .  (27)
Proof. The optimal income tax function T* is well defined whenever the condition 
dVtJ ^  > 0 of Lemma 1 holds. By construction, (T*, P*) is the only optimal policy which 
ensures perfect consumption smoothing without individuals trading any asset. ■
When thinking about the policy relevance of the proposed social security system, an 
important limitation is that we do not know what should be done if agents fail to be 
supply an optimal amount of labor supply, i.e. if their yR fails to be in DOM. Clearly, 
to address this issue, the present framework would need to be enriched with features that 
could explain such outcomes. It could nevertheless be conjectured that, whether workers 
fail to choose yR € DOM  because of uncertainties such as skill risks or because of limited 
cognitive capacities, the unlikely labor supply histories would be penalized. Indeed, this 
would improve incentives to work at little cost in terms of welfare. Determining the 
robustness of optimal policies to modeling uncertainties remains an important issue for 
further research.
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5 Simulation
I now simulate the optimal policy for a reasonable calibration of the model. Individuals 
can work from age 25 until they die on their 80th birthday. The annual discount rate is 
2%; so p = 0 .0 2 . The disutility from supplying labor along the intensive margin is given 
by a standard power function:
/1+*
v (h) =  t V t ,  (28)
1 s
where 8 is the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Following Kleven Kreiner 
Saez (2008) and Brewer Saez Shephard (2008), I take 8 — 0.25.15 This reflects the low 
intensive elasticity of labor supply well documented in the empirical literature. The 
instantaneous utility derived from consumption is logarithmic:
ufa) = log(ct). (29)
Note that, preferences being separable between consumption and leisure, this logarithmic 
specification is required to have the number of hours worked and the retirement age 
unaffected by the productivity level a when the government does not intervene. 16
The productivity profile of an o-worker is proportional to a baseline productivity 
profile 7 t, the proportion being given by his productivity index a\ thus 7 t(a) =  0 7 1. The 
baseline profile is such that productivity is constant and normalized to 1 until age 60 and 
then declines smoothly and quadratically until it reaches 0 at 80. This is consistent with 
the fact that, under the current fiscal system, the number of hours worked by participating 
workers is almost constant until age 60 (see Prescott Rogerson Wallenius 2009, Figure 2). 
Furthermore, it also explains why some people, those who do not wish to retire after age 
60, currently choose to alternate spells of employment and leisure rather than to enjoy 
all of their leisure after some early retirement age. 17 The distribution of the productivity 
index, /(a ) , is lognormal. The mean is normalized to 1 and the standard deviation is 
set at 0.7, an empirically plausible value according to Kanbur and Tuomala (1994). The 
baseline productivity profile and the lognormal distribution of a are plotted in Figure 1 
and 2 , respectively.
15 This value also falls in the middle of the range of elasticities considered by Rogerson and Wallenius 
(2008).
16Similarly, in a Ramsey model with technological progress, logarithmic utility of consumption is 
needed to obtain a balanced growth path with constant labor supply.
17 From the normative perspective of this chapter, although I impose that individuals work continuously 
until retirement, it would be equally desirable to allow the low productivity workers who retire before 60 
to alternate spells of employment and leisure provided that the present value of their production remains 
unchanged. To implement these alternative optimum allocations, the social security system (22) would 
have to be changed slightly by setting, for instance, age 60 as the legal retirement age before which no 
history-dependent transfer could be made.
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The planner maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function; thus k, = 1 in (11). 
Finally, the fixed cost of working b is calibrated such that the average retirement age of 
participating workers is 62 and the level of government expenditures E  is calibrated such 
that it amounts to a quarter of total output. To simulate the optimal policy, I just solve 
a discretized version of the first-order conditions characterizing the optimal allocation.
Let us now turn to the corresponding results. Figure 3 displays the lifetime production 
and consumption of workers as a function of their productivity index. The least produc­
tive individuals, those with a  < 0.26, never participate to the labor market. They only 
represent 3.3% of the population. Lifetime consumption exceeds production for about a 
third of workers, 35.9%; those whose productivity index a falls below 0.65. The most 
productive agents consume slightly more than 50% of their output. Figure 3 suggests 
that there is hardly any progressivity in the optimal fiscal system.
Figure 4 shows the budget surplus raised from each type of workers, i.e. the differ­
ence between the lifetime production and consumption of an a-worker multiplied by the 
number f(a )  of such workers. This illustrates the well-known fact that the bulk of re­
distribution occurs from the upper-middle class to the lower-middle class. This is simply 
because the very rich and very poor are not very numerous. As could be seen from Figure 
4, the total surplus across the whole population is positive. This is necessary to finance 
the government expenditures E  which amount to a quarter of total output.
Unsurprisingly given the low intensive elasticity, the labor supply of participating
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workers is not very sensitive to productivity. It is equal to 0.79 for the least productive 
agent who participates, for whom a = 0.26, a varies between 0.91 and 1.02 for an a = 5 
worker whose productivity while working fluctuates between 0.63 and 1. Hence, although 
pretty constant, labor supply is slightly increasing in the productivity index a  as well as 
in the age-specific productivity of an a-worker.
A large part of the variation of the labor supply across agents is associated with the 
extensive margin. Figure 5 displays the retirement age of the different types of workers. 
As expected, it is desirable to have the career length of individuals increasing in their 
productivity. Indeed, the high productivity agents with a > 3.4 retire after age 72, more 
than 10 years later than the average retirement age of participating workers which was 
set a t18 62. Figure 6 shows the distribution of the retirement age across the population. 
Only 29.9% of individuals, of which 3.3% never work, retire before age 60, i.e. before 
their productivity starts declining.
How do the wedges along the intensive and extensive margins compare? It turns 
out that, with a constant intertemporal elasticity substitution, as implied by (28), the 
relationship between the intensive, r l(a, £), and the extensive, r e(a), wedge satisfies:
=  . 1
r e ( a )  5
(30)
18The average retirement age for the whole population, including the 3.3% of agents who never work, 
is 60.8.
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This is immediately obtained by dividing (18) by (19), after having plugged in (28). 
Hence, the lower is the elasticity of labor supply along the intensive margin, the higher 
should the intensive wedge be relative to the extensive wedge. The intuition is reminiscent 
of Ramsey’s (1927) inverse elasticity rule: a low elasticity implies that a large wedge will 
only lead to a small behavioral response. In the extreme case where 8 = 0, all the burden 
falls on the intensive margin which, de facto, does not exist as participating workers 
always supply exactly one unit of labor.19 Note that (30) implies that the intensive 
wedge faced by an ct-worker is independent of his age. Figure 7 reports the wedges of 
participating workers. With 8 = 0.25, the intensive wedge is five times larger than the 
extensive wedge.
6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have characterized the optimal redistributive policy in a dynamic frame­
work with an intensive and an extensive margin to labor supply. My results advocate 
for the implementation of a history-dependent social security system which induces a 
positive correlation between the productivity of workers and their retirement age. Thus,
19In the opposite extreme where 6 =  +oo, both wedges axe equal. With v(lt ) +  b =  It +  b the labor 
supply is equally responsive along both margins. Indeed, the worker can practically avoid paying the 
fixed cost of working by supplying all his labor at age 25.
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my analysis suggests that an important amount of redistribution could optimally be done 
within the social security system. While I have not quantified the welfare gains to be 
expected from the implementation of the optimal policy, they must be at least as large 
as those generated by an optimal age-dependent income tax which were evaluated, by 
Weinzierl (2008), to be close to 2% of aggregate consumption in the US.
Due to the looming pension crisis, policy makers are starting to realize that, sooner 
or later, the retirement age will need to be raised. This creates a unique opportunity 
to reform social security systems and this work suggests that, rather than imposing an 
homogeneous increase in career length across the population, a well designed reform 
should encourage higher productivity people to retire later.
A number of issues remain for further research. It would be interesting to solve for 
the optimal policy when workers are heterogeneous in both productivity and fixed costs 
of working. This remains, however, a non-trivial multidimensional screening problem.20 
Also, I have abstracted from skill risks, which are at the heart of the recent dynamic 
optimal taxation literature. In particular, allowing for the random occurrence of a per­
manent disability shock, as in Diamond Mirrlees (1978) or in Chapter 3 of this thesis, 
seems particularly relevant for the optimal design of social security.
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Conversely, the values held by individuals in a society have an impact on the policies 
that could be implemented. If people are naturally reluctant to work, then the adverse 
incentive effects of social policies are likely to be large. This would make them so expensive 
to implement that voters, as taxpayers, would be unlikely to support them.
In this chapter, I therefore propose a model where values and policies are jointly 
determined. More specifically, the focus is on the interactions between the provision of 
unemployment insurance and cultural transmission, where work ethic is the cultural trait of 
interest. Those having a low work ethic are characterized by a substantial disutility cost of 
working, or equivalently by a low productivity, and by a willingness to live off 
unemployment benefits, without searching for a job, for as long as possible. By contrast, those 
having a high work ethic enjoy working and would feel guilty if unduly relying on 
government-provided benefits.
The policy is determined by majority voting. On the one hand, risk-averse workers 
would like to have some insurance against the unemployment risk; while, on the other hand, if 
the average work ethic across the population is too low, the severity of the moral-hazard 
problem makes generous unemployment insurance prohibitively expensive to adopt. This 
trade-off determines the impact of values on the policy to be implemented.
To identify the reverse causation, I rely on an extended version of the Bisin Verdier 
(2001) framework1 which captures the fact that, rather than being something spontaneous, 
cultural transmission results from an optimizing behavior of parents. When deciding on the 
level of effort to exert to raise their children to work hard, altruistic parents take into account 
the policy that will be implemented in the future. Clearly, the prospect of having a high work 
ethic is less attractive if children, once they have grown up, will be able to live off generous 
unemployment benefits for extended periods of time. This is the channel by which policies 
affect culture.
In this setup, the two cultural traits present in the population are complementary. 
Indeed, if most people have a high work ethic and desire to have a good level of insurance 
against the risk of becoming unemployed, then the returns to having a low work ethic and to 
live off the generous benefits are substantial. Conversely, if most people have low values, 
then the moral-hazard problem is so large that voters favor a replacement ratio that is 
sufficiently small to induce everyone to work, which makes it preferable to enjoy working. 
Thus, as I shall formally prove, any stable equilibrium of the model is characterized by a 
culturally heterogeneous population. This result should be contrasted with that of Bisin and 
Verdier (2004) who find, in the context of redistribution rather than social insurance, that the
1 The Bisin Verdier (2001) model of cultural transmission, which builds on the seminal work o f Cavalli-Sforza 
Feldman (1981) and Boyd Richerson (1985), has been successfully applied to a number of different contexts, 
including the links between marriage and the transmission of religious beliefs (Bisin Verdier 2000 and Bisin 
Topa Verdier 2004), the analysis o f ethnic identity and integration (Bisin Patacchini Verdier Zenou 2006) and 
the transmission of education (Patacchini Zenou 2007).
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system converges towards a homogenization of preferences.2 The intuition is that, in the case 
of redistribution, the policy that is implemented is favorable to the majority; while, with 
unemployment insurance, it is preferable to be part of the minority, especially for those 
having a low work ethic. In other words, here the government budget constraint is more 
important than the political constraint; whereas the reverse is true for redistributive policies.
In the second part of this chapter, I argue that the model can account for a substantial 
fraction of the history of European unemployment since World War II. I perform a calibration 
which suggests that the introduction, or wide expansion, of unemployment insurance 
programs just after WWII was followed, a generation later, by an increase in the number of 
low work ethic individuals registered as unemployed. In this respect, the key feature of the 
model is the existence of a long lag between the introduction of a policy and the behavioral 
response of agents. The strength of this explanation is that it is compatible with the co­
existence3 of generous unemployment insurance and low unemployment in the 1950s and 
1960s. This could therefore be seen as an alternative to the dominant story, defended by 
Blanchard Wolfers (2000) and Ljungqvist Sargent (1998), which relies on the interaction 
between shocks and institutional rigidities. The model suggests two or three possible 
scenarios for the future evolution of European unemployment. Using data from the World 
Values Surveys, I also present some empirical evidence that values did decline over the 
second half of the twentieth century.
This chapter is related to a recent literature on the interplay between social norms and 
economic incentives in the context of the welfare state. Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull (1999) 
assume that “to live off one’s own work” is a social norm. Furthermore, the larger the number 
of people adhering to this norm, the stronger it is felt by individuals. Agents have to choose 
whether to work or to live off the public transfers, the size of which is determined by majority 
voting. Despite some important similarities, it should be emphasized that their approach 
substantially differs from mine in a number of ways. First, I assume that there is a true motive 
for unemployment insurance and, as a result, those who are involuntary unemployed do not 
have any feeling of guilt when receiving unemployment benefits. Also, I suppose that agents 
differ in their work ethic, rather than in their wages, which permits an explicit model of 
cultural evolution. Finally, by assuming a feeling of guilt that is a decreasing function of the 
population share living on transfers, they obtain that agents adapt their individual ethic to the 
policy that is implemented. On the contrary, in this chapter, cultural transmission from one 
generation to the next is the only source of adaptation of the work ethic to the chosen policy. 
An important consequence of this difference is that their model cannot generate any lag 
between the introduction of a policy and the evolution of the work ethic.
2 A similar result was derived by Benabou and Tirole (2006) under a slightly different, more behavioral, model 
of cultural transmission. See also Piketty (1995) and Alesina Angeletos (2005) for closely related stories with 
similar conclusions.
3 This co-existence is sometimes referred to as the “European unemployment puzzle”. The relevant literature is 
briefly surveyed at the beginning of the second section of this chapter.
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In order to generate such a lag, Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) propose an explicit 
model of norm transmission from parents to children. As in the paper discussed in the 
previous paragraph, norms are tied to outcome, e.g. being welfare dependant, rather than to 
effort, e.g. not trying to look for a job. Also, this norm is felt more intensively as more people 
adhere to it. It should be emphasized that the assumed cultural transmission process is hardly 
comparable to the one used in this chapter. Indeed, the only motivation of parents for raising 
children to work hard is to avoid having them rely on their altruism in the future. Hence, if 
parents could credibly commit not to donate more than a certain amount to their children in 
the future, then norm transmission would never occur.
Some work has also recently been done on the impact of cultural values on labor 
market institutions and outcomes. Algan and Cahuc (2009) argue that countries characterized 
by stronger civic virtues are more prone to provide insurance through unemployment 
insurance, thanks to a lower moral-hazard problem, rather than through job protection. Their 
approach is closely related to the political economy aspect of my work. In another paper, 
Algan and Cahuc (2006) emphasize the Catholics’ male breadwinner conception as one of the 
main cause of the high level of labor market rigidities, favoring insiders, encountered in 
Mediterranean countries. Also, Algan and Cahuc (2005) argue that the strength of family ties 
in Continental Europe explains a rate of employment lower in these countries than in the US, 
especially among women, the young and the old. It should be emphasized that all these 
analyses take culture as given, while, as I argue throughout this chapter, we might expect it to 
evolve as labor market institutions change.
This has led Aghion, Algan and Cahuc (2008) to investigate the effect of the minimum 
wage on the quality of labor relations. They argue that state regulation prevents workers from 
negotiating, which would foster cooperation. The channel by which policy affects culture is 
very different from the one I propose as it relies on the evolution of beliefs about the 
cooperative nature of the economy. Along similar lines, Blanchard and Philippon (2006) 
argue that bad labor relations cause high unemployment which corresponds to an, undesirable, 
low trust equilibrium.
While I focus, in the second part of this chapter, on the rise in European 
unemployment, Fernandez (2007) attributes another major structural change in the labor 
market, constituted by the rise in female labor force participation, to an evolution of culture. 
More specifically, the cultural change was driven by a process of intergenerational learning 
about the payoffs from working in the market rather than at home. A calibration of her model 
replicates the S-shaped increase in female labor force participation that occurred throughout 
the twentieth century.
Another major structural change, which occurred during the British Industrial 
Revolution, was the rise of the middle-class which replaced the landowning aristocracy as the 
economically dominant group. Again, culture seems to have been a key driving force. 
According to Doepke and Zilibotti (2008), the triumph of the bourgeoisie was due to their
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patience and high work ethic, which were shaped by the nature of their preindustrial 
professions. See also Gradstein (2008) for a similar story of reversals of fortune.
More generally, this chapter contributes to the growing literature on the relationship 
between culture and economic outcomes (see Guiso Sapienza Zingales 2006 for an overview). 
Importantly, Tabellini (2008a) provides evidence that distant political institutions have an 
impact on culture as measured by trust and respect, democracy being favorable to these 
values. Conversely, countries where morality is more widespread have better governance 
indicators and tend to be more developed. The empirical analysis of Algan and Cahuc (2008) 
confirms these findings. Tabellini (2008b) proposes a theoretical explanation for the 
interaction between cooperation and legal enforcement which relies on an extended version of 
the Bisin-Verdier (2001) framework. Finally, Aghion, Algan, Cahuc and Shleifer (2009) 
emphasize the two-way causality between trust and regulation. They show that there is a 
complementarity between high trust and low regulation or, equivalently, between low trust 
and high regulation.
This chapter is organized as follows. The theoretical model is presented in the first 
part. I begin by a description of the functioning of the economy at a point in time, I then turn 
to the cultural transmission process and to the resolution of the model. In the second part, I 
argue that the model offers an explanation for the history of European unemployment since 
World War II. After a brief review of the literature on the topic, I perform a calibration of the 
model and then present some supportive empirical evidence. The chapter ends with a 
conclusion.
2 The Theoretical Model
2.1 The Economy
Let us consider an overlapping generation economy such that each generation is populated by 
a continuum of agents of mass 1. Each individual lives for two periods corresponding to 
childhood and adulthood. The young acquire preferences while the old work and try to 
transmit a high work ethic to their children.
As workers face the risk of being unemployed with probability p , the government
provides some unemployment benefits bt , at time t , that are financed by a tax xt on wages.4 
Adults have the choice between working full time, which might entail some unemployment 
spells, and not working at all. Those who decide not to work also benefit from the 
unemployment insurance system. The population is divided between agents who have a high 
work ethic, type H, and those who have a low work ethic, type L. These two cultural types are 
characterized by different preferences. Work is more enjoyable, or less painful, to type H than
4 While I focus on unemployment insurance, it should be emphasized that the model also applies to other forms 
of social insurance to which non-working people qualify, such as minimum income guarantees or disability 
benefits.
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L. Also, type H individuals, unlike type L, feel guilty when receiving unemployment benefits 
without actively searching for a job.
More specifically, let Ut.(W) denote the utility of an agent of type i &{HyL\ who 
chooses to work. We thus have:
UH (F) = (1 -  p )v (w -x t) + pv(bt) + 0 , (1)
UL =  p )v (w -x t) + pv(b,),  (2)
where v stands for the increasing and strictly concave utility of consumption and w the 
before-tax wage. Thus, a worker spends a fraction p  of his working life unemployed. The 
parameter <j>> 0 captures the fact that working is relatively less painful for those having high 
work ethic. This could reflect a higher productivity or a stronger taste for work.
Similarly, Ui (NW) stands for the utility of non working agents of type i, i.e. the 
utility of those who are not even searching for a job. It is given by:
UH (NW) = v(b,) , (3)
UL(NW )=v(b,) + r . (4)
where y  > 0 denotes the leisure that low work ethic individuals enjoy while not working.
Individuals of type H feel so guilty from relying on benefits to which they are not entitled that
they cannot enjoy any leisure while inactive.
Work ethic, as defined in this chapter, has two dimensions: commitment to work (f) 
and willingness to cheat on benefits y . It should be emphasized that both are needed.5 The 
economic significance of (j) is that if everyone has to work, because unemployment benefits 
are too low, then it is preferable to have a high work ethic, i.e. <ft>0=> UH (W) > UL (W) . 
The parameter y implies that, with full insurance, low work ethic individuals strictly prefer to 
shirk,i.e. y>0=> [w -x t =bt => UL(NW) > UL (W)\.
The definition of individual preferences clearly implies UH (W) > UL (JV) and 
UL (NW) > UH (NW) . Hence, if type H agents choose not to work, then so do the Ls:
[U„(NW)>UH(W)]=>[UL{NW )>UL{W )l (5)
Conversely, if the Ls choose to work, then so do the Hs:
\Ul ( W ) > U l{NW )]^>[U h { W ) > U h {NW)]-  (6)
The policy implemented by the government consists of a level of taxes, xt , and 
unemployment benefits, bt . Denoting by q, the proportion of agents of type H in period t , 
the government budget constraint that must be satisfied at time t if only the Hs work is:
q,]iX-p)xt - P b ,] - ( l - q t)bt = 0 . (7)
5 In their analysis of trust and regulation, Aghion, Algan, Cahuc and Shleifer (2009) also have two dimensions to 
individual preferences. Agents can either be civic or uncivic. The former are more productive while the latter 
generate higher negative externalities on other members of society.
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It appears clearly from this constraint that the existence of L, who take unfair advantage of the 
system, increases the cost of providing unemployment insurance. This will prevent the 
provision of full insurance that would be ideal for H.
The policy to be implemented is determined by an electoral process. Two cases must 
therefore be distinguished, depending on which type holds the majority. I assume that 
lim v(c) = -oo so that a policy that does not induce anybody to work is never adopted. This
c-» 0
implies, by (5), that, for all policies resulting from the voting process, agents having a high 
work ethic choose to work.
Whoever holds the majority, there are two policies that could be implemented. Under 
the first one only type H agents work, whereas the second induces everyone into activity. 
There is a trade-off between the desirability of the two policies. On the one hand, as could be 
seen from the government budget constraint, (7), the inactivity of type L agents increases the 
cost of providing unemployment insurance as they do benefit from the policy without ever 
contributing to its funding. On the other hand, in order to induce them to work, it is necessary 
to decrease the level of unemployment benefits, which is costly in terms of worker’s forgone 
insurance.
Let us first consider the case where type H agents hold the majority, qt >1/2 .  The
“first policy” is such that only the Hs choose to work. Intuitively this should be implemented 
if the number of agents of type L is not too large and if inducing them to work is excessively 
costly in terms of forgone insurance. The optimization problem corresponding to this first 
policy is given by:
maxU„{W) (8)
such that: U„ {W) > UH {NW)
-/>)?,)&, = 0 .
The “second policy” is such that all adults choose to work. Noting, by (6), that if the Ls work 
then the Hs also work, the corresponding optimization problem is:
maxU„(W), (9)
such that: UL (W) > UL {NW)
(1 - p ) x t -p b , = 0 .
The policy chosen by voters of type H is the one associated with the highest maximand.6
Let us now turn to the case where type L agents are in majority, qt < 1/2. Again,
voters have the choice between two different policies, one where only the Hs work and
another such that everyone chooses to work. The corresponding optimization problems are:
6 Given the specification of the optimization problem, one might wonder about the possibility that agents o f type 
L work even if the first policy is adopted. In fact, this case cannot arise. Indeed, given the specification o f the 
budget constraint in problem (8), if  in equilibrium the Ls choose to work, then the second policy must be 
preferred to the first one.
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max UL(NW) (10)
k A)
such that: U„ (W) > UH (NW)
qt ( \ - P ) x t p ) q t )bt =  °>
and:
maxU L(W) (11)
k A l
such that: UL (W) > UL (NW)
(1 - p ) x t — pbt = 0 .
Note that, as UH (W) and UL (W) only differ by a scalar, i.e. $ , the second policy is not 
affected by who holds the majority, i.e. (9) and (11) yield the same values for x, and for bt . 
The incentive compatibility constraint for H, UH (W) > UH (NW ), could be written as:
(1 -  /?)[v( w - x , ) -  v(bt )]>-<£. (12)
Thus, type H agents only stop working when the level of unemployment benefits exceeds the 
net wage by a sufficient amount. But, full insurance would only be provided if all agents were 
of type H. As a consequence, the incentive compatibility constraint for H is never binding 
when the Hs are in power.7 Hence, when the Hs are in majority, if the first policy is adopted, 
(8), the limit on the level of insurance that the government can provide is due to the budget 
constraint rather than to the incentive compatibility constraint. The corresponding incentive 
compatibility constraint for L reduces to:
(1 -  p)[v(w -xt) -  v(b, )] > y . (13)
Clearly, inducing type L to work puts an upper bound on the level of insurance that can be 
provided to workers.
To solve the model, let us first consider the policy that is adopted when the Hs are in 
power. The following lemma is proved in Appendix 1.
Lemma 1: I f  type H  agents choose the policy to be implemented, then there exists a threshold 
q e (0,1) such that i f  q, >q then the first policy is adopted, i.e. (8) preferred to (9), and if
qt <q then the second policy is adopted, i.e. (9) preferred to (8).
Note that if q < 1/2, then the first policy is always adopted whenever the Hs actually are in 
power.
Let us now turn to the case where the Ls are in charge. The following lemma is proved 
in Appendix 2.
7 This could be checked more form ally from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
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Lemma 2: I f  type L agents choose the policy to be implemented, then there exists a threshold 
q g (0,1) such that i f  q, > q then the first policy is adopted, i.e. (10) preferred to (11), and if
q, <q then the second policy is adopted, i.e. (11) preferred to (10).
Note that if q >  1/2, then the second policy is always adopted whenever the Ls actually are in 
power.
We might wonder about the relative values of the threshold for H, q , and for L, 
q .The following lemma is proved in Appendix 3.
Lemma 3: q > q.
Thus, if type H agents choose the first policy, then so do the Ls. Conversely, if the Ls choose 
the second policy, then so do the Hs. It can be checked that many equilibria are inefficient in 
this model. Indeed, when the Ls hold the majority, at q type L agents are indifferent between 
the two policies whereas the Hs strictly prefer the second one. Also, more fundamentally, 
whenever the second policy is implemented, the resulting equilibrium is dominated by an 
allocation such that everybody works and where full insurance is provided. In this case, the 
source of the inefficiency is the incentive compatibility constraint for L. If possible, the 
government should try to promote a high work ethic, through the educational system for 
instance, in order to alleviate the moral-hazard problem associated with the provision of 
unemployment insurance.
Before turning to the cultural transmission process, let us define the welfare of an 
agent of type H or L at time t as a function of the equilibrium policy, i.e. as a function of qt . 
This will be relevant to the cultural transmission effort of parents.
2.2 Welfare
Let V'(qf) be the welfare on an agent of type i e {H,Lj given that, at time t , the share of 
type H agents is equal to qt . The purpose of this subsection is to characterize this function.
In equilibrium, three possible cases could prevail: 1/2 < q < q , q < q <  1/2 and 
<1/2 < q. For simplicity, I focus on the first case which seems quite realistic. It should 
nevertheless be noted that the two other possibilities could also be analyzed and would indeed 
yield very similar insights.
Assuming 1/2 < q < q , there are three different political outcomes that can arise. If
qt g (q, 1], then type H agents choose to implement the first policy, (8); if qt e (1/2, q) ,  then 
the Hs choose the second policy, (9); and, if qt e[0 , l /2 ) , the Ls choose the second policy,
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(11). Note that the last two outcomes are in fact equivalent. Type H agents always choose to 
work, which implies:
V"(q,) = UH(lV-,q,). (14)
Type L agents only choose to work if qt < q , implying:
, \UL(JV;q ) if q <q
V‘ ^ , )  = \ „  \  ,  05)[UL(NW;q,) if q, >q
As we shall see in the next subsection, when deciding on the strength of their cultural
transmission effort, parents compare the welfare of being of type H to the welfare of being of
type L. We therefore need to determine A V(qt) = VH (qt) -  VL (qt).
From equations (14) and (15), we have:
m q ,) = \ U M - U^  (16)
\UH(W ;q ,)-U L(NW;q,) if q ,> q
Using the specification of the utility functions given by equations (1) to (4), it is 
straightforward to check that:
AF(?,) = {<!> ' / ? . < < ?  (17)
p)[v(w -x ,)-v (b ,)\ + <j>-y if q ,> q
When all agents have a high work ethic, q = 1, perfect insurance is provided and, hence, 
AK(1) = ^ - ^ . I f / > ^ ,  then AV, as given by (17), is negative for q sufficiently close to 1. 
For simplicity, I assume throughout the paper that AV is exogenously bounded below by 0.8 
It is easy to prove that:
limA V(q)<<f>, (18)
q - y q
q> q
implying a discontinuity of AV at q . Indeed, if (18) does not hold, then the incentive 
compatibility constraint for low work ethic agents, (13), is automatically satisfied at q under 
the first policy, (8). But, then, type H agents strictly prefer the second policy, (9), to the first,
(8), as it is associated to a lower level of taxes for a given level of insurance. But, this is a 
contradiction9, as, by definition, type H voters should be indifferent between the two possible 
policies at q . By the same token, it must be that A V{q)<(j) whenever the first policy is 
implemented, i.e. for all q e (q ,\) .
For some of the results that will subsequently be derived, AV  needs to be a non­
increasing function of q . Although, practically, this condition will always be satisfied, there 
is a theoretical possibility that, as q increases, providing unemployment insurance becomes 
so much cheaper that the level of taxes declines and hence the level of insurance also declines,
In the cultural transmission process described in the following subsection, this assumption only affects the 
speed with which work ethic declines when q is close to 1, but has no consequences for subsequent results.
9 Note that this proof follows the argument given in footnote 6.
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i.e. the gap between w - x  and b increases. I therefore assume that the utility function v is 
such that AV  is non-increasing10 for q e (5,1) •
Now that I have described the functioning of the economy at a single point in time and 
that I have defined the agents’ welfare when the economy is in equilibrium, I turn to the 
cultural transmission process.
2.3 Cultural Transmission Process
As should be clear from the previous subsections, by “culture” or “values” I denote a 
preference profile, i.e. type H or type L. Following the seminal work of Cavalli-Sforza and 
Feldman (1981), it is common to distinguish three modes of cultural transmission between 
individuals: vertical, oblique and horizontal. The former denotes the transmission of values 
from parent to children. Oblique cultural transmission occurs when a child is influenced by 
individuals of the parental generation other than his own parents. Finally, horizontal 
transmission results from the interaction between different individuals of the same 
generation.11 Being specifically interested in the dynamics of cultural transmission, I abstract 
from this third channel12.
I rely on the model of Saez-Marti and Sjorgen (2008) which is a refinement of Bisin 
Verdier (2001) that is particularly appropriate when work ethic is the cultural characteristic to 
be transmitted13. For simplicity, I assume that each adult only has one child and that each 
child only has a single parent. All parents try to instill a high work ethic into their children. 
Such vertical cultural transmission has a probability r ‘ of success in period t for a parent of
type /, where, as we shall soon see, the type of the parent matters to the extent that 
transmitting a high work ethic is harder for parents having low values. In case, this process is 
unsuccessful, i.e. with probability 1 -  r] , then oblique cultural transmission operates and the 
child adopts the preference type of a randomly selected adult who thus becomes his role 
model. The process of oblique transmission is allowed to be biased. Thus, a rebellious child, 
i.e. a child that failed to be influenced by his parent, chooses a role model who has a high 
work ethic with probability f ( q t) when a proportion q, of adults has a high work ethic in
10 It could be shown that a sufficient, but far from necessary, condition for this to be satisfied is that 
v 'W ( v 'C O ) 2 is a non-increasing function of X . In the case of a CRRA utility function, this is equivalent to 
assuming that the coefficient o f relative risk aversion is greater or equal to 1.
11 See Ellis (2007, section 2) for a careful discussion on culture, values and norms.
12 Social norms are an example of horizontal cultural transmission. Thus, the contribution of Lindbeck, Nyberg 
and Weibull (1999), which analyses the interaction between norms and the welfare state, should be seen as 
complementary to the approach o f this chapter.
13 The Saez-Marti Sjorgen (2008) approach has also been applied by Saez-Marti and Zenou (2007) in the context 
of discrimination in a model where all parents try to give their children “good work habits”.
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period t . In this chapter, I assume that the bias is towards role models having a low work 
ethic; or, more formally, a negative bias14 characterized by:
m < q ,  (19)
for q g (0,1). This bias reflects that the fact that a high work ethic is not easily transmitted to 
an uneducated child who is naturally more attracted by the easy life style of low work ethic 
individuals. Finally, we must logically have /(0 )  = 0 and / ( l )  = 1 since, when all possible 
role models are of one type, the child will necessarily adopt this type if vertical cultural 
transmission fails. Figure 1 summarizes the cultural transmission process.
Figure 1: The cultural transmission process
Parent of type i g {H,L}
1 - t!
Child of type H
Child of type L Child of type H
Let P/J (t\ ) denote the probability at time t that the child of a parent of type i adopts 
preference type j , which is a function of the cultural transmission effort at t of a parent of 
type i . Thus, the assumed cultural transmission process implies a Markov process with the 
following transition probabilities:
^ ( r " )  = ( l - r ," ) ( l - / ( ? , ) )
' P,L" ( ^ )  = T f + ( l - ^ ) f ( q , )
^ ( r , I ) = ( l - r ,I )(l-/(<7 ,))
For instance, the probability that a parent of type H has a child of the same type, P™ (r/7) , is 
equal to the probability of successful vertical preference transmission, r/7, plus the
14 Note that, in the context of this chapter, given that all parents try to raise their children to work hard, the bias 
needs to be strictly negative; otherwise the average work ethic in the population would never decline.
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probability of having a rebellious child that randomly meets a mentor of type H, 
(1 - r ”) f  (qt). The dynamics of preferences is given by:
= /(?,) + (!-  /(<7, m , r + (1 -  9, )r,1 ]'
To complete the resolution of the model, we need to determine rf* and r f  which is the
outcome of an optimization decision of parents.
Each adult cares about the welfare and, hence, about the preference type of his child. 
This leads him to choose a costly socialization effort which determines the probability of 
vertical preference transmission, x\ . The cost function, C; (r/), is assumed to be strictly 
increasing, strictly convex and satisfies C,(0) = C'(0) = 0 as well as Cf(0)>0. It is type
dependent as transmitting a high work ethic is easier for parents who have a high work ethic 
themselves; or, more specifically:
C'l ( t ) > C h ( t ) ,  (22)
for any r  e (0,1).
Parents are assumed to be altruistic. Hence, when choosing their transmission effort, 
they weigh their child’s expected utility when old against the cost of giving them a desirable 
education. Thus, the utility that a parent of type i derives from cultural transmission is given 
tiy:
Wi(qM) = ^ - C X T ; )  + f l P “(T;)Vl(qM) + P7(T;)VJ(qM)], (23)
T!
where p  is a parameter capturing the intensity of altruism and V  (ql+l) corresponds to the 
utility that a child of type i would get next period with a share of type H agents equal to qt+x.
Here, as in Bisin Verdier (2004), the future welfare of a child depends on the policy that will
be implemented next period and, hence, parents need to form rational expectations on the 
evolution of values from one generation to the next. But, by the law of large numbers, there is 
no uncertainty at the aggregate level, which implies that there is perfect foresight about the 
value of q at / +1. It should nevertheless be emphasized that expectations are assumed to be 
rational in order to enhance the internal consistency of the model, however most insights from 
this analysis could also be derived under backward looking expectations.
The total utility of an adult of type j, I / ' ,  is composed of the direct gratification he 
derives from his labor market activity and of the utility associated with cultural transmission. 
Thus:
U1 = V l(g,) + Wl(qM). (24)
The two terms do not directly interact and can therefore be treated separately in the 
optimization process.
The optimal socialization effort for each type, r] , is derived by maximizing W* (qt+l), 
given by equation (23), with respect to t ‘ ; which gives:
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C'(r;) = >0(l-/(?,))A F(?w ). (25)
This first order condition says that the optimal level of effort is such that the corresponding 
marginal cost is equal to the marginal benefit, where the latter is composed of the intensity of 
altruism, f$, of the probability that a rebellious child adopts a low work ethic, which is to be
avoided, 1 -  f ( q ,) , and of the extent to which type H is preferable to L, A V{qt+X) . As cultural
transmission is more costly to the Ls than to the Hs, cf. equation (22), and, as the cost 
function is convex, we must have:
r," > r , \  (26)
for any time period t . Note that the first order condition for the cultural transmission effort 
implies a decision rule xlt (qn qt+l) which is a function of qt and ql+l.
2.4 Dynamics of cultural transmission
We now combine all the elements that we have derived in order to characterize the dynamics 
of cultural transmission. Let us first define the equilibrium of the model.
In equilibrium, the dynamics of preferences, i.e. the dynamics of qt , is characterized
by:
• The transition function for qt induced by the cultural transmission process:
q, = / ( ? , )  + ( ! - / ( ? , ))[<7,r," +(1 - q . t f ] ;  (27)
• The cultural transmission effort, x\ for parents of type / e {H,L}, which is optimally
chosen by parents and which must therefore satisfy the first-order condition:
q (T i) = / ] ( l - f ( q t))AV(qt+]); (28)
• The welfare gain from being of type H rather than of type L,
AV(qt) = VH(qt) - V L(qt) , as a function of the political equilibrium induced by the
share qt of type H agents:
A V(qt)
where, for simplicity, it is assumed that AV(qt) is exogenously bounded below by 0.
In order to apply this definition of the equilibrium, let us combine the transition 
function for q , (27), and the first order condition for the cultural transmission effort, (28), in 
order to obtain the dynamics of preferences:
q,+1= f(q ,)  + ( l - f ( q M q , C ^ \ m - f ( q , ) ) m q , +1)) + ( l - q t) C r \ / ? ( l - f ( q , ) ) m q t+l))W O)
\<f> i f  q t < q
1(1 -p )[ v (w -x t) -v (b t)] + </>-y if qt >q
(29)
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with AV  given by (29) and, if needed, bounded below by 0. The following lemma, which is 
proved in Appendix 4, shows that qt+x is a well defined function of qt .
Lemma 4: For a given value o f qt , there could be at most one corresponding value o f qt+].
Hence, equation (30) implicitly determines qt+l(qt). Note that the proof combines equation
(30) with the fact that AV is non-increasing in q .
Let us now investigate in greater details the dynamics15 of cultural transmission 
implied by this function. First, it is straightforward to check that when, initially, all agents 
have a high work ethic, values do not decline as children do not have any “bad” role model to 
follow:
<7,+1(l)  =  l .  (31)
If, on the contrary, the economy starts with a population that exclusively has a low work 
ethic, then, next generation, this will no longer be the case as some parents would have 
successfully raised their children to work hard; so:
9„,(0)>0.  (32)
When, initially, the share of type H agents is arbitrarily close to 1, but strictly smaller than 1, 
then the average work ethic is lower in the following generation. This is stated more formally 
in the following lemma which is proved in Appendix 5.
Lemma 5: > 1.
dq,
The proof essentially relies on an implicit differentiation of equation (30).
It is clear from equation (17) and (18) that AV  is discontinuous at q . What impact
does this have on the function g/+1(g,) ? First, note that, if parents always expect the first 
policy, (8), to be implemented, then the discontinuity never plays any role as qt > q for all t . 
What about the case where ql+l(q,)<q  for some values of qt ? An obvious sufficient 
condition for the existence of such qt is qt+l (0) < q . Let us now consider a value of q that is 
initially high and which declines until the second policy, (9), is about to be implemented. 
More precisely, let q+ denote the smallest value of q, such that the first policy, (8), will still
be implemented next period; thus q+ is formally defined by:
(?+) =  §'• (33)
9/-»9+9/>9+
15 Having a look, ahead, at Figure 2, 3 and 4 which represent the function qt+l(qt) might help to follow the 
derivation of its properties.
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Similarly, q_ denotes the largest value of qt such that the second policy will be implemented 
next period; or more formally:
fan 9,+] (?-) = ?• (34)
q,«i-
Clearly, if there was no discontinuity in AV, we would have q+ -  q_. As stated in the next 
lemma, which is proved in Appendix 6, for a range of values of qt there does not exist any 
corresponding value of qt+x.
Lemma 6: q+ >q_ and, hence, qt+x(qt) is not defined for qt e(q_,q+).
This lemma states that for a range of values of qt , there does not exist any rational
expectation equilibrium. In fact, this result has a simple intuitive interpretation. If parents 
expect the first policy, (8), to be implanted next period, then it is not necessary to make a 
large cultural transmission effort as, for a child, having a high work ethic is not so much 
better than having a low one, i.e. AV is quite low under the first policy thanks to generous 
unemployment benefits. But this leads to a deterioration of values which results in the 
adoption of the second policy, (9), next period. If, on the contrary, parents expect the second 
policy, (9), to be in force, they make such a large transmission effort, as AV is high, that the 
first policy, (8), will be chosen by voters next period. There is therefore no rational 
expectation equilibrium16.
Even though I have derived a number of properties satisfied by the dynamics of 
cultural transmission, qt+x(qt), a large number of possibilities remain, including the existence
of multiple equilibria, i.e. several solutions to qt+x (q*) = q *. I can establish additional
properties of the dynamics of preferences by imposing restrictions to the cost functions. The 
following lemma offers a useful example.
Lemma 7: For CH and CL sufficiently convex, ^ t+i > 0.
dqt
This proposition17 follows immediately from the implicit differentiation of equation (30), 
which was used to prove Lemma 5 and which could be found in Appendix 5. Following this 
route, I could add further restrictions to the cost functions in order to reduce the number of
16 One might wonder about the possibility of having a mixed strategy equilibrium. In fact, this cannot occur as, 
with an infinity of voters, even if  each voter votes randomly, by the law of large number, it is either the first or 
the second policy that is implemented for sure or each policy might win with equal probability. But, even in this
last case, the equal probabilities will, generically, not induce a cultural transmission effort leading to qt+x = q
next period.
17 Obviously, this proposition only applies when qt+x is defined.
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possible equilibria. For instance, it could be proved, by implicitly differentiating (30) twice, 
that, for C, sufficiently convex and C"(r) > 0 , ql+] is a convex function of qt .
Instead of adding extra assumptions in order to reduce the number of possible 
equilibria, I focus on the equilibrium towards which the economy converges when it starts 
with an initial population that has a very high work ethic, i.e. q0 close to 1. As I will
subsequently argue, this is the relevant case when applying the model to the history of 
European unemployment. Proposition 1 follows from equation (31), Lemma 5, 6 and 7:
Proposition 1: For CH and CL sufficiently convex andfor q0 sufficiently close to 1, q either 
monotonically converges to an equilibrium q* < q0 or it initially decreases until it reaches a 
point where no rational expectation equilibrium exists.
Note that Lemma 7, which insures monotonous convergence, is stronger than what is needed 
for convergence to q*; in fact, it would be sufficient to have dql+l/ dqt > -1 . The three
possibilities resulting from equation (31), Lemma 5, 6 and 7 and which led to Proposition 1 
are depicted in Figure 2, 3 and 4.
Figure 2: Starting from a share of type H close to 1. the economy converges to a stable equilibrium
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Figure 3: Starting from a share of type H close to 1, the economy eventually reaches a no-rational-
expectation-equilibrium point
Figure 4 : Starting from a share of type H close to 1. the economy either converges to a stable equilibrium 
or reaches a no-rational-expectation-equilibrium point
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It should be emphasized that, starting from q0 close to 1, the graphs are generic until either
the stable equilibrium q* or a no-rational-expectation-equilibrium point is reached. There
could, however, be additional equilibria further to the left, i.e. for smaller values of qt ; but
these are not relevant for q0 close to 1 and most of them could be ruled out by imposing
1 8additional restrictions to the cost functions .
In Figure 2, if the economy is initially characterized by a very high share of type H 
agents, i.e. q0 > q*, then values deteriorate until equilibrium q* is reached for sure. In
Figure 3, with qQ > q+, values start eroding until a no-rational-expectation-equilibrium point 
is reached for sure. Finally, in Figure 4, starting from q0 > q+, values converge towards q * 
unless the recursion gets trapped into a no-rational-expectation-equilibrium point, i.e. it 
generates some qt e(q_,q+). In this last case, the outcome critically depends on the initial
value q0.
The results of Proposition 1 contrast sharply with those obtained by Bisin and Verdier 
(2004) in the case of redistributive politics where the economy converges towards a 
homogenization of preferences19. Their result is driven by the voting process. Indeed, if a 
majority of agents have a high work ethic, then low redistribution is implemented which 
encourages the transmission of a high work ethic. Conversely, when most agents are of type 
L, redistribution is high and hence being of type L is more attractive. Here, on the contrary, 
agents have an incentive to be part of the minority. Indeed, when most people are of type H, 
unemployment benefits are generous, which does not encourage the transmission of a high 
work ethic. This is fundamentally explained by the fact that, in the context of this chapter, the 
budget constraint is more important than the political constraint. For type L agents, having 
enough type H workers to contribute to the funding of the unemployment benefit system is 
more important than holding the majority. Conversely, if the number of low work ethic 
individuals is so large that generous unemployment insurance cannot be provided, everyone 
has to work and, hence, it is preferable to enjoy working and, therefore, to be of type H.
I now turn to the application of the model to the analysis of the postwar history of 
European unemployment.
18 For instance, multiple equilibria could be ruled out in configurations corresponding to Figure 2 and 4 by 
assuming that Ci is sufficiently convex, C ”> 0 and c„ = CL. The first two requirements imply that
dqf+1 / d 2qt > 0  and the first and last one, together, are sufficient to insure that
dql+x{ q - ) ld(l< <dqt+l(q+)/dqt .
19 It should be emphasized that the cultural transmission processed assumed in this chapter is slightly different 
from that used in Bisin and Verdier (2004). In particular, they do not allow for biased oblique cultural 
transmission and they assume imperfect empathy, i.e. a parent assesses his child’s action using his own 
preference profile, which implies that parents of type L make a costly effort to raise their children to have a low 
work ethic. Nevertheless, Proposition 1 could also be established under this alternative framework (see the first 
draft of this chapter, which is available upon request). However, without the bias in oblique cultural 
transmission, the economy cannot be expected to move from the first to the second policy and, hence, 
unemployment never drops.
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3 Application to European Unemployment
3.1 The European Unemployment Puzzle
Observation of cross-country rates of unemployment suggests a positive correlation between 
institutional rigidity (high minimum wage, stringent employment protection legislation, 
generous unemployment benefits...) and unemployment. It is therefore tempting to assert that 
labor market rigidities are the main cause of the high rates of unemployment that 
characterized the recent economic history of Europe. The problem with this interpretation is
90that most of these institutions pre-existed the soar in European unemployment. It is therefore 
necessary to find an explanation that is compatible with the coexistence of stringent 
institutions and low unemployment in the 1950s and 1960s. This is sometimes referred to as 
the “European unemployment puzzle”
The solution proposed by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) is that high unemployment 
resulted from the combination of labor market rigidities and of the occurrence of adverse 
shocks affecting the economy. According to this scenario, all major economies have been 
more unstable since the 1970s, and only those having a flexible labor market could prevent a 
rise in their rate of unemployment. Although Blanchard and Wolfers provide some empirical 
evidence that the impact of invariant institutions has changed over time, they have difficulties 
identifying the precise nature of the shocks that would have triggered such a dramatic increase 
in the number of unemployed.
On the theoretical side, a similar hypothesis is defended in Ljungqvist Sargent (1998)
91which focuses more specifically on the effects of unemployment insurance. It is argued that, 
in a turbulent economy, when a worker loses his job, he loses a lot of job specific human 
capital with it, and he is therefore unlikely to find another position paid at a similar level. 
Generous unemployment benefits, indexed on the last income level, induce the unemployed to 
have a high reservation wage which discourages them from searching for another job. On, the 
contrary, in a laissez-faire economy, they are searching actively as they are willing to accept 
lower paid jobs. Hence, it is, again, the combination of turbulence and a generous welfare 
state that led to massive unemployment. According to Homer, Ngai and Olivetti (2007), the
2 0  See, for instance, Blanchard Wolfers (2000) for the corresponding evidence. In particular, they show the 
evolution o f the replacement ratio of unemployment insurance from the early 1960s until 2000 for the five 
largest European economies (cf. Figure 7): in France and Germany the level of benefits remained fairly high 
throughout the period; in the United Kingdom it started from similar levels but declined in the 1980s; in Spain 
and Italy it started from a lower level but increased in the 1960s for Spain and only more recently for Italy.
21 Ljungqvist Sargent (2008) offers a more advanced treatment which also allows for employment protection 
legislations.
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adverse effects of turbulence on unemployment may have been magnified, until the early 
1990s, by the then pervasive state control of some industries in Europe. Also, Mortensen and 
Pissarides (1999) propose a story where the rise in European unemployment is due to the 
interaction of skill-biased technology shocks with generous unemployment insurance and 
stringent employment protection.
Nickell, Nunziatta and Ochel (2005) challenge these views. They note that European 
labor market institutions did not remain constant over the later-half of the twentieth century, 
but have instead become more stringent. They then provide evidence that the rise in 
unemployment could be attributed to changes in institutions. However, although this 
explanation could explain some part of the story, it is hard to believe that quantitatively small 
changes in labor market policies could have had such dramatic effects on European 
unemployment. More fundamentally, from a political economy perspective, it is not clear that 
these changes in institutions were exogenous. Indeed, they have arguably been the political 
response to the rise in the number of jobless. For instance, in the framework of Hassler, 
Rodriguez Mora, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2005), the European medium voter, who is not 
very mobile, could respond to an increase in the rate of unemployment by voting for higher 
benefits. Instead, in the US, the possibility to move to regions with a higher labor demand is 
perceived, by the medium voter, as a substitute to the provision of unemployment insurance.
The literature also offers other explanations to the puzzle based on the impact of 
growth and technological progress on unemployment. On the one hand, Pissarides and 
Vallanti (2007) and Pissarides (2007) attribute the very low rates of European unemployment 
in the 1950s and 1960s to the high rate of growth associated with the technological catch-up 
of the Old Continent. On the other hand, Homstein, Krusell and Violante (2007) argue that 
half the rise in European unemployment since the 1970s could be attributed to the 
combination of an increase in the rate of growth by creative destruction and of the pre­
existing rigid labor market institutions. Indeed, growth by creative destruction leads to the 
destruction of old job-worker matches which forces workers to return to unemployment 
before they could find another position. However, as suggested in Chapter 2 of this thesis, this 
last explanation is unlikely to hold when allowing for on-the-job search.
In this section, I argue that the evolution of European unemployment over the second 
half of the twentieth century could be explained by the dynamic response of culture to 
institutional rigidities. As in Ljungqvist Sargent (1998), unemployment insurance is the 
institutional factor that I focus on. I shall assume that when unemployment insurance 
programs were initially put in place across European countries, in the 1930s and 1940s, most 
agents had a high work ethic. Under the proposed scenario, because of the cultural 
transmission process, one generation later many more agents had a low work ethic, which 
increased the number of non-working people who unfairly took advantage of unemployment 
benefits22. These agents were registered as unemployed and contributed to the rise in
2 2 In the model, those who have a low work ethic, i.e. type L agents, live off unemployment benefits forever. 
However, this could be seen as a reduced form which should not be interpreted too narrowly. The idea is that
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European unemployment . It should be emphasized that this story, like the one involving 
shocks, is consistent with the coexistence of institutional rigidities and low unemployment in 
the 1950s and 1960s. In other words, because of changing preferences, similar policies could 
have different consequences at different points in time. Clearly, the key feature of the model 
at work here is the existence of a long lag, equal to one generation, between the introduction 
of a policy and the behavioral response of agents.
3.2 Calibration
To illustrate this scenario, I now rely on a simple calibration of the model of the previous 
section. The relevant functional forms need to be specified. Assuming a constant relative risk 
aversion utility function, we have:
c'~e - l
v(c) = T T ’’ (35)
where 6 is the CRRA coefficient. The cost, to a parent of type i , of successfully transmitting 
a high work ethic with probability r ' is assumed to be quadratic; thus:
( t h V  ( r L\ 2
Ch(th ) = ^ ~  and CL(TL) = a ^ - ,  (36)
where a>  1 reflects the extent to which cultural transmission is more costly for parents with 
a low work ethic. From the first order condition for r ' , given by equation (25), it follows 
from this specification of the cost functions that r H = a r L.
We finally need to specify the function / ,  which determines the magnitude of the 
negative bias in oblique cultural transmission. More precisely, recall that f{q )  is the 
probability that a rebellious child, i.e. a child for whom vertical cultural transmission failed, 
adopts a high work ethic when a proportion q of adults are of type H. Saez-Marti and Sjogren
(2008), who introduced this function into models of cultural transmission, propose a 
microfoundation for /  which, in the context of this chapter, reduces to:
m = — qn!"  , , (37)qmH +(1 ~q)mL
where mH and mL stand for the merit of being of type H and L, respectively, as perceived by 
a rebellious child. The idea is that / ( q) corresponds to the probability of randomly meeting 
an adult of type H , weighted by the relative merit of having type H. The negative bias 
reflects the fact that rebellious children perceive type L as being superior to H; hence we must 
have:
agents work as little as possible, but just sufficiently to qualify for the benefits. Also, the unemployment income 
could be thought o f as a minimum income guarantee which does not decrease over time. Finally, note that 
Ljungqvist Sargent (1998) and Algan Cahuc (2009) also assume a permanent stream of unemployment benefits.
23 This is broadly consistent with the empirical findings of Laroque and Salanie (2000) who estimate that nearly 
50% of French unemployment is voluntary; unemployment being defined as voluntary whenever the 
productivity o f an agent is below his reservation wage.
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m L > m H . (38)
Clearly, from (37), only the ratio mL / mH needs to be determined.
As I am focusing on the history of European unemployment over the second half of 
the twentieth century, I choose 1950 as the initial period and consider that 25 years separate 
two generations. I assume that the creation of unemployment insurance came as a surprise in 
1950. For the explanation to work, I need to suppose, as required by Proposition 1, that, 
initially, the work ethic was very high, i.e. ql95Q close to 1. One justification for this is
historical. Indeed, it is unlikely that those who survived World War II, many of whom would 
have been willing to risk their life for the nation, would have been inclined to take unfair 
advantage of government-provided benefits. Another justification, which is more in line with 
the model, is that work ethic could have hardly declined before the creation, or wide 
expansion in coverage, of generous unemployment insurance systems which occurred just 
after WWII24.
This last explanation could easily be built into the model by assuming that the merit of 
having a low, rather than a high, work ethic is increasing in the generosity of unemployment 
benefits. Thus, I assume:
m, = mH, (39)
where k > 0 is a fixed parameter. Before the creation of unemployment insurance, the 
replacement ratio was close to zero, and, hence, oblique cultural transmission was unbiased,
i.e. f (q )  = q , implying that the work ethic could not deteriorate from one generation to the 
next. The postwar fall in values was then triggered by the provision of generous 
unemployment insurance.25
It should be stressed that equation (39) creates a new channel by which policy affects 
culture. This extension26 to the model of the previous section adds a discontinuity in /  at q ,
2 4 In many European countries, unemployment insurance was created in the 1930s and widely expanded just 
after WWII. Furthermore, as the baby boom generation was bom in the late 1940s and early 1950s, for the 
purpose of cultural transmission, it is reasonable to consider that the system was created in 1950. In France, it 
was created in 1946.
25 Assuming AV(qt+l) =  $  before the creation of unemployment insurance, instead of equation (17), and
m L I  m H  constant and greater than 1 could lead to a high steady state value of ql950. However, equation (39) is
necessary to guarantee such a high steady state value of q]950 for all calibrations of the model. Of course, there
is always the possibility that q] 9 5 0  was high because external events, such as WWII, pushed it above its steady 
state level.
2 6  It could be objected that the specification of the relative merit o f type L and H given by equation (39) should 
influence the voting behavior of adults. To solve the problem, it could be assumed that in the total utility of 
parents, given by equation (24), the first term, corresponding to direct gratification from market activities, weigh 
much more than the second term, corresponding to cultural transmission. Alternatively, it could be assumed that 
rebellious children are forward looking and only care about the replacement ratio that will be prevailing next
period, i.e. in (39) b(qt) and x(qt) should be replaced by b(qet+l) and x(q*+l). However, I keep the
specification of equation (39), which seems to be the most sensible, and assume that this does not influence 
voting behavior, which also seems quite realistic.
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which, from equation (30), translates into a discontinuity in qt+l(qt) at q that we previously
did not have. However, this hardly modifies the dynamics identified in the previous section. 
Note that the discontinuity in / ,  unlike the one in A V , does not lead to the non-existence of
a rational expectation equilibrium as q/+1 remains well defined for all values of qt in the
neighborhood of q , if such was already the case.
Let us now turn to the calibration of the exogenous parameters of the model. The wage 
w is normalized to 1. The coefficient of relative risk aversion, 6 , is set equal to 4, which 
seems reasonable given the distribution of risk aversion reported by Dohmen et al. (2005) for 
a sample of German residents. The frictional rate of unemployment, p , is taken to be equal to 
2%, which is close the lowest rates of unemployment ever observed in industrialized 
countries. I further assume that, in 1950, only 2% of the population had a low work ethic; 
hence ql950 = 0.98. Together with the frictional rate of unemployment, this implies that, in 
1950, only 4.0% of the work force was jobless.
I set y - 6 .  Given the values of the above parameters, this implies that, in order to 
induce the low work ethic agents to work, the replacement ratio of unemployment insurance 
cannot exceed 37.5%; which seems sensible. I also set ^ = 6; implying, from (17) and (25), 
that parents make a strictly positive cultural transmission effort whenever they expect less 
than perfect insurance to be provided to their children.
I assume that transmitting a high work ethic costs twice as much to parents of type L 
than to parents of type H; thus a  = 2. I take k = 2, which, as could be seen from the 
calibration results below, implies a rate of unemployment close to 7% for the second 
generation of workers. In order to present three calibrations corresponding to the three types 
of equilibria depicted in Figure 2, 3 and 4 ,1 take three different values for /?: 2, 0.4 and 0.2, 
respectively. In the model ft denotes the intensity of parental altruism, but it could also be 
seen as a parameter of the cost function, CH and CL, as is clear from equation (21). So a high 
value of p  either corresponds to strong altruism or to a low cost of cultural transmission. 
This is associated to a high value of q *, when it exists. The exogenous parameter values used 
for the calibration of the model are displayed in Table 1.
Table 1: Exogenous parameter values
w p e 0 r P a k # 1 9 5 0
1 0.02 4 6 6
0.2
0.4 2 2 0.98
2
Under the chosen calibration, the political equilibrium is characterized by q -  0.887 
and q = 0.354. Although, in the previous section, I focused on the case where q > 1 / 2 , this
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does not make any difference here as in the reported calibrations q never falls below a half.
We can therefore restrict our attention to qt > 1/2.
Whenever qt > q>  1/2, type H agents choose to implement the first policy, (8),
implying that only the Hs choose to work. Thus, unemployment is composed of type H agents 
who cannot find a job, which occurs with probability p , and of all type L agents who do not
work and have no intention to do so. When q > q t > 1/2, the second policy, (9), is
implemented and everybody prefers to work, reducing the fraction of jobless to p  . Hence, the
observed rate of unemployment at time t is given by:
The three calibrated time paths of unemployment are displayed in Figure 5, 6 and 7; 
they correspond to ft equal 2, 0.4 and 0.2, respectively.
(40)
Figure 5: Convergence to a stable equilibrium with high benefits
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Figure 6: No rational expectation equilibrium in 2025 and beyond
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Figure 7: Convergence to a stable equilibrium with low benefits
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In Figure 5, the economy reaches a stable equilibrium that is above q . It corresponds to the 
case depicted in Figure 2. As ft is very high, the intensity of vertical cultural transmission is 
very strong, which prevents a large deterioration of values. According this scenario, we have 
almost already reached the long-run equilibrium in 2000 and the rate of unemployment will 
not change much in the future.
In Figure 6, there is initially a fall in values until a no-rational-expectation-equilibrium 
point is reached in 2025. This case corresponds to Figure 3 and it could indeed be checked 
that the dynamic equation (30) does not have any fixed point. The interpretation is that, if
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parents expect the generous system to be sustained, then they make a low investment in 
cultural transmission and, hence, more people will cease to work next period, thus threatening 
the sustainability of the policy. If, on the contrary, parents do not expect the system to be 
sustained, then cultural transmission is intense and, hence, the work ethic will be sufficiently 
high for the policy to be sustained.
Looking at the current political debate about the future of the welfare state in 
continental Europe, this story might be insightful. Indeed, on the one hand, many parents hope 
that their children will be able to benefit from generous welfare policies and from heavily 
protected public sector jobs, while, on the other hand, they realize that these policies are not 
sustainable if people continue to behave opportunistically. This situation leads to some 
confusion about the values that should be transmitted to the young generation. My model 
suggests that this confusion could be related to an absence of rational expectation equilibrium.
Finally, in Figure 7, the rate of unemployment increases until it becomes so high that 
the second policy, (9), inducing everyone to work, is implemented.27 According to this 
scenario, corresponding to Figure 4, the cost of providing generous unemployment insurance 
will become so important that European countries will choose to reduce their replacement 
ratios sufficiently to prevent the free-riding of type L agents. Indeed, in recent years, the level 
of unemployment insurance across European countries has been, if anything, on the decline, 
partly through tighter eligibility rules. Note that, although unemployment remains low and 
constant beyond 2025, depending on the precise specification of the bias / ,  the average work 
ethic might continue to deteriorate. Also, in the last scenario, if we start from a slightly 
different initial value of q , there is a possibility that the recursion falls into the no-rational-
expectation-equilibrium trap. And, indeed, for ql950 = 0.979, there is no rational expectation
equilibrium in 2000 and beyond.
While the model is able to replicate the main trend in European unemployment, it has 
so far remained silent about why the US experience was so different. In fact, it could also 
replicate the stagnation of US unemployment over second half of the twentieth century if we 
assume that workers are less risk averse in the US than in Europe, as recently documented by 
Naef et al. (2008) who compared Americans to Germans. More precisely, in the calibrated 
model, for a coefficient of relative risk aversion smaller or equal to 3, the second policy, 
inducing everyone to work, is always preferred to the first, even in 1950 when unemployment 
insurance was created. In other words, because Americans are less risk averse, they are more 
concerned about the moral-hazard effect of unemployment insurance and have, therefore, 
always voted for low replacement ratios.
27 The model could offer an alternative explanation for the recent structural decline in European unemployment. 
If the cost functions are not sufficiently convex, as required by Proposition 1, then the convergence to q * is 
non-monotonic, implying that unemployment fluctuates as values fluctuate from one generation to the next.
28 For a slightly different, but equally plausible, calibration of the model, e.g. higher p  and lower y and (f) , the 
second policy becomes implemented as soon as in 2 0 0 0 .
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The calibration is only an illustration of the ability of the model to describe the main 
trend in post-war European unemployment. But, does it correspond to what actually 
happened? It turns out to be possible to confront some of the implications of the model to the 
data, which allows an assessment of the empirical relevance of the proposed scenario.
3.3 Empirical Evidence
The usual way to test theoretical predictions involving values is to use survey data such as the 
World Values Surveys (WVS). The problem is that these have only been collected since the 
1980s. The solution is to work with cohorts. My theoretical prediction is simply that young 
generations have lower values than older ones.
I use the answer to the following question from the WVS: “Please tell me whether you 
think it is always justified, never justified or something in between to claim government 
benefits to which you are not entitled”. Respondents were asked to report an integer number 
between 1 for “Never Justified’ and 10 for “Always Justified’. The WVS consists of three 
main waves, in 1980, 1990 and 2000, and this question was included in all three.
Work ethic, as defined in this chapter, has two dimensions: willingness to work hard 
and honesty. It could reasonably be objected that the above question only captures the latter 
but not the former. However, the WVS only contains few questions related to willingness to 
work and these were only sporadically included in surveys. It could nevertheless be checked 
that, when available, the answers to these questions have the expected correlation with the 
propensity to cheat on government-provided benefits. For example, those who think that it is 
never justified to cheat also are “satisfied with [their] job”, “looking forward to work after the 
weekend” and think that “work should come first even if this means less spare time”; the 
corresponding correlations being 13.6%, 19.1% and 8.7%, respectively, and all strongly 
significant.
Before going further, I should mention the closely related work of Algan and Cahuc
(2009). Using the answer to the same question, about the willingness to cheat on benefits, 
they have shown that, on average, a US citizen tends to provide the same answer as someone 
living in his country of origin. This shows the relevance of cultural transmission from one 
generation to the next and suggests a major role played by parents in this process. Moreover, 
this is in line with my model which predicts, whenever a  > 1, that the Americans with a low 
work ethic are likely to be those whose parents had a low work ethic themselves. Also, 
Mulligan (1997) provides some evidence that children of parents who live on welfare have a 
tendency to behave similarly as adults. He argues that this results from an intergenerational 
transmission of work ethic.
In order to check whether work ethic has declined over time, I focus on the impact of 
an individual’s year of birth on his willingness to claim benefits to which he is not entitled. It
29 Of related interest, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman and Sunde (2006) provide some evidence, from a German survey, 
that trust also gets transmitted from parents to children.
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is obviously necessary to control for some key characteristics of the respondents. I therefore 
control for gender, level of education , political orientation, religion and nationality. I include 
all 18 West-European countries which are members of the OECD, i.e. Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Great Britain.
As, in my sample, about 63% of respondents think that it is never justified to claim 
government benefits to which they are not entitled, I just run a probit regression where 1 
stands for “Never Justified” while 0 corresponds to any other answer, i.e. any reported 
number between 2 and 10. It could be checked that running an ordered probit gives very 
similar results. The marginal effects from the probit regression are reported in Table 2, 
column 1.
3 0 It could be objected that the level of education of an individual is a consequence of his work ethic. It is 
nevertheless included in order to capture the structural increase in the length of education that occurred 
throughout the twentieth century. The cohort effect is almost unchanged when education is omitted.
179
Table 2: Probit regression
Dependent variable: Never justified to claim government benefits to which you are not entitled
(1) (2) (3)
Year o f  Birth
-0.58*** -0.50*** -0.52***
Age
(0 .0 1 ) (0.04)
0 . 1 0 ***
(0.04)
(0.04)
0.92***
(0.08)
-0.009***
Age
(0 .0 0 1 )
Gender:
Female Reference Reference Reference
Male
-3.11*** -3.10*** -3 11 ***
(0.44) (0.44) (0.44)
Highest level o f  education:
Lower education Reference Reference Reference
Middle education
2.08*** 2  |4*** 2.30***
(0.56) (0.56) (0.56)
Upper education
1 .2 0 ** 1.26** j 49**
(0.59) (0.59)(0.59)
Political orientation:
Centre Reference Reference Reference
Left
-3.59*** -3.55*** -3.65***
(0.53) (0.54) (0.54)
Right
1.80*** 1.80*** 1.81***
(0.55) (0.55) (0.55)
Religion:
No religion Reference Reference Reference
4  9 3 *** 5.00*** 5.23***
Protestant
(0.82) (0.82) (0.82)
2.47*** 2.57*** 2  4 9 ***
Roman catholic
(0.967) (0.67) (0.67)
Muslim
-6.52 -6.17 -6.06
(4.62) (4.62) (4.63)
Jew
6.52 6.56 6.65
(5.15) (5.14) (5.15)
Buddhist
-19.67** -19.80** -20.33**
(9.00) (9.00) (9.00)
Other Religion
-3.12*** -3 14*** -3.07***
(1.18) (1.18) (1.18)
Country dummies Included*** Included*** Included***
Pseudo R 0.0857 0.0858 0.0879
Number o f  observations 50893 50893 50893
Note: Marginal effects in percentage terms for average characteristics with the corresponding standard errors in 
parentheses. Significance: *** for 1%, ** for 5% and * for 10%.
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In line with theoretical predictions, the first regression suggests a strongly significant negative 
effect of the year of birth on work ethic. However, it could be objected that this result might 
simply be due to the omission of age from the regression. Indeed, it sounds reasonable that 
people adhere to more conservative values as they get older. More precisely, as the data were 
only collected after 1980, those who were bom a long time ago were older when surveyed. 
Hence, the negative coefficient on year of birth might just correspond to an age effect.
Fortunately, the data set contains three waves of surveys and, hence, it is possible to 
control for both age and year of birth. However, the limits of this exercise should not be 
underestimated; I am trying to disentangle a cohort from an age effect while each cohort has 
only been observed for, at most, 20 years. Thus, the empirical specification regarding age is 
likely to be critical and I therefore try two possibilities: a linear and a quadratic effect of age. 
The corresponding results are reported in the second and third column of Table 2, 
respectively. The inclusion of age only induces a small reduction in the effect of year of birth, 
which remains strongly significant. Age has a rather small, but also strongly significant, effect 
and, in the quadratic case, work ethic peaks at 50.4 years old.
Clearly, one problem with the specifications of Table 2, is that it imposes a linear 
effect of year of birth, whereas I have previously argued that values might have fallen faster at 
certain times, such as after World War II. To address this issue, I run the same regression, but, 
instead of having a single control variable for the year of birth, I use a dummy variable for 
each decade of birth, thereby allowing for non-linear effects. The marginal effects 
corresponding to each decade are plotted in Figure 8, 9 and 10, where age is not included as a 
control in Figure 8, enters linearly in 9 and quadratically in 10. The cohort of those bom in the 
1930s is chosen as the reference.
Figure 8: Effect of decade of b irth  on willingness to be honest without controlling for age
o0)
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Decade of birth
Note: The first point also includes all those bom before 1900 (who are not very numerous).
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F igure  9: Effect o f  decade of b ir th  on will ingness to be honest allowing for a linear effect o f age
ro -10
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Decade of birth
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Note: The first point also includes all those bom before 1900 (who are not very numerous).
Figure 10: Effect of decade of birth on willingness to be honest allowing for a quadratic effect of age
-20
-30
1900 1920 1940 
Decade of birth
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Note: The first point also includes all those bom before 1900 (who are not very numerous).
Consistently with the evidence presented in Table 2, all three figures show that values have 
declined over the twentieth century. This fall was large; in Figure 9, for example, being bom 
in the 1960s, rather than the 1930s, decreases the probability of answering “Never Justified” 
by 12%. Furthermore, Figure 8 and 9 suggest a modest acceleration in the decline after 
WWII. It should be emphasized that the magnitude of the impact of year of birth on values is
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considerable, larger than that of most other control variables and comparable in size with the 
country fixed effects31.
In the regression corresponding to Figure 9, the marginal effect of age is 0.22, about 
twice as large as in Table 2, column 2. This nevertheless remains small compared to the effect 
of year of birth. The age coefficients of the quadratic specification associated to Figure 10 are 
almost unchanged, compared to Table 2, column 3, and work ethic now peaks at age 57.3, 
which seems reasonable. All the other marginal effects of the probit regressions are very close 
to those reported in Table 2.
A typical concern with the proposed identification strategy is that the results might be 
driven by a year effect which cannot be distinguished from the impact of age and year of 
birth. Note that my findings would only be invalidated by a negative trend, i.e. if people were 
more likely to answer “Never Justified” in the context of 2000 than in that of 1980. However, 
this problem is unlikely to be severe since all the data were collected between 1980 and 2000 
and, in most European countries, the economic environment regarding the labor market and 
the welfare state has not changed dramatically during that period. It is therefore unlikely that a 
person of a given age and a given year of birth would have answered very differently in the 
context of 1980 than in that of 2000. Furthermore, given the magnitude of the impact of year 
of birth that I find, only a very large year effect would be problematic.
Using variables such as the rate of unemployment or output to proxy for a potential 
year effect would not be compatible with the model. Indeed, the theoretical work above 
suggests that unemployment and output are endogenous and, at least partly, driven by the 
values held by individuals. An alternative, which I follow, is to use the phase of the business 
cycle in which countries were when the surveys were performed, which I measure by the 
deviation of the annual real GDP growth rate from its average value32 from 1974 to 2006. 
These deviations are substantial, about 1.7% on average, and we might therefore expect 
answers to differ whether the country is in a boom or in a recession.
Indeed, when controlling for age, the business cycle coefficient is negative and 
significant. This implies that people are more tolerant towards cheating on benefits in 
recessions than in booms. The marginal effect of an additional percentage point of GDP 
growth on the probability to think it is never justified to cheat is nevertheless small, about -
0.25% with a linear effect of year of birth, as in Table 2, and -0.6% with dummies for the 
decade of birth, as in Figure 9 and 10. Most importantly, the other coefficients of the 
regression are hardly affected by the new control variable. Hence, this suggests that the 
decline in work ethic documented above is not driven by a missing year effect.
To check the robustness of the above results, I now replicate the same empirical 
exercise with the following questions: “Work should always come first, even if  this means less
31 The country marginal effects, compared to France, range from -4.5% for Greece to 31.8% for Denmark (see 
Figure 13). The average deviation of the 18 country marginal effects from their mean is 7.8%. (This is for the 
specification associated to Figure 9, but country fixed effects hardly change across specifications.)
3 For almost all countries in the sample, I cannot reject at the 95% confidence level the absence of a trend in 
growth rate.
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spare time”. The answer is coded as 1 if the respondent “Strongly Agrees” or “Agrees” and as 
0 otherwise. However, this question was only included in the last wave of the WVS and it is 
therefore not possible to control for age. The other controls remain unchanged. Only 15 
countries are included in the regression as this question was not asked in Austria, Norway and 
Ireland. The sample size is 16062. Note that this question, unlike the ones asking if people are 
“satisfied with [their] job” and whether they are “looking forward to work after the weekend”, 
was also asked to non-working people. The marginal effects of the decades of birth are 
reported in Figure 11.
Figure 11: Effect of decade of birth on the probability to think that work should come first
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Note: The first point also includes all those bom before 1900 (who are not very numerous).
The magnitude of the decline in work ethic is remarkably similar to the one suggested by the 
willingness to be honest when claiming benefits. Interestingly, the pattern is slightly different 
from that of Figure 8. The belief that work should come first declined sharply among the 
generation bom in the 1940s and 1950s and then remained low, but pretty constant, among 
the following cohorts.
Although not a full proof of the proposed explanation for the post-war history of 
European unemployment, the empirical findings show that the key driving force that I have 
emphasized throughout, i.e. the decline in work ethic, was at work during the second half of 
the twentieth century.
As I have previously argued, the decline in work ethic might have been triggered by 
the installation of unemployment insurance. The decrease in willingness to be honest when 
claiming benefits should have therefore been faster in countries that implemented the most 
generous unemployment insurance systems shortly after WWII. Unfortunately, due to limited 
sample size, the country-specific year of birth effects are often insignificant. As countries
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need to be pulled together, I construct three categories. The first consists of countries that had 
a replacement ratio lower than 15%, as defined by the OECD summary measure33, in 1961, 
the earliest year for which the measure is available. It includes Greece, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain and Switzerland. The second category consists of countries that had a 
replacement ratio higher than 15% in 1961: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland and 
Great Britain. This is the benchmark category as these countries had generous unemployment 
insurance long before the soar in the number of jobless, which led to the European 
unemployment puzzle. Finally, the third category consists of Scandinavian countries: 
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. They had very low replacement ratios in 1961, 
except Denmark. However, with well developed welfare states, Scandinavians benefited from 
other forms of social insurance which should have had the same negative effect on values as 
unemployment insurance. Iceland and Luxembourg need to be dropped as the OECD does not 
report any measure of replacement ratios before 2001.
I run the same probit regression as before, with willingness to be honest as the 
dependent variable and a linear age effect34, but allow for different dummies for decade of 
birth for each of the three categories. The corresponding marginal effects, which are 
normalized to 0 for the cohort bom in the 1930s, are displayed in Figure 12.
Figure 12: Effect of decade of birth on willingness to be honest for three different groups of countries
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—  High Replacement Ratio - - - - - - -  Low Replacement Ratio -  - *  - -  Scandinavia
Note: The first point also includes all those bom before 1900 (who are not very numerous).
33 See also Martin (1996) for measures o f replacement ratios since 1961.
34 Results are very similar with a quadratic effect o f age.
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The fall in values clearly appears to have been stronger in the group of countries that had the 
most generous replacement ratios. For instance, the magnitude of the effect of being bom in 
the 1960s, rather than in the 1930s, is significantly different, at the 1% confidence level, 
between the first and second categories. All countries nevertheless seem to be affected by a 
downward trend. This is not surprising as work ethic is certainly affected by many factors 
beyond the generosity of the welfare state. Interestingly, although Scandinavian still have a 
very high work ethic, as shown by their high country fixed effects, this might not last forever. 
Indeed, their very generous welfare state seems to undermine the values which have, so far, 
made it sustainable.
Another prediction of the theory, related to the political economy aspect of the model, 
is that the average level of values held in a society has a positive impact on the generosity of 
unemployment insurance. This suggests a positive correlation between the country fixed 
effects obtained from the previous regressions and the corresponding replacement ratios. It is 
indeed reasonable to consider that country fixed effects are exogenous from the perspective of 
the model, which does not pretend to capture all dimensions of culture. This could be 
rationalized by differences in the deep parameters of the cultural transmission process such as, 
for instance, those affecting the cost functions or the bias in oblique cultural transmission. I
- i f
obtain a 32.4% correlation between the country fixed effects and the OECD measure of 
replacement ratio36 in 2005. This relationship is displayed in Figure 13.
351 use the marginal effects of country dummies of the regression corresponding to Figure 9, i.e. the regression 
allowing for decade of birth dummies and a linear effect o f age. Note that these are hardly distinguishable from 
the corresponding coefficients for the other specifications.
3 6 A similar exercise was originally performed by Algan and Cahuc (2009, Figure 8 ) in a slightly different 
context. They obtained a 60% correlation. Their sample included non-European OECD countries and they used 
the total unemployment expenditures per unemployed worker instead of the OECD measure o f replacement 
ratios. Also, their marginal effects o f nationality on willingness to be honest were obtained under a somewhat 
different specification.
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Figu re  13: C o rre la t ion  between unem ploym ent in su rance  generosity and  the values held in a country
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Note: France taken as reference. (E.g., being British rather than French increases the probability of answering
“Never Justifiable” by 23.5%.)
Great Britain seems to be an outlier, which might be explained by a lower level of risk 
aversion than in other European countries.
In an empirical investigation of the relation between culture and unemployment, 
Briigger, Lalive and Zweimiiller (2008) provide some further evidence of interest. In order to 
disentangle the effect of culture from that of policies on economic outcomes, they use a 
regression discontinuity design. The discontinuity is the language border between the German 
and the Latin, i.e. French and Italian, speaking parts of Switzerland, which does not coincide 
with the limit of any political jurisdiction. Exploiting the local results from six national 
referenda on working time regulations, they show that the Latin-speaking Swiss have a 
stronger taste for leisure. The length of unemployment spells is also longer on the Latin 
speaking side of the border. As the economic environment hardly differs between the two 
sides, it could be concluded that culture has a causal impact on voting and working behavior, 
consistently with what has been argued throughout this chapter. Stutzer and Lalive (2004) 
also exploit the results from a Swiss referendum to argue that the social norm to live off one’s 
own work has a negative impact on the duration of unemployment.
Finally, some other anecdotal evidence related to this work could be found in the 
literature. Using Swedish data, Ljunge (2006) documents that, after controlling for a bunch of 
observable characteristics, the sick leave participation rate of a young generation is 25% 
higher than that of a cohort bom 20 years earlier. This strongly suggests that values did 
decline from one generation to the next. Also, Lemieux and MacLeod (2000) report that a
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large increase in the generosity of unemployment insurance in Canada in 1971 was followed 
by a steady increase in the level of unemployment over the 20 consecutive years, which they 
attribute to a time-consuming learning process. Although the timing is a bit quicker than my 
model would suggest, an evolution of preferences is likely to have plaid a role. Indeed, 
consistently with my theoretical predications, the young generation, which entered the labor 
market once the generous benefits were already in place, had a much higher likelihood of 
benefiting from unemployment insurance than workers from older cohorts.
4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have presented a model where unemployment insurance and cultural values 
are jointly determined. On the one hand, the generosity of welfare benefits is affected by the 
extent of the moral-hazard problem which depends on the average work ethic across the 
population. On the other hand, when deciding on their cultural transmission effort, parents 
form expectations about the policy that will be implemented in the future.
I have shown that, in the context of unemployment insurance, the interaction between 
the welfare state and work ethic sustains cultural heterogeneity over the long-run. On the 
contrary, Bisin and Verdier (2004) proved that if the welfare state is exclusively involved in 
redistribution, cultural homogeneity eventually prevails. The obvious question to ask in future 
research is which effect dominates when the government is involved in both social insurance 
and redistribution. Although a formal analysis would be required, long-run cultural 
heterogeneity would presumably prevail. This is explained by the fact that, as emphasized in 
Bisin Verdier (2004), the redistributive policy only has a vanishing impact on cultural 
transmission as the population becomes homogenous. Thus, the opposite effect of social 
insurance would dominate before complete homogenization is realized.
The model can generate a substantial lag between the introduction of a policy and a 
deterioration of work ethic. It can therefore explain why the consequences of similar policies 
could be different at different points in time. Hence, it provides a natural solution to the 
“European unemployment puzzle” due to the co-existence of institutional rigidities and low 
unemployment in the 1950s and 1960s. Relying on a simple calibration, I have argued that the 
introduction of unemployment insurance programs in the late 1940s was followed, a 
generation later, by a decline in work ethic, which has led to an increase in the number of 
non-working people registered as unemployed.
The model generated some predictions about the likely long-term evolution of 
unemployment. If values do not fall further, unemployment will remain high; while, if work 
ethic continues to deteriorate, the generosity of unemployment benefits will eventually 
decline sufficiently to prevent opportunistic behavior and, hence, unemployment will drop. 
Finally, I have presented some supportive empirical evidence. In particular, I have shown that 
older generations do have higher values than younger ones, even after controlling for age. 
Thus, although unlikely to be the full story about European unemployment, my work suggests
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that the observed decline in work ethic is a key underlying trend explaining why the effects of 
similar labor market policies are now markedly different from what they were in the 1950s.
Clearly, the very simple and highly stylized model of this chapter could be extended in 
a number of ways. Let us just mention a few directions. First, we could consider other labor 
market institutions. For instance, following Algan Cahuc (2009), it would be interesting to 
allow the government to set a layoff tax. This would permit an analysis of the substitutability 
between unemployment insurance and employment protection legislations in an economy 
with cultural transmission.
The calibration, which only consisted of one point every generation, was essentially 
informative about the long-run trend in unemployment. To learn about higher frequency 
movements, it would be sensible to allow for more overlapping dynasties with the work ethic 
of adults affected by the behavior of others. Such horizontal cultural transmission is at the 
heart of Lindbeck Nyberg Weibull (1999) which assumes that a social norm is felt more 
intensively as more people adhere to it. Integrating such norms in the context of this chapter 
remains an important challenge for future research.
Finally, this chapter has shown that the very long-run labor supply elasticities could 
differ markedly from the short-run elasticities. This is potentially important as, following 
Prescott (2004), a substantial amount of work has been done to try to attribute differences in 
the quantity of hours worked on both sides of the North Atlantic to differences in tax rates. 
The problem with this explanation is that it necessitates a higher elasticity of labor supply 
than microeconometric estimates typically suggest. Furthermore, hours of work continued to 
fall in Europe even after the level of taxes ceased to increase. Cultural transmission could 
potentially be an important part of the solution to this puzzle.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
If qt is close to 1, then the first policy yields almost full insurance and is therefore preferred 
to the second policy which would need to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint for L, 
(13). If the first policy is adopted and qt is low enough, qt ^ q  say, then type L workers 
would choose to work since the level of unemployment benefit that could be provided would 
be too low. But this implies that for qt <q , type H would prefer the second policy. The proof 
can be completed by noting that, under the first policy, the welfare of type H is a strictly
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increasing function of qt whereas, under the second policy, it is independent of q, . Note that 
this proof implies that q e (^d).
B Proof of Lemma 2
If qt is close to 0, then the second policy is preferred by L to the first one which would imply 
a very low level of unemployment benefits37.
I proceed in three steps to prove that, when qt is close to 1, the first policy is preferred to the 
second:
1. If qt is close to 1, then unemployment benefits are higher under the first policy than 
under the second. This is due to the incentive compatibility constraint, 
Ui(W) > Ui(NW) , that is tighter for L than for H. Thus, type L agents prefer to be
IQ
inactive under the first policy than under the second .
2. If type L agents are working, under the second policy, then they would like to have 
full insurance, implying that the incentive compatibility constraint for L is binding. 
So, under the second policy, type L agents are indifferent between working and not 
working.
3. Hence, by a revealed preference argument, for qt close to 1, type L prefer the first 
policy since not working under this policy is preferred to working under the second 
policy.
Again, the proof can be completed by noting that, under the first policy, the welfare of type L 
is a strictly increasing function of qt whereas, under the second policy, it is independent of
C Proof of Lemma 3
By construction, at q type L agents are indifferent between the first and the second policy. As 
under the second policy the incentive compatibility constraint for L is binding, the welfare of 
type L agents is given by UL (NW) under both policies and, hence, at q the level of 
unemployment benefits must be independent of the chosen policy. Nevertheless, the tax rate 
necessary to finance the unemployment benefits is lower under the second policy, where both 
types contribute, than under the first. Thus, at q , workers of type H strictly prefer the second 
policy to the first. This leads H to choose a higher threshold than L.
37 Remember that lim  v (c ) =  —oo is assumed.
c —> 0
38 Remember that when the Ls are not working, they just want to maximize the level of unemployment benefit 
that they receive.
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D Proof of Lemma 4
Let us assume for a contradiction that for a given qt there exists two corresponding values of 
qt+], i.e. q't+] and q”+i with q”t+l > q't+l .As AV is non-increasing in q , we must have:
AV(q?+l)<AV(q;+l).
But, as Ci is strictly convex, C '_1 is strictly increasing. Thus, it follows that:
/ ( * , ) + 0  ■ - / f e ) ) AF « +1))+(1 -  <7, - f ( q t))AV(q;+1))]
z  X q , )  +  (1  -  X q ,  ) ) f o , C'h 1 ( W  -  X q , ) ) m q ' f+1) )  +  0  -  <7, ) c r ! ( / ? ( 1  -  X q t ) ) A F  ( ^ ) ) ] '
By equation (30), this implies:
#M -1 —  ^ /+ 1 »
which is a contradiction.
E Proof of Lemma 5
Implicit differentiation of #,+1(<7,) as determined by equation (30) gives:
dq/+i
dq, i  -  P(\ -  f ( q t ) ) 2 a f ' ( ^ /+i )
q, + i - q ,
=  f \ q ,  )[i -  q t f  (q t >q ,+1) -  0  -  qt K 1 (q t »? ,+i )]+ 0  -  / ( ? ,  ))[*■" (? ,,  ? ,+1) -  ( ? , , qt+])],
q, . W /- / H ) A i - / f e ) ) A F f e +1)
where:
+
i ) = c r 1 .
We now need to substitute qt = 1 into this equation, to use the fact that / ( l )  = 1 and to recall 
that, by assumption, C”(0) > 0. It follows that:
= m > h
where the last inequality follows from the fact that / ( l )  = 1 and f ( q ) < q  for all q e (0,1).
F Proof of Lemma 6
The proof of this lemma is similar to that of Lemma 4. At q+ the first policy, (8), is 
implemented while at q_ the second one, (9), is. Thus, from equation (18):
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lim AV(ql+1(qt))< lim AV(qt+l(qt)) = <j>.
9,<q-9,><7+
Substituting this in the right hand side of equation (30), it immediately follows that, if 
q_ = q+, then:
which is a contradiction (as by definition of q+ and q_, given by (33) and (34), both sides 
should be equal to q ).
Now, we still have the possibility that q+ < q_. However, this would imply that there 
exists multiple equilibria for qt e (q_,q+), which, by Lemma 4, cannot be the case.39 We 
must therefore have q+ > q_.
39 The proof of Lemma 4 uses the fact that AV is non-increasing in q . In fact, here, all we need is 
AV(q) < (j) whenever the first policy is implemented, i.e. for all q e  (<7,1) .
<1, -*<l-
q,<q-
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